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The theoretical and empirical relationships of moral behavior and
moral judgment to personality were reviewed.

Kohlberg's moral develop-

ment theory and Fromm's character development theory provided the integrating organization for the review of nineteen personality variables
examined with six moral judgment instruments.
The Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the
Objective Moral Judgment Scale, and the Measure of Moral Values were
administered to eighty adult students.

Four problems were tested:

(1) psychometric comparisons of the four moral reasoning instruments,
(2) a test of a trait theory of moral character, (3) a test of increased
self-actualization with moral development, and (4) a test of a structural
model of moral reasoning and character.
Comparison of the MJS and SMJS essentially replicated the findings
reported by Gilligan, et al (1971).

Analysis of the OMJS revealed that

its reliability was inadequate for research purposes and failed to parallel
the MJS scores.

The MMV possessed substantial reliability and its scores

paralleled MJS scores.

The MMV scores failed to statistically distin-

guish the moral stage classifications.
The test of a trait theory of moral character involved analyzing the
POI and 16 PF subscale scores for the moral stage groups on the MJS.

This

analysis failed to reveal either a substantial number or consistent set of
xiii

significant findings.

The trait theory was rejected as being inadequate

to explain moral development.
Analyses of POI scores by moral stage groups indicated that selfactualization did not significantly increase with moral development.
MJS stages 3 and 5 individuals possessed the most consistent set of high
POI scores.

Moral development as a concomitant construct of an increase

in the self-actualization construct under examination was rejected.
A factor analysis of the POI and 16 PF scores was further examined
by a discriminant analysis with the MJS moral stages as the a priori
groups.

This analysis revealed two significant dimensions which distin-

guish the moral stage groups: ego strength - superego strength, and
conventionality.

Stage 2 subjects showed the lowest superego strength

scores, the highest ego strength scores and the highest conventionality
scores.

Stage 3 individuals had scores on all three dimensions between

those of the stage 4 and 5 subjects.

Stage 4 individuals had the highest

superego strength scores and the lowest ego strength scores.

Stage 5

subjects possessed a balanced proportion of ego strength and superego
strength with the least amount of conventionality.
This model of character predicted over 86'; of all subjects correctly
into Kohlberg's three primary levels of moral reasoning: preconventional,

conventional, and postconventional.

The prediction rate of the model

remained significantly higher than chance when five stages of moral judgment were used.

This evidence supported the conclusion that there is a

significant characterlogical component in the development of adult moral
reasoning.

xiv

Chapter 1

Consistency of Moral Character:

An Historical Overview

To be told that one is a moral person is generally considered a
strong compliment of one's character.

This use of the term 'moral' as a

compliment indicates its colloquial usage as a trait of personality.
Such a perspective tends to either dichotomize people into moral and
immoral or to place them along a continuum between these two extremes.
The consistency of a moral trait of personality has received extensive
investigation.

This chapter will review the historical development of

both the theoretical conceptualization of mural character and the research undertaken which attempted to verify the various theories.
Psychologists have generally rejected such a conceptualization as
being manifestly too simple.

Hartshorne and May (1928 and 1929) conclud-

ed from behavioral measures of moral character of children that there
was little evidence for the existence of a constant moral factor in
personality.

This conclusion was based on an analysis of the evidence

which indicated that acts in a potentially moral situation were as much
a function of the specific situation as of the individual.

Critics

(Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1960; and Burton, 1976) of Hartshorne and
May's findings re-analyzed and re-interpreted the data.
detected a variety of constant trends in the evidence:
socio-economic, and a personality moral trait.

They have
developmental,

One trend clearly emerges

from the numerous interpretations of Hartshorne and May's evidence:
there is little agreement on the consistency of moral character.
1

mavighwrst_ahd(Taba: plo_grphintion Of Cherptter
Havighurst and Tab& (1949) believed that moral character was a
trait of personality and therefore
and persistence.

was

characterized by organization

instead of studying specific behaviors, they used

primarily reputational measures.

These measures were thought to dis-

close the persistence of moral character.

They further used a number

of projective instruments, questionnaires and case studies to discern
organizational characteristics of moral character.

This combination

of reputational measures (based on observations of moral conduct by
peers), projective measures, case studies, and questionnaires on moral
beliefs and values distinguished a persistent, moral character trait.
This moral character trait consisted of five dimensions: honesty,
responsibility, loyalty, friendliness, and moral courage.

Significant

and substantial correlations were found between these traits across
subjects.
The total organization of the individual's values, attitudes,
impulses, abilities, habits, and ratings was studied.

Five personality

types were empirically delineated from the data as shown in Table 1.
A Clinical Conference Group determined the personality profile which
consisted of factors characterizing each member of that type but no
other.
The self-directed, adaptive, and submissive persons all had 'high'
character reputations while the remaining two types were characterized
by 'low' character reputations.

An individual with a 'good' character

could possess any one of three personality structures.

These subjects

with 'good' character, however, varied in their profiles of the five
moral traits of honesty, responsibility, loyalty, friendliness, and

PS

Area

Social pertonality

Raracter
r-Putation

Table 1
Havighurst and Taba's Character Types

Outgoing
Does not

Timid

Blames society

Self-defensive

Openly hostile

Defiant

Not openly hostile

Complaining

Discontented

Unadjusted

Personality Type

Confident

initiate ac-

for failure

Submissive

Conscientious
Positive,

tion

Adaptive

Orderly
favorable

Stubborn

Self-Directive

Persistent

reactions to

High

high

Average to

than on other

Higher on MC

Very low

Atitious

Introspective

Avoids con-

I High

Higher on F

Higher on H

traits

Low to average

environment

!Higher on H

than on H

and R than

flict

and R than on

and R

on F
continued

•

High

Adaptive

Some uncer-

High

Personality Type
Defiant
Submissive

Self-Directive
Variable
Little un-

Area

Mural beliefs
High uncertainty
certainty

tainty

inconsistent,

training
No conflict

provides no
basis for con-

with family

training

Severe family Family

No conflict

ing

family train-

Permissive

Low

and principle

training

Fano'ly env i rcn Strict family
rent
Some conflict with
family

with family

structive
character
formation
Conflict with
family
Early neglect

Unadjusted

Low to average

Variable family
training

Conflict with family

continued

11

Area

Social adjustment with
age mates

Intellectual
ability

elf-Directive
Very popular

Adaptive
Follower

Submissive

Unpopular

Defiant

Unpopular

Unadjusted

Personality Type

eader

Hostile or indiffer-

Fair
Seldom high

Low to high

ities

Low to high

IQ would imply

Low, or lower than

would imply

than IQ

Low, or lower

Quarrelsome

ent to school activ-

Hostile to
school activ-

Nonentity

erage

Low to av-

social skills ities

Awkward in

Active in

Average to
high

Fair to high

Seldom high

social skills

Awkward in

fairs

school af-

ctive in
school skills

verage to high

er than IQ

igh, or high-

achieve-

would imply

School

sent

continued

Area

Personal

Self-Directive
Self-doubt

adjustment Self-critical
Some anxiety, but
well controlled
Concern about
moral problems

High on all

Adaptive

Self-critical

Self-doubt

Submissive

authority

Hostile to

Defiant

impulses

Aggressive

Unadjusted

Personali_ty Type

adjustment

Feelings of
insecurity
Inadequately
socialized
Moves against
people

Table 19.

Note: F=Friendliness,

impulses

Aggressive

authority

Submissive to

Self-assured

Unaggressive

measures

No signs of
anxiety

people

Moves toward

Average aggressive- Unaggressive
ness
Moves away from
people
Lack of warmth in
human relations
Gains security
through achievement

r and personality
From: Havighurst and Taba Adolescent characte
PI-Honesty, and R=Responsibilitv

7
moral tOur.90.

AdmPtive persons were higher on friendliness than on honesty

and responsibility. Self-directive individuals, conversely, were
higher on honesty and responsibility than on friendliness.
Two types of criticisrs can be made of Havighurst and Taba's study.
One area of criticism concerns the selection of moral traits.
of loyalty and friendliness are open to challenge.

The traits

The trait of loyalty

has been seriously impugned by the commission of inhumane acts by Hitler's
subordinates and dishonest acts by Nixon's subordinates.

Friendliness

was not defined but appeared to include sociality, altruism, and empathy
as defining characteristics.

Sociability is neither a necessary nor

sufficient component of morality. The unethical used car salesman succeeds
on his sociability skills.
The second area of criticism concerns the data itself.
third of the subjects could not be typed by personality.

Almost a

The Population

sample was divided on a mean split into high moral versus low moral croups.
The personality types were clinically rather than statistically derived
and maximized traits which were exclusive to a type.

This exclusivity

principle may have hidden trait similarities within the two character
groups which were more important than the exclusive traits.
lations of moral traits were based on reputational measures.

The correA potential

halo effect is an inherent liability of such a reputational rating scale
and may be the basis of spurious correlations.
Although Havighurst and Taba divided their subjects into dichotomous
'high' versus 'low' character types, they further noted both distinctive
moral trait profiles within each extreme and different levels of variability, relativity, and ambiguity in moral beliefs and principles within
the polar types, a finding which further substantiates the complexity of

moral character.
Wright (1971), after reviewing Hartshorne and May's research.
Havighurst and Tabes research and additional research on five apes
of moral behavior, concluded that individual differences in one aspect
of morality were only weakly and uncertainly associated with individual
differences in other aspects.

If valid,there is great difficulty in

treating morality as a network of moral traits.

Wright suggests that

each trait is a complex dimension which is influenced by many different
kinds of learning and experience.

Wright further concluded that

"character is defined not so much through an inventory of actions performed. as by a description of the principles that give coherence and
meanino to an individual's behavior, and of the relatively enduring
dispositions and motivations that underly it " (p. 203).

This conception

of character (and thus morality) clearly denotes its two components:
moral reasoning and moral behavior.
Peck and Havighurst: The Structure of Character
The research reported in The Psycholgsy_of Character Development
by Peck and Havighurst (1960) was a follow-up study begun in 1948 of the
subjects in Havighurst and Taba's 1943 sample.

They selected thirty-four

of the original subjects who were administered additional and repeated
measures on a wide range of psychological components.

The types of

measures were essentially the same as in the previous research: selfreport projective and objective measures, reputational measures, and
clinical interviews.
Peck proposed the theoretical typology upon which to design their
research and to interpret the findings.

He drew this typology from a

synthesis of Freud's oral, anal, and genital developmental stages, Fromm's
(1947) receptive, exploitative, hoarding, marketing, and productive

9
character stages. and Reisman's (1960) anomy. tradition-directed conformity. other-directed conformity. and autnnomy types.
retical contribution of Peck

WS

A significant theo-

his introduction of a developmental theory

to accompany and explain character.

This schema is presented in Table 2.

This set of character types was intended to (1) be defined and labeled in terms of the control system the individual uses to adapt
his search for satisfaction to the requirements of the social world.
(2) include all the possible modes of adaptation. (3) be defined in
terms of motivation (so long as it achieves behavioral expression).
(4) represent both operational patterns of behavior, and the stage
of psychosocial development to which each pattern presumably is most
appropriate. (p. 4)
Peck's motivational theory of character expressed the theories of
Freud (unconscious motivational dynamics) and Fromm's conative structures.
Peck and Havighurst's research represents the first American study to be
based on data other than behavior.

Their emphasis was on the individual's

reasons for acting either morally or not morally.

Only reasoning associated

with actual behavior was considered; reasoning about hypothetical moral
behavior was not included.

This study is, therefore, an intermediate type

of analysis between the purely behavioral analysis of Hartshorne and May
(1928 and 1929) and Kohlberg's (1958) strictly cognative analysis.
The over seventy measures of personality collected were analyzed as
comprising six personality factors (see Tables 3 and 4).
tors were then applied in two different analyses.

These six fac-

In the first analysis,

the eight observed character types were rank ordered by the relative proportion of Rational -Altruistic character structure the subject possessed.
This ranking from lowest to highest percentage of Rational -Altruistic
reasoning was called 'Maturity of Character.'

The six personality factors

10
Table 2

Peck's Developmental

Character Type
Amoral

cnemia of Character

Developmental Period
Infancy

Expedient

Early Childhood

Conforming

Later Childhood

Irrational-Conscientious

Later Childhood

Rational-Altruistic

Adolescence it, Adulthood

11
Table 1
Factorial Pattern of the Personality Characteristics:
Peck and Havighurst 1
After Second
Rotation

Before Potation
Trait

I

II

III

Personality*
Vector

IV

I"

11'

-.lb

.51

.17

.72

2

Ill'

1 2 34 56

2. Functional IQ

t
.77 .38 .25

3. Ot,servation

.81

.14

.10

.58

.05

.63

2

4. Insight

.83 .33 .34

.03

.48

.11

.81

2

5. Fmpathy

.42 .10

.28

.19

.16 -.01 .49

6. Locus of Concern .86 .13 -.08

.32

.73 -.09 .48

-.37

.19 -.47 .02

.33 -.21

.17 -.22 .55

.26

4
2

7a. Outward Acceptance of Father's
code

.28 -.41 -.10

-6

7b. Positive Feeling
toward Father

.51 -.09

4

7c. Negative Feeling toward
Father

.28

.06

.35 .22 -.18

.00

.32

.47

-.27 -.66 -.23

.81

.14 -.20

.71

-.11

8a. Outward Acceptance of Mother's Code

1

8b. Positive Feeling toward
Mother

.16

.06

.42 -.29

.53

2
continued

1Z
After Second
before Notation

Rotation

-Tir-

Trait

8c. Negative Feeling -.51.63

.08

Personality*

.05

Vector
III

TrTTM
6

-.31 .73 -.15

toward Mother
9a1. Outward Feeling toward
Same-Sex
Peers

.73 .17

.16

-.18

.49 -.02 .59

2

9a2. Inner Feeling toward
Same-Sex
Peers

.36 -.19 .33

-.12

.03 -.28 .44

4

9b1. Outward
Feeling
toward
OppositeSex Peers

-.20 .16

.57 -.06 -.22

.36

.55

.38 -.35 -.21

.54

.34 -.44 .01

.84

.04

.87

-.03 .30

.90 .14 -.06 .11

.74

-.09 .51

1

9b2. Inner Feeling toward
OppositeSex Peers

-6

11. Range of
Moral Horizon

.19 -.31

1

12. Emotional
Maturity

2
continued

I)
After Second
Before Rntatinn

Rotation

Vector

Tr

xl 111---1V

Trait

Personality*

13. Identity of
Impulse and
Behavior

.26 -.17 .68

.34

-.26 -.23 .65

4

14. HeteronomyAutonomy

86

.28

.35

.07

.49

.05 .84

2

.90

.14

.13

.21

.63 -.10 .66

2

.92

.25

.11

.08

.69

.01 .67

2

.92

.05 -.06

.04

.73 -.18 .51

2

.65

.15

-.66

-.35

.93 -.02 -.11

-.32

.19

-.33

.30

.00

.26 -.43

-.52

.62

.04

.16

-.30

.73 -.19

19. Self-Perception .89

.21

.10

.08

.66 -.02 .65

-.23

.91 -.02 .18

1

-.17

.70 -.31 -.07

1

15a. Assignment
of Responsibility
15b. Rationality
16a. Inner Consistency
16b. Conformity

1

17. Guilts about
Outer Behavior

-4

18. Guilts about
Inner Behavior

6
2

27. Emotional
Stability

.80

.19 -.43

28a. Absence of
Overt Hostility .57 -.17 -.49

continued

14
After Second

Personality*

Rotation

Vector

Before Rotation
Trait

T

iv

Ttr-- i

-1-11 6

280. Absence of
Covert Hostility

.64

-.57 -.18 .24

.49 -.71

.16

.71

-.02

5

30. Superego
Strength

.40

.62 -.46 -.12

.50

3

*Pl: Moral Stability, P2: Ego Strength, P3: Supereoo Strength.
P4: Spontaneity, P5: Friendliness, P6: Hostility-Guilt Cqfplex.
tWith an N of 34 children, loadings of .20 or less considered to be
not significantly different from zero.

Loadings above .40 are the only

ones of significance in the table.
1 Based on Table 20, p. 244 from Peck and Havighurst (1960).
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Table 4

Peck and Havighurst's Personality Factors in Character

Description

Label
Moral Stability

Tendency to follow the established moral code.
willingly and with genuine satisfaction.

Ego Strength

A complex of capacities to react to event with
accurate perception, appropriate emotions, and
. all proceeding
insightful, rational judgment.
from a well -integrated personality system.

Superego Strength

The degree to which behavior is directed by or
in accord with, a set of internalized moral
principles--a conscience.

Spontaneity

Tendency to express feelings and wishes directly in action.

Friendliness

A generalized attitude of warm liking for other
people.

Hostility-Guilt Complex

A complex of intense feelings of hostility,
linked with strong feelings of guilt about inner
impulses.
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were correlated with Maturity of Character (see Table S).
This preliminary analysis indicated that consistency in overt morality
as measured by the Moral Stability factor was more dependably produced as
one moved up the Maturity of Character scale from Expedient. to Conforming.
to Rational -Altruistic character structure

This finding was somewhat

surprising since it was hypothesized that the Conforming and Irrational Conscientious types would be as consistent as the Rational-Altruistic type.
Another unexpected finding concerned the Spontaneity factor.

One view

of human nature assumes that spontaneous expression of human nature unleashes man's innately evil self.

The findings not only revealed that

spontaneity was not inversely related to morality but also that the actual
relationship was curvilinear.

Both those at the low end of the Maturity

of Character scale and those at the high end showed a high decree of sponSubjects with an intermediate maturity of character (Conforming

taneity.

and Irrational -Conscientious) had low spontaneity scores.
The Hostility-Guilt correlation was less significant than the other
measures.

Further analysis revealed that this factor clearly differentiated

Amoral (high hostility-guilt) type subjects from Rational -Altruistic (low
hostility-guilt) subjects but was inconsistent within the other character
types.

Peck and Havighurst concluded from this series of analyses that

mature character requires rational judgement, emotional maturity, and
psychological integration.
In the second analysis in which the personality factors were used,
the factor scores were visually charted by character type using pre -selected
ranges of scores.

I rearranged their Table 6 for clearer interpretation

by transforming the scores into a graph (see Figure 1).

This analysis was

used to generate the personality profiles for each character type.
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Table S
Correlations of Personality. Character. and Moral Reputation

Personality
Vector

Maturity of
Character

Adult
Reputation

Peer
Reputation
^

Moral Stability

.84

.74

.63

Ego Strength

.77

.55

.69

Superego Strength

.68

.63

.53

Spontaneity

.24

.05

.16

Friendliness

.57

.13

.04

-.33

-.25

-.07

Hostility - Guilt

Levels of significance: .44 = .01; .54 = .001; .33 - .05.
From Peck & Havighurst, 1960, p. 87, Table 5.
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Profiles on The Personality Fact
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Analysis of these character-type Wing profiles revealed eight distinct
patterns of profiles.

The resulting analysis of character and personality,

therefore, included the eight observed character types.

Each type will be

briefly described.
The Amoral type is characterized by low ego strength; poor control
over impulses; hostile. immature emotionality; inappropriate emotional
lability; active, generalized hostility; weak superego strength. lacking
any integrated system of internalized moral principles; blind impulsiveness; poorly socialized; irrational; suffering from punitive but ineffectual
guilt feelings; sharp inner conflict; and lacking positive, healthy selfregard.
The Expedient type indicates weak ego strength with below-average
accuracy and integration of ego perceptions and controls; high egocentricity;
low autonomy; ineffectual superego; and low spontaneity.
The CEA (posesses approximately equal proportions of Contorming, Expedient,
and Amoral reasoning) type is very similar to the Amoral character, except
with less hostility and guilt, and CEA's are more passive.
The Conforming character type has weak-to-moderate ego integration and
moderate-to-strong superego.

This type is passive and conforming to outer

pressures (outer directed) with strong, chronic guilt and low spontaneity.
The Irrational -Conscientious character shares a weak-to-moderate ego
strength with the Confolming character.

This type differs in possessing

a compulsive superego; intolerance; appreciable generalized hostility; low
spontaneity; low self-confidence, and a lack of positive concern for others
(low empathy).
The two subjects with the IAE character (possess approximately equal
proportions of Irrational -Conscientious. Amoral, and Expedient reasoning)
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show high inner conflict resulting from an active, controlling superego but high compulsiveness; covertly hostile with a punitive guilt, weak
ego strength, and low self-regard.
The seventh group consisted of individuals who had high proportions
of both Rational -Altruistic and Amoral type responses (high secondary R).
These subjects are the only ones who received average or better scores
on Rational -Altruism.

They have, however, as high or higher scores on

another of the remaining type dimensions.

This group is characterized by

high ego strength which included a high degree of rationality, a realityadapted ego, and firm ego integration.

(hey also show high autonomy,

high spontaneity, good regard for people, and high altruism.
The Rational -Altruistic type is very similar to the high secondary
R group.

Both have a well -integrated ego free from serious conflict, few

guilt feelings, emotional maturity, high rationality, high spontaneity,
and high self-regard.

ihe difference between the two groups is consistently

higher scores on all ct these personality factors by the Rational -Altruistic type.
Further analysis of the longitudinal data revealed developmental
trends in character and personality relationships.

There were increasing

ego strength scores from Amoral to Rational -Altruistic types.

These

scores included increasing rationality, emotional maturity, and integrated
behavior.
Superego strength also showed a linear progression in scores from
Amoral to Rational -Altruistic.

Peck and Havighurst distinguished four

stages ot conscience in this sequence.

The Amoral character possesses a

repressive, punitive, and internally inconsistent superego.

The second

stage of conscience is willing compliance to expected rule conformity as
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defined by society.

This type of superego is other-directed and passive

In making moral decisions.
of conscience.

The Conforming character possesses this stage

This type is very similar to the 'conventional' type of

authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950).

The irrational-Conscien-

tious character has instead a deeply internalized, rule-rigid superego.
These rules are neither questioned nor adapted to the reality of the moral
situation.

Moral reasoning and behavior, therefore, is stereotyped and

self-righteously dogmatic.

This type of conscience was labelled the

tyrannical neurotic superego first described by Freud.
mentally mature type of superego strength
Altruistic character.

Their superego

The most develop-

is exemplified by the Rational-

is integrated into their ego.

Their firmly internalized moral principles are, therefore, open
to questioning in order to achieve the moral purpose inherent in the moral principle as appropriate to the reality of the moral situation.

As a result,

the superego strength score above is lower for the Rational -Altru
istic
type than for the Irrational -Conscientious type.
Although not one of the six personality factors, regard for others
and self, labelled 'love' by Peck and Havighurst, was the final
developmental trend.

Both the Amoral and Expedient character types are incapable

of loving and feeling loved.

Although the Irrational -Conscientious type

can act loving, they do not feel loving or loved.

The Conforming type

feels more loved and more loving but is limited to consideraten
ess and
affection rather than deep love.

The Rational-Altruistic person is deeply,

spontaneously loving, gives love freely, and feels lovable.
After the completion of the analysis, Peck and Havighurst
interpreted
their findings within the theoretical models of Freud and
Erikson (1950).
The data for the Amoral character were interpreted
as indicating that this
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type is:
heavily fixated at the early 'oral' stage of psychosocial development.
They demonstrate a profound lack of what Erikson has called 'basic
trust' (Erikson. 1950). and also lack the perceptual and judgmental
ego powers which are necessary to achieve what both Erikson and Piaget
have referred to as 'psychological autonomy (Peck and Havighurst.
1960: p. 167).
The Lxpedient character is psychogenetically described as narcissistic and their orientation not being much past the late oral stage.
They show more of Erikson's initiative but are compelled by drives and
frustrated by lack of satisfaction of these drives.
Both the Conforming and Irrational -Conscientious characters

are seen

as having mastered the developmental tasks of the 'anal' stage with the
exception of an underdeveloped autonomy.

The difference between the two

types is a matter of degree.
The Rational-Altruistic type shows "the characters of Freud's 'genital'
type

and of Erikson's person who has firm identity, good capacity for

human intimacy, and a creative, generative orientation.
fit Fromm's productive orientation

They likewise

and Reisman's 'autonomous character'"

(p. 170).
Despite Peck and Havighurs:.'s inclusion of Erikson's stages of development, their conclusions about the nature of development are basically
Freudian.

They concluded that an individual's characteristic personality

and character pattern were "largely laid down by age ten and changed little
thereafter" (p. 157).

Changes in development after age ten consisted of

becoming more stable in the basic character pattern and of changing the
surface details of behavior.

This view of development was to be flatly
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rejected by Kohlberg (1958. 1969).
Peck and Havighurst (1960) also reported an 'obverse
conducted by Ruth Cooper.

factor analysis

This analysis entailed a subject-by-subject

correlation matrix which generated ten bipolar personality factors.

These

ten factors were then compared for the subjects within the character groups
previously determined.

This procedure indicated both substantial profile

agreement between subjects within character types and substantial agreement with the composite, character type descriptions generated by the
original six factors.

The obverse factor analysis tended to maximize

differences within groups.

This revealed that several kinds of personality

and behavior patterns could be evaluated morally as a particular character
type.
This finding supported the hypothesis that character is a oersistent
pattern of underlying, dynamic motives.

Each character type consists of

a core Gestalt or organization of motives.

Various atomistic personality

traits can cluster in varying configurations around the character core.
This hypothesis was further supported by correlating the personality variables singly with the character types.

The number of significant corre-

lations which resulted were fewer than expected by chance.

Only when the

core profiles were compared with the six factors did distinctive relationsnips appear.

Fromm (1947) had predicted this type of relationship between

personality organization and character.

Kohlberg (1969) later expressed

similar ideas.
The research of Peck and Havighurst was based on detailed, in-depth
data gathering and analysis.

Despite the exacting and advanced analytic

procedures used, crucial criticisms must be made.

The first and most

serious criticism focuses on their data analysis.

Thirty-plus personality
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variables were factor analyzed based on thirty-four Subjects.

This ratio

between number of variables and number of subjects is not substantially
reliable for this type of analysis.

Partially recognizing this liability.

Peck and Havighurst set .40 as the minimum loading for inclusion of a
defining variable in a vector.

Still, the possibility of spurious factors

remains significant.
A second criticism concerns their substitution of 'vectors' for
actual factors.

The factor analysis produced three factors.

From this

three-factor system, six vectors were constructed based on "six clusters
of variables which were statistically distinct from one another, and
which represented psychologically separate and meaningful dimensions that
it was desirable to retain" (p. 243).
this procedure.

There are NO consequences from

First, some personality traits load above .40 on more

than one vector.

The vectors, therefore, are not statistically independent.

Secondly, two vectors are defined by only one trait.

The practice of

isolating one trait as a vector which is not a distinguishable facLor is
questionable.

This procedure is even more questionable considering the

limited number of cases upon which these vectors are based.
The vector scores were then used to define character types and to
differentiate between types.

Reference to Figure I reveals that these

type definitions and differentiations are based on groups ranging in size
from three to eight.

At no point are the vector scores statistically

checked for significant differences between groups.
type profiles into serious
fications.

This brings the

question as statistically reliable classi-

Since actual scores were not provided, it is not possible to

make this crucial test.

There may be no statistical difference between

Amoral and Rational -Altruistic types or any comparison of types.

The

character profiles have, therefore, not been statistically substantiated.
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In spite of the difficulties inherent in Pock and Navighurst's study,
it remained one of the most in-depth and significant studies of moral
development until the research of Kohlberg.

Although Peck and Navighurst

only briefly mentioned the work of Viaget. Piaget's influence on subsequent research in morality was to be important.

Piaget's influence com-

pleted the transition from moral research based on behavior to research
based on moral reasoning.

Chapter II
The Structure of Moral Thousht and Its Relation to Personality
Piaget:

The Structure of Childhood Moral Reasoning

Jean Piaget (1932) not only systematically pioneered the Psychological study of moral reasoning but also constructed a developmental theory of moral judgment.

As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget

studied the way the child's acquisition of knowledge of the world and
the child's construction of a representational schema of his knowledge
developed.

Behavior, and moral behavior as a necessary subset of

behavior, was ccnceived as a function of cognitive structures (schema)
possessed and used by the individual.

These schema are relatively

lasting structures of adaptation to the environment which develop towards
an increasingly complete and stable equilibrium with the environment.
Each succeeding schema represents a new Gestalt which supersedes and
incorporates through transformations the preceeding schema.
Planet outlined two developmental moral schemas which he labeled
'moral realism' and 'the morality of reciprocity.'

Children whose

characteristic moral reasoning was classified as moral realism

operated

with a schema that assumed moral rules were external and rooted in authority.
Their application of moral judgments tended to be literal, socially insensitive, and based on material damage rather than on intentions.

The

basic elements of the morality of reciprocity are an awareness of another's
point of view, the realization that rules are created out of human relationships and are therefore alterable, and the development of an incipient
moral autonomy.
26
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Although these schemes were presented as distinct stages, Piaget
emphasized that there

was 41104ri

a certain mixture of the two.

A tran-

sitional phase was discerned by Piaget between the moral realism stage and
the morality of reciprocity.

Peters (1971) considered this transitional

phase an intermediate stage which he labeled 'transcendental,'

During

this stage the individual internalizes and neneralizes the rules, and
recognizes that he is obeying an imposed rule.

An implicit reference to

a fourth, more developed stage of moral development in Piaget's theory
was examined by Kay (1969).

This fourth hypothesized stage goes beyond

normative autonomy to the types of autonomy exemplified by Christ and
Socrates.
Piaget considered moral reasoning as an intrinsic aspect of general
intellectual development.

As such, this conceptualization was one of the

first to avoid the moral character controversy.

By incorporating and in-

tegrating what had previously been viewed as a distinct 'moral' trait into
an overarching perspective, many of
theories were inaoplicable.

the criticisms levelled against trait

A person neither possesses nor fails to possess

the trait of moralness, instead, everyone develops through a sequence of
moral schemas.

One no longer has 'high' or 'low

character, or 'good' or

'bad' character, or is on a continuum between these bipolar terms.
individual is moral but his moral perspective is different.

Each

All individ-

uals, however, can be classified into a certain number of specific moral
schemas.

Piagees theory represents a radical shift in psychological

thinking about morality and an individual's

possession of morality.

With this divergent formulation of morality, it is no longer a
search for moral traits or profilesthat occupies the psychologist.

The

question now becomes one of determining which personality traits and/or
profiles, if any, are related to the various

stages of moral judgment.

Piaget (1932) initially gave very little attention to this relationship.
This lack of attention may be due

to two reasons.

Although certain person-

ality-like traits can be deduced from Plaget's stages, these are dispositions which change with the child's development from one stage to the
next stage.

The fact that he was studying children between the ages of

fotir and twelve would seriously qualify any personality conclusions.
In later work, Piaget (1967) proposed that emotions develop through
a process analogous to that of intellectual development (and thus moral
development).

He speculated that emotions in the small child were impul-

sive and follow each other singly.

Through the course of development,

these various emotions become organized in such a way that emotions
compensate each other in a kind of equilibrium.

This compensation is

a function of simultaneously processing several perspectives ot the
environment and one's role in it, not only one's immediate feelings but
also one's awareness of the other's intentions and an ability to place
one self into the other's emotional perspective in evaluating possible
courses of action (included in this equilibrium).

This coordination of

emotional structures, which becomes a relatively persistent aspect of an
individual's personality, "emerge as regulations whose final form of
equilibrium is none other than the will" (Piaget, 1967 and Wright, 1971).
Kohlberg: The Structure of Life-Long Moral Reasoninl
Piaaet's developmental theory of moral judgment was modified and
elaborated by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1963, 1969, 1973).

He constructed

his stages and theory of development on a review of past theories and
upon empirical evidence.

His review of theories current during his re-

search included: 1. the philosophical position of Hume, Smith, Mill, and
Stephen; 2. the psychoanalytic theory of Freud (and Nietzsche's similar
philosophical thesis); 3. Durkheim's respect for society treatise; 4. Mead's
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socially organized role-taking postulation: and S. the formal

cognitive

theories of Baldwin and Piaget.
Kohlberg's theory has been a dynamic one.
claimed that there were SiX stages.
(1971) in Table

6.

he (1468) originally

These stages are

defined by Kohlberg

This schema was expanded by dividing stage 5 into

a stage 5A and 58 (Kohlberg. 1973).

Stage 5A consisted of a social contract,

utilitarian law making perspective, while stage 56 reco9nized a higher
law of inalienable rights and a scrupulous duty to such rights (a conscience orientation).
In this same article, Kohlberg hypothesized a seventh stage.

Con-

templative experience of a nonegoistic and nondualistic nature characterized this seventh stage.

The self is seen from the persnective of the

cosmic and there is a sense of being a

part of the cosmos.

A cosmic

identification develops as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage 6)
perspective.

An individual's value of life is from the standooint of

identifying himself with the cosmic perspective.

Kohlberg makes no claims

for having yet recognized this stage in structural analyzes of protocols.
It exists as a philosophical and theological concept.
Recently Kohlberg has been reluctant to score stage 6, Kohlberg's
1974 Moral Judgment Scale scoring manual proscribed scoring protocols for
stage 6.

This recent edition of the scoring manual provided neither prin-

ciples nor examples for scoring stage 6 responses.
Kohlberg, like Planet, is not studying moral character.

He has re-

placed this dichotomous trait with a develoomental stage construct.

Never-

theless, Kohlberg (1958) has speculated about the relationship of moral
reasoning to personality.
On one level of analysis, Kohlberg (1958) viewed the moral reasoning

Table 6

Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages

1.

Preconventiondl level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of

good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of
either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment.
reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those
who enunciate the rules and labels.

The level is divided into the

following two stages:
Stage 1:

The punishment and obedience orientation.

The physical

consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the
human meaning or value of these consequences.

Avoidance of punishment

and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not
in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment
and authority (the latter being stage 4.)
Stage 2:

The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action con-

sists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
of the market place.

Human relations are viewed in terms like those

Elements of fairness, physical pragmatic way.

Re-

ciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,"
not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family.
group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right , regardless
of immediate and obvious consequences.

The attitude is not only one of
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conformity to oeruonal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it. of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and
of identifying with the persons or group involved in it.

At this level,

there are the following two stages:
Stage 3:
Orientation.

The ,interpersonal_ copcprdance

2Arl:

9pod_
.
"
.
.
Or

Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is

approved by them.

There is much conformity tostereotn ical images of

what is majority or "natural" behavior.

Behavior is frequently judged

by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time.
One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4:

The "law and order" orientation.

There is orientation

toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order.
y,
Right behavior consist of doing one's duty, showing respect for authorit
and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.
III.

Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and

principles which have validity and application apart from the authority
of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the
individual's own identification with these groups.

This level again has

two stages:
Stage 5:

The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with

utilitarian overtones.

Right action tends to be defined in terms of gen-

eral individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined
and agreed upon by the whole society

There is a clear awareness of the

relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.

Aside from what is consti-

tutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal
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'values and 'opinions.- The result is an emphasis upon the 'legal
point of view." but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing
law in terms of rationa

considerations of social utility (rather than

freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order").

Outside the legal

realm, fret agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation.
This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.
Stage 6:

The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is de-

fined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.

These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule,

the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the
Ten Commandments.

At heart, these are universal principles of justice,

of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual persons.

From:

L. Kohlberg, The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of

moral judgment. The Journal of Philosophy. 1973, 70, pp. 631-632.
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stages as Personality types.

Not hypothesized that 'the general elements

of the types my hang together to forr a distinct and unitary %Mole, or a
concrete 'personality type" (p. 229).

While explaining and describing

the six stages. Kohlberg (1958) specifically noted a variety of oersonality traits that might be related to the particular stages: autonomy,
conformity, need for social approval, flexibility, authoritarianism,
sympathy, guilt, anxiety, and ego strength.
In considering autonory. Kohlbern distinouished between life-style
autonomy and moral autonomy as necessary for clearly delineating the relationship with moral reasoning.

The autonomy of developing and main-

taining personal tastes, goals, and opinion in the face of pressure to
conform to other's personal preferences was not expected to show a consistent relationship to moral reasoning.

The stage 2 individual should be

autonomous in the sense of being resistant to social oressure (i.e., lifestyle autonomy).

The stage 6 individual is also resistant to social pres-

sure to change,,qhich violates his moral reasoning (i.e., moral autonomy).
Conformity can be defined as subordinating one's own opinions to
those of others (social pressure).

Kohlberg (1958) stated that stage 3

individuals were oriented towards conformity, Particularly as associated
with situational social pressure.

The stage 4 person does not conform as

much to situational social pressure as to the social pressure exerted by
authority.
The need for social approval was another trait discussed by Kohlberg
(1958).

The need for social approval is felt most strongly by stage 3

persons for whom it is their primary orientation.

Stage 4 individuals

have a more specific need than stage 3 individuals, a need for approval
from those in authority.

The stage 5 person has yet another type of

approval need: recognition of achievement and reputation by peers.
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Kohlberg (1958) further noted certain trait stnilarities between
stage 2 and S individuals.

Those classified into these stages were mt.

Pected to share a high level of flexibility in instrumental, utilitarian
affairs.

Both stages also shared a motivational orientation toward

enhancement of the purposes of the self.

Flexibility wdS seen as an

asset in instrumental enhancement.
Although Kohlberg (1958) criticized the typology of the Authoritarian personality, he did explain the relationship between it and stage
4 moral judgment.

He claimed that staoe 4 individuals would possess a

few characteristics of the "Authoritarian Personality." although he failed
to specify which ones.

There is no necessary relationship, however,

between the "Authoritarian Personality" characteristics of prejudice and
anti-democratic attitudes and stage 4 reasoning.
A strictly emotive view of moral judgment was inadequate from
Kohlberg's (1958) view, but he did consider moral judgment's likely
relationship to several emotive traits.
that morality was based on sympathy.

Kohlberg cited Hume's theory

The stage 3 individual would indeed

be motivated by sympathy, according to Kohlberg (1958).

Duty to the

value and dignity of human life rather than sympathy would be the motivation of stage 6 individuals.

These same individuals, however, may demon-

strate through their behavior a high level of sympathy.
Guilt and anxiety, as emotive traits, bear an uncertain relation to
morality (Kohlberg, 1958).

The unclear relationship results from the

multin10 definitions of guilt and anxiety.

If the guilt or anxiety is

felt only as an external avoidance force then Kohlberg (1958) does not
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consider this related to being moral.
as moral guilt.

Only self reproach would qualify

Kohlberg (1958) did not specify how moral guilt would

vary between stages.
Kohlberg (1958. 1963) has placed strong emphasis on ego strength
as an important coaponent of moral reasoning.

He has not, however,

specified the relationship between ego strength and moral stages.

It

is clear that ego stren9th is necessary for all six stages but it is
unclear whether a significant difference between stages should be expected.

A stage I child requires ego strength, for example, to behave in

order to avoid punishment and to receive rewards.
In a major theoretical exposition, Kohlberg (1969) reviewed,
criticized, and modified major developmental theories of personality,
socialization, and moral judgment.

The theorists reviewed included

Freud, Gesell, Erikson, and Piaget.

Kohlberg showed that all of these

theorists viewed personaltiy development as changes in the child's world
views and coping mechanisms rather than as maturation of fixed character
traits.
Personality traits, like character traits, do not change through a
process of development.

Kohlberg (1969), following the tradition of the

other developmental theorists, contended that polar personality traits
are rarely either stable or aae-developmental.

Most longitudinally stable

traits are non-cognitive ones such as temperment traits like introversionextroversion and activity-passitivity.

Polar personality traits are those

traits which are defined by a quantitative ordering of individuals on a
single dimension such as conformity, aggression, affiliation, anxiety, need
achievement, condescension, etc.

Most developmental theories assume that

such traits are differentiated balancings of conflicting forces and that
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these balancings differ at different forint, in the 1ife cycle as new
developmental tasks are focused upon.

Such traits would not, therefore,

have a formal-structural base parallel to the developnental, structural
basis of Kohlberq's moral judgment theory.
Only those personality traits which have a structural. developmental basis parallel to that of cognitive and moral developrent should
be significantly related to moral judgment.

Kohlberg (1969) proposed

two personality domains which possessed a structural basis: affective
and interpersonal schemata.

These affective schemata appear analogous

to Piaget's (1967) emotional structures.

Types of feeling, according

to Kohlberg, develop a set of general structural properties which represent successive forms of psychological equilibrium.

These structural

properties are the same as those of cognitive and moral schemata.

The

development of affects is largely mediated by change in cognitive
patterns.

Each more mature emotion involves a cognitive differentiation

not made at the next less mature affect.

Kohlberg (1969) stated that

moral judgment stages should be described in both cognitive structural
terms and affective structural terms like guilt and empathy.

He did not

define and discuss guilt and its specific position in the descriptions of
each stage.
Motivational personality traits such as dependency, aggression,
affiliation, anxiety, need-achievement, and conscience strength are neither
stable nor developmental according to Kohlberg.

The interpersonal schema

was not defined and was only discussed in connection with how it shared
the same elementary structural features as moral judgment.
Kohlberg (1973; and Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) has compared his
structural moral judgment stages to only one personality theory: Erikson's
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functional. ego-development theory.

In an attempt to explain apparent

retrogression of sore college-aged individuals in moral judgment. Kohlberg
and Kramer (1969) interpreted this evidence in term of Erikson's concepts
of moratorium, identity crisis, and identity achievement through crisis
resolution.

Although retrogressed subjects indicated the capacity for

and awareness of principled thought, they lacked the committment to this
stage of moral reasoning.

Committment was thought to

of the resolution of the identity crisis.

often be a part

Kohlberg (1973) stated that

the available evidence indicated that no individuals who had not undergone
an identity crisis had developed to a stage of principled reasoning.
Simultaneously, not all subjects who had undergone and resolved an identity
crisis had matured to a principled stage of morality.

Identity questioning,

apparently, must be combined with explicit cognitive-moral stimulation
and reflection.
The preceding analysis led Kohlberg (1973) to revise his analysis
of moral judgment and ego-development.

He concluded that Eriksonian ego

stage progression was insufficient to produce principled morality.

It

was necessary to integrate Piaget's cognitive-structural accounts of
experience with the personal exPerience of choice central to Erikson's
theory for an adequate theory.

"All those moving to principled morality

would be expected to go through this identity progression.

The movement

from conventional to principled morality is one which must be considered
as a matter of personal choice and as a choice of self in a sense not
true of earlier moral stages," (Kohlberg, 1973).

Kohlberg (1973) further

proceeded to give a detailed comparison of his theory and Erikson's.
is reproduced in Tables 7 and 8.

This
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Table 7
Comparison of Erikson's Ego Stages and Kohlberg's Morel Stages

Ego Stages

Moral Stages

Ascribed identity accepted

Conventional Morality 3 & 4

Identity crisis or Moratorium

Traditional or retrogressed
relativism

Identity Achievement

2

5A

Principled morality

5B & 6

3!
Table a

Erikson Functional and Piaget-Kohlberg Structural Stages
•

Erikson

Piaget
Nature of Stages
Stages are different

Stages are choices Or uses of new

structures for a single

functions by an eoo--earlier

function, e.g.. moral

functions or choices remain on

judgment, logical reason-

background to the new stage.

ing.

perience leading to development

Accordingly, lat-

Ex-

ter stages replace earli-

is personal experience, especially

er stages.

experiences and choice of personal

Experience

conflict.

leading to development is cognitive experience, especially
experiences of cognitive conflict and match

Focus of Stages
The developmental change

The development change involved

is primarily a changed per-

is primarily a self-chosen, self-

ception in the physical,

perception identification with

social, and moral world.

goals.

The outcome of movement is

ment is relatively permanent and

perceptual change.

The

The outcome of a move-

results in a choice or a commitment.

ability of the new stage is
not the result of choice.

continued
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later stages are more COgnitively

later stages are more adequate

adequate than earlier stages:

than earlier stages, not in cog-

(1) including the earlier stage

nitive inclusiveness, but in

pattern. (2) resolving the same

virtue or ego strength, i.e.,

problems better. and (3) in being

in their ability to order per-

more universally applicable or

sonal experience in a form

justifiable, i.e.. in the univer-

that is stable. positive, and

sality and inclusiveness of

purposive.

their ordering of experience.

stage and adequacy of stage use

Attainment of a

are distinct, however.

From: Kohlberg, 1973, p. 200, Table 2.
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10100r2 one FE9nm: TI p Interface of Character Structqres and.oloral
Thought Structures
One of the purposes of the present review is to demonstrate the
Interfaces between Kohlberg's
character types.

moral judgment stages and Fromm's (1947)

The application of Fromm's theory in moral theorizing

has already been noted in its use by Peck and Havighurst.

There are sig-

nificant differences between the theoretical assunntions and characteristics
of Kohlberg's and Peck and Havighurst's theories

as well as

differences between their types of data and analyses.

important

It is partially for

these reasons that an effort will be made to discover the parallel between Kohlberg and From, and to then empirically demonstrate these parallels.
Another theory analyzing and constructing a developmental typology
of moral judgment current during Kohlberg's initial work was Fromm's (1947)
character theory used in Peck and Havighurst's research.

Kohlberg (1959)

included Fromm's name once in his dissertation (p. 285) without providing
bibliographic reference.

Kohlberg's succeeding publications have con-

sidered Fromm's theory no more than did his dissertation.

This review

will attempt to broaden Kohlberg's initial and subsequent analytic review.
Fromm provides the most complete theory of personality and character.
His theory, therefore, is believed to present the best framework in which
both to organize the available evidence and interpretations

and to explore

the relationships between Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages and personality
structure.
Since Fromm's work foreshadowed later theoretical developments in
American existential and humanistic psychology by May and Shostrom, the
present analysis will also point to their parallels with Kohlberg.
The relation between one's morality and his personality was the focal
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thesis of Erich Fr's (1947) Han qr Himself: An Inquiry Into The
Psychology of Ethics.

Fromm viewed personality and noralness as being

inherently related. "The subJect matter of ethics is character ....
problems of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality"
(pp. 42 and v).
Fromm (1947) conceptualized personality as the totality of inherited psychic Qualities (temperament) and acquired qualities (character).
Temperament represented the person's constitutional mode of reaction.
The stimulus to which the person emitted a reaction through a particular
mode (e.g. choleric vs sanguine) was dePendent on his locus of relatedness
to the environment.

The mode of reaction (temperament) determined neither

the reaction nor the ethicalness of the reaction.

Temperament determined

only the medium and amplification (the mode) of the reaction.
Character was, however, "the subject matter of ethical judoment and
the object of man's ethical development" (From, 19A7).

Fromm defined

character as the organization of motivations underlying a person's orientations by which one relates oneself to the world.

Man relates himself

to the w6cld in two ways: 1) by acquiring and assimilating things, and
2) by relating himself to other people and to himself.
The fundamental entity in character was the organization (structure)
of motivations.

A number of single character traits followed from the

specific motivational structure.

The character structure was analytically

and ontologically prior to the traits themselves.
There are distinct structural parallels

between Kohlberg and Fromm.

Kohlberg's(1969) moral judgment stage theory was also structurally, as
opposed to trait, centered.

His focused criticism of the hypothesis that

moral judgment was related to personality traits then was consistent with

4)
FrOWS theorising.

Kohlberg (1969) did not, however, eliminau the

existence of a relationship between character and moral judgment.
Types of valuing and of feeling, like reasoning, were hypothesized
as schematic which developed general structural characteristics.

These

structural characteristics represented successive stages of psycholcgical
equilibrium.

The structural equilibrium of "affective and interpersonal

schemata involves many of the same basic structural features as the
equilibrium of cognitive schemata and moral schemata " (Kohlberg, 1969).
Kohlberg's (1969) discussion of these affective and interpersonal
schemata indicates that they are similar to Fromm's conative structures.
The affective schemata resemble Fromm's motivational

structures.

Fromm's

orientation of relatedness to others and oneself parallels Kohlberg's
interpersonal schemata.

From further hypothesized that Freud's superego

conscience was only one developmental stage.

The productive character

was proposed as a higher developmental stage represented by a structurally
distinct orientation.
In his theorizing, Fromm demarcated five character orientations
based on a non-exhaustive matrix of personality traits (Table 9, and 10).
Fromm did not indicate that the four nonproductive orientations were developmental.
The similarities previously discussed, however, between Fromm's five
character orientation types and Kohlberg's six moral judgment stages
generates the proposed structural parallels presented in Table 11.

The

findings of the present empirical study are not, however, dependent
on the adequacy of this model.
The purpose of this

study is to explore and, hopefully, add definition
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Table 9*

Fromm's Character Types

ASSIMILATION

I.

SOCIALIZATION

Nonproductive orientation
a) Receiving

Masochistic

(Accepting)

(Loyalty)
symbiosis

b) Exploiting

Sadistic

(Talking)

(Authority,

c) Hoarding

Destructive

(Preserving) (Assertiveness)
withdrawal
d) Marketing

Indifferent

(Exchanging)
II.

(Fairness)

Productive orientation
Working

Loving, Reasoning

*From Fromm (1947, 14. 116-117).

IS
Figure 10'
Unproductive Character Types and Traits

RECEPTIVE ORIENTATION (ACCEPTING)
Positive Aspect

Negative Aspect

accepting

passive, without initiative

responsive

opinionless, characterless

devoted

submissive

modest

without pride

charming

parasitical

adaptable

unprincipled

socially adjusted

servile, without self-confidence

idealistic

unrealistic

sensitive

spineless

optimistic

wishful thinking

trusting

gullible

tender

sentimental
EXPLOITATIVE ORIENTATION (TAKING)

Positive Aspect

Negative Aspect

active

exploitative

able to take initiative

aggressive

able to make claims

egocentric

proud

conceited

impulsive

rash

self-confident

arrogant

captivating

seducing
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HOARDING ORIENTATION (PRESERVING)
Positive Aspect

Negative Aspect

practical

unimaginative

economiLal

stingy

careful

suspicious

reserved

cold

patient

lethargic

cautious

anxious

steadfast, tenacious

stubborn

imperturbable

indolent

composed under stress

inert

orderly

pedantic

methodical

obsessional

loyal

possessive
MARKETING ORIENTATION (EXCHANGING)

Positive Aspect

Negative Aspect

purposeful

opportunistic

able to change

inconsistent

youthful

childish

forward-looking

without a future or a past

open-minded

without principle and values

social

unable to be alone

experimenting

aimless

undogmatic

relativistic

efficient

overactive

curious

tactless
continued
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intelligent

intellectualistic

adaptable

undiscriminating

tolerant

indifferent

witty

silly

generous

wasteful

*From Fromm (1947, pp. 120-121).
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Table
Theoretical Parallels between Fromm's Character and Kohlberg's Moral
Structures

Character Structures

Moral Judgment Structures

Receiving

Social Approval (3)

Exploiting

Instrumentality (2)

Hoarding

Authoritarian (4)

Marketing

Social Contract (5)

Productive

Principled (6)
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to this hypothesized relation between moral judgment structure and
character structure.

As an exploratory study. it will perform analyses

of three interrelated aspects of the probler.

The first of these analyses

will compare four of the measures previously used to scale moral judgment.

The second stage of the study will investinate the relationships

between a sample of potentially relevant personality trait scores and
moral judgment scores.

The final stage of analysis will attempt to

determine the character structures and their personality trait compositions which relate to Kohlberg's moral judgment structures.

Chapter III
The Measures of Moral Judgment
The study of character must be based on the instruments
assessing moral judgment and those measuring personality traits.

A

prerequisite of such a study, therefore, must be a review of such instruments, their psychometric properties, and their interrelationships.
Only the moral judgment measures will be reviewed, however, due to
the lack of published compendium of this information and the volume of
data on personality instruments.
Instruments Based on Kohlberg's Theory
The major instruments have been developed from either Kohlberg's
research or Hogan's research (1973 & 1975).
been presented.

Kohlberg's theory has already

Four instruments have been derived from Kohlberg's theory:

the Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the Objective
Moral Judgment Scale, and the Defining Issues Test.
Moral Judoment Scale
The development of a moral development scale (Moral Judgment Scale,
MJS) and a cognitive theory of moral development by
(1958), revived interest in moral judgment research.

Lawrence Kohlberg
At least six other

measures related to assessing moral judgment have been developed since
then; for ease of reference and as an aid in readina, these are presented
in Table 12.

Published data on the relationships between these measures is

insubstantial.

These instruments will be surveyed and critiqued.

The Moral Judgment Scale is a structured, projective test consisting
of a series of stories involving moral dilemmas to which the subject makes
50
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Table 12
Moral Judgment Instruments Reviewed

Name

Moral Judgment Scale (MJS)

Type

projective

Source
Kohlberg (1958)

Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS) projective

Gilligan, Kohlberg et al 1971

Objective Moral Judgment Scale
(OMJS)

objective

Maitland & Goldman 1974

Defining Issues Test (DIT)

objective

Rest et al 1974

Empathy Scale (ES)

objective

Hogan 1969

Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) objective

Hogan 1970

Measure of Moral Values (MMV)

Hogan & Dickstein 1972

projective

S2
moral judgments and presents reasoning to support these decision.

The

scale can be scored in one or both of two ways: a global system
and/or a
detailed system.
For global scoring

each subject's response per dilerra is assiclned

a score on one of the Kohlberg stages.

The subjects results can be

reported for either each dilemma or the dominant stage across dilemm
as
can be computed.
The detailed scoring method entails categorizing the responses
as to
respective moral thought-issue units (see Appendix A; Kohlberg,
1971:
Kurtines & Grief, 1974).

The responses are then assigned stage scores

within each thought-content unit.
are then computed.

Percentages of responses at each stage

A moral maturity score (MMS) can be computed by multiplying

the percentages of stage usage by the assigned weights for each stage.
procedure yields a total score for

each subject between 100 - 600.

Kurtines and Grief (1974) reported two major problems
scoring procedures.

This

with these

First, the judgmental nature of the coding procedures

necessitated by the projective technique introduces potential scorer

bias.

Second, the use of two scoring systems confounds the generalizability of
results.

Fodor (1971 & 1972), for example, reported a significant difference

between detailed mean scores for delinquents and nondelinquents, althou
gh
both groups had the same global score.
drawback of the MJS.

Kohlberg (1958) reported another

The effectiveness of the various dilemmas for

assessing moral reasoning is not equal.

The inter-dilemma reliability

coefficient, however, was not reported.

The test-retest reliability was

also reported as "Door" by Rest et al (1974).

S3
Sexual Moral Judrent SW,
Gilligan, Kohlberg. Lerner. and Belenky (1971) developed the
Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS) as an extension of the MJS.

The

SMJS has an identical format to the MJS and differs only in the nature
of the area of human affairs (sexual relations) for which moral judgments
and reasoning are

probed (see Appendix C. stories 2 and 3 for examples).

Only one published study has used the SMJS.

The respondents were hirh

school juniors.
Scores for the adolescent sample showed that the SMJS was only
moderately, .405 for females and .482 for males, correlated with the MJS.
The results further demonstrated that this deviation was directional.
Approximately 80

of those subjects showing any difference in level of

moral reasoning exhibited lower moral reasoning for the sexual dilemmas.
Direct comparison of scores on the MJS versus scores on the SOJS for
the same sample supported the inequality in the effectiveness of the various
dilemmas for assessing moral reasoning.

The interscorer agreement level

was lower for two out of three of the SMJS stories compared to three MJS
stories (see

Table 13).

Objective Moral Judgment Scale
Maitland and Goldman (1974) developed an objective form of the MJS.
Their scale (OMJS) attempted to eliminate the cumbersome administration
and scoring procedures of Kohlberg's MJS.

The OMJS stimulus set consisted

of fifteen moral dilemmas (see Appendix B for the stimulus set) followed
by a question designed to elicit one particular issue of moral judgment.
The subject was then required to select one of six stage responses which
followed each dilemma.

These responses were derived from Kohlberg's

(1971) issues scoring guide.

The order of these responses was randomized.

1.

t

111.

Gilligan, et al.

a.

Table 13
ng Method
Interjudge Agreement, Global Rati

63

83

18

67

85

17

9

74

83

10

15

18

64

2

20

22

22

44

82 66

0

20

25

45

24

31

55

0

5

15

20

29

51

80

Story
r and Minor Code of Response to Each
Modal
Percentage of Agreement on Maip
Sex Stories
Standard*
Modal**
Stories
Sex***
C
8
A
Standard
I
IV
III

20

15

6

5

11

20

80

15

13

11

3

Major Stage Agreement

13

2

0

64

18

2

0

perfect agreement

2

2

16

0

difference in minor code

b.

major code one stage-off

major-miror disagreement

One Stage Disagreement
a.
b.
TWO Stage Disagreement

*Kohlberg. 1969
dard stories (III,IV, I).
**Modal Stage rating for the 3 stan
sex stories (A, B. C).
***Modal stage rating for the 3

SS
The test was scored by summing the steno responses across the fifteen
dilemmas, resulting in scores with a possible range from fifteen to ninety.
The reported OMJS test-retest reliability was 1'6.83 for 12 to 19year-olds and ..60 for 11th and 12th grade pupils.

The split-half

reliability coefficient was re.71 and a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20
yielded an .!1..67.

A direct validity comparison with Kohlberc's MJ

was not conducted.

OMJS scores were, however, transformed to compare

with Kohlberg's moral maturity score (MMS) by multiplying the total score
by 100/15.

These scores were compared with the MMS norms for a sample

of the same age and academic level.

This comparison provided hiclhly

supportive validity data (MJS=364, OMJS transformation scores=365).
means were not, however, based on the same subjects.

lhese

Neither the standard

deviations nor the correlation between the two sets of scores were reported.
Defining Issues Test
Rest, Cooper, Coder, Nasanz, and Anderson (1971) constructed another
objectively based instrument for assessing moral development.

Their Defin-

ing Issues Test (DIT) consisted of moral dilemmas which were presented
with twelve issues bearing upon that dilemma.
each dilemma

The subject was to evaluate

and its concomitant issues, and to then indicate on a Likert

scale how important each issue was in resolving the dilemma.

The issues

exemplified a distinctive characteristic on one of Kohlberg's stages.
DIT has a test-retest Pearson correlation of .81.
with the MJS.

The

The DIT correlated .68

Rest et al„interpreted this result as showing that the PIT

and MJS were not equivalent measures.
Instruments Based on Hoyan's Theory
Robert Hogan (1973 & 1975) constructed an alternative theory of moral
development to that of Kohlberg.

Hogan emphasized the ontogenesis of
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character structure analogous to Fromm's theory.

The dimensions of this

character structure according to Hogan's typology are moral knowledge,
socialization, empathy, autonomy, and ethical attitude.
Moral knowledge is defined as awareness and comprehension of the
relevant social rules.

Socialization is the degree to which one has

internalized these social rules as personally obligatory and binding.
Empathy is the capacity and disposition to regulate one actions in
accordance with the expectations of others.

Autonomy is seen as the

capacity to make moral judgments without beina influenced by peer group
pressure or the dictates of authority.

Ethical attitude is the degree

to which one perceives moral rules as being instrumentally valuable for
regulating social conduct versus beina valuable for personal integrity.
Hogan has developed instruments to assess three of these dimensions.
He constructed the Empathy Scale (ES) to measure empathy. and the Survey
of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) to scale ethical attitude.

Hogan used I.Q.

tests to measure moral knowledge, since earlier research had shown a high
correlation between intelligence and moral knowledge.

The Socialization

scale of the California Personaltiy Inventory was used to assess socialization.

Hogan (1973 and 1975) used both Barron's Scale of Independence

of Judgment and Kurtines' (1973) CPI Autonomy Scale to scale autonomy.
Measure of Moral Values
To determine the importance of each of these dimensions. Hogan and
Dickstein (1972) developed the Measure of Moral Values to measure moral
maturity.

This scale was comprised of fifteen statements requiring a

projective response.

These responses were scored two points if any one

of four predefined moral concerns was clearly expressed: 1) concern for
the sanctity of the individual, 2) judgments based on the

spirit rather

than the letter of the law, 3) concern for the welfare of society as a
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whole. and 4) capacity to see both sides of an issue.

An answer was

assigned one point if any of the four concerns was easily implied.

This

method yielded a range of possible scores from 0-30 for the totaled items.
Neither item analysis nor reliabilities were reported.
The construct validity of this instrument must he critically examined.
Hogan and Dickstein (1974) used this same W.> to assess the construct of
'perception and attribution of injustice

by using a different scoring

theme criteria (blame) than that used for assessing moral values (Hogan
and Dickstein, 1972).
studies.

The instructions were identical, however, in both

Low scorers were defined as possessing a tendency to attribute

injustice to institutions.

High scores conversely denoted a tendency

to perceive injustice as due to individuals.
The attribution of injustice to institutions rather than individuals
is a different type of moral judgment.

Moral decisions about people and

institutions beyond self are not the same as Kohlbern's moral reasoning
about personal behavior.

Attribution in Hogan's dilemmas might reflect

moral rationalization rather than moral judgment, where rationalization
means defensive projection of responsibility rather than acceptance of
responsibility.

If the same projective responses to the MMV can be

scored to determine both maturity of moral judgment and degree of moral
rationalization, then these two sets of response

scores should be analyzed.

This analysis mould determine whether maturity of moral judgment correlates
with the degree of moral rationalization.
show less moral rationalization.

The more morally mature should

A failure to support such a prediction

would challenge the construct validity of the MMV.
Hogan and Dickstein (1972) found that the level of sensitivity to
injustice (not attribution of injustice) was significantly correlated

..01, n•92, with maturity of moral juogment.

An increase in

moral maturity was accompenieo by an increase in assigned lives of sensitivity to injustice.
Although the MMN was explicitly presented as a parallel technique
for the MuS, no estimate of method variance or between instrument score
Isomorphism was reported.

Hogan 0973. Rogan and Dickstein. 1972) re-

ported two significant correlations between the SEA and his MMV, r=-.34
(n=41, p=.01) and r=-.40 (n=41, p=.01) respectively.

These apparently

were based on the same sample data but no explanation of the inconsistenc
y
has been provided.
Empathy Scale
The Empathy Scale (ES) (Hogan, 1969) was postulated to measure
one
aspect of moral reasoning because empathy was defined as an inherent
element ot taking the moral point of view.

The moral point of view was

conceptualized as adopting impersonal motivations and ends for one's
actions through identifying with the goals and expectations of one's
social group.
The ES was made-up of sixty-four true-false items.

Thirty-one ot

these were drawn from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) while
twenty-five were taken from the MMPI

and eight items were from other

sources.
Much of the validity evidence and the reliability coetficients for
the ES were based on comparisons with results from the CPI and the
MMPI.
This lack of indepenC.ence between the ES and the validity criteria
measures
represents serious contounding.

The personalogical correlates reported by

Hogan (1969, 1970, and 1972) which relied on the ES as the moral
judgment
index and used the CPI and MMPI as the personality measures must
be
seriously qualified.

S9
Hogan (1968) used the ES

AIS an index of moral judgment in his

research and reported (Ho)an and Dickstein. 1972) correlations of .48
n • 41. p • .05. and .58 n • 30. p • .01, between the ES

and MHO/

for two samples.
A more serious criticism of Hogan's Empathy Scale involves the
underlying construct Hogan used for empathy.

Hogan confounds the construct

himself by using different conceptualizations in different expositions.
His (1969) initial definition was: "the act of constructing for oneself
another person's mental state...without actually experiencing that
person's feelings (p. 308)."

In a later article. Hogan. (1973) defined

empahty as "role-taking ability."

Role taking was not defined but G.H.

Mead's (1934) theory was most frequently cited.

A third definition was

still later presented (Grief and Hooan, 1973); empathy was conceived as
"the ability to adopt the moral point of view, to consider the implications
of one's actions for the welfare of others... (p. 280)."

Grief and Hogan

also stated that empathy referred to "a sensitivity to the needs and values
of others" in the same paper.

Finally, Hogan (1975) defined empathy as

"the capacity and disposition to regulate one's actions in accordance with
the expectations of others...

(p. 160).

A factor analysis of the ES and Grief and Hogan's (1973) interpretation of the resulting factors further calls into question both the nature
of the construct measured and its conceptual validity.
divided into three factors.

The ES items

The first factor suggested that a tolerant,

even-tempered disposition was a component of empathy.

The second factor

was interpreted to reflect that an empathetic person was also self-possessed,
outgoing, and socially ascendant.

The third factor indicated that a human-

istic and tolerant set of sociopolitical attitudes was an aspect of an
empathetic disposition.
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How (1969 6 197S) has further supported this interpretation.
He stated that the validationil evidence substantiated that high scorers
on the ES were msocillly acute and sensitive to nuances in interp,rsonal
low scorers were "hostile cold, and insensitive to the feel-

behavior."

ings of others."

This conceptualization is not equivalent to considering

the implications of one's actions for the welfare of others.

Hogan

seems to confuse role-taking empathy with moral empathy which are two
distinct concepts.

The face validity of the ES items (Table 14) more

strongly supports the role-taking empathy concept than the moral empathy
concept.

Kohlberg (1958) criticized the assumption that role-taking

empathy was synonomous with moral empathy.

Survey of Ethical Attitudes
The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) was conceptualized as measuring
the existence of two sets of

ethical ideals employed in moral justification

and decision making: the ethics of personal conscience and the ethics of
social responsibility.

The bases for the ethics of social responsibility

were the legal system and the general welfare of society.

The ethic of

personal conscience was based on a higher order of personal integrity.
Although Hogan proposed that these two ideals appeared to form a part of
Kohlberg's distinction between stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning, Hogan philosophically argued that neither ideal represented a higher form of moral
reasoning.
this study.

For this reason, the SEA will not be used as an instrument in
The research generated by the SEA will, however, be reviewed

because of its exploration of personalogical variables.
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Table 14
Empathy Scale Role-Taking Items

1.

I like to talk before groups of people.

2.

1 think I am usually a leader in my group.

3.

I usually don't like to talk much unless I am with people I
know well.

4.

I am a good mixer.

5.

1 usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.

6.

I have a natural talent for influencing people.

From: E. Grief and R. Hogan (1973, p. 282).
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The SEA consisted of both forced-choice and weighted-continuum
items.

These items involved both attitude items and forced-choice items

related to a moral dilemma story.
were published.

Neither item analyses nor reliabilities

Hogan and Dickstein (1972) reported a correlation of

r.-.34, n=41. p_ =.05

between the SEA and the MMV.

This negative relation-

ship indicated that those scorinn in the personal conscience ranne on
the SEA scored in the higher range of moral maturity on the MMV.

A

correlation coefficient between the SEA and MJS was not reported.
The most inconsistent findings to be reviewed in this study derive
from the ES and SEA scales.

The relationship of these two instruments

compared on the CPI and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator showed them to be
measures of almost completely independent constructs, even though both
were presented as inherent elements of

moral reasoning.

The justification

for including the research based on these instruments resides in their
claim to report personality-moral judgment relationships.
ment, based on this

Neither instru-

critique, will be used, however, as a measure of moral

judgment in this study.
The seven measures of moral judgment are all techniques which have
been used in morality-personality research.

This research will be re-

viewed in relation to the specific personality variables studied and
the moral judgment instrument used.

Chapter IV
The Mature of Relponsibility and Research Relationships to Moral Jud9nent
The character typology constructed by From (1947) and presented
in Tables 9 and 10 will serve as the organizational structure through
which the research will be presented.

The primary division in Fromm's

schema was between the 'unproductive' character structures and the
'productive' character orientation.
Three axial dimensions distinguishing between the unproductive and
productive character can be gleaned from Fromm's presentation.

The first

of these dimensions concerns the nature and source of responsibility:
whether responsibility exists within, to and for oneself; or within and
to sociofreligious authority.

The second dimension centers on the nature

of our relation and interaction with others: whether it is founded in
symbiosis (e.g. to loose the self either through submission to or dominance of others), in withdrawal (e.g. to protect the self through either
distance or destruction of others), or in love (e.g. the affirmation of
the truly human self through caring, knowino, and respecting others).
The third dimension turns upon the acceptance and development of Kierkeoaard's
and May's (1967) construct of certitude : the full development of the
human potential (both reason and emotion), and the creation of integrity
through thinking, feeling, and acting as a psychological and ethical,
fully conscious entity.
Alker and Poppen (1973) presented a similar tripartite loci for
representing the nature of an ideolocical choice.
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Their schema was also
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grounded in Fromm (1942) and more recently in existential theory.
The research findings testing the relationship between personality
traits and moral judgment will be presented within Fromm'

triadic

structure.
The problem of responsibility has. according to Fromm, a number
of aspects and a wide range of implications.

These asoects include

socialization, authoritarianism, autonomy, and conformity: while the
implications encompass

guilt, anxiety, dogmatism and tolerance.

Each of these will be treated separately.
Socialization
In Fromm's theorizing, socialization (superego). authoritarianism,
autonomy, and conformity to social approval were all dimensions defining
the individual's orientation to responsibility.

The possession of an

authoritarian character orientation placed one into a chain of dependency
to authority.

The mechanism of authoritarian ethics was the formation

of a dependency reaction through the arousal of guilt feelinps.

Fromm

explained the relation as such: "Guilt feelings have proved to be the
most effective means of forming and increasing dependency. and herein
lies one of the social functions of authoritarian ethics...At is this
interaction between guilt feelinq and dependency which makes for the
solidity and strength of the authoritarian relationships"(p. 159).
Fromm stayed within the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition to define
superego socialization as the internalization of an external authority, i.e.
the parent and the society.

As the basis for responsibility, Fromm

claimed that superepo-socialization conscience was authoritarian based.
The measure of conscience followed as the degree of conformity to
authority.

The productive character, however, developed beyond authori-
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tartan socialization to an autonomous responsibility for his existence.
A number of studies present findings which bear on these aspects.
A review of children's moral judgment literature by Kohlberg (1964)
concluded that the obtained correlations
and moral behavior were inconclusive.

between supereoo strength

Kohlberg explained this incon-

sistency by relying on selected findings which indicated that moral
character was based on reason (ego strength) rather than superego strength.
Reason entailed the processes Kohlberg theorized as necessary for moral
behavior: a) foresight - the ability to consider consequences, and b)
generalization - the ability to recognize the effects of one's actions
on others.

Kohlberg reported that the control of unsocialized fantasies

was significantly related to reason.
A number of findings nave been based on the Socialization subscale
of the California Psychological Inventory.

This scale was specifically

designed to assess the dearee to which a person had internalized the
rules, values, and conventions of his society.

Table 15 presents the

findings of four studies which used the CPI Socialization scale and a
measure of moral judgment.
The tabulations show the SEA and MMV to be significantly correlated
with the CPI Socialization scale.
related for either of two samples.

The ES, however, was not significantly
The two MMV correlations, although

from different reports, Hogan and Dickstein (1972) and Hogan (1973),
appear to be based on the same
the case

sample and data.

If such was indeed

then Hogan did not provide any explanation for the change in the

coefficient.
The socialization dimension has also been explored through the MMPI.
An individual with a chronic lack of superego socialization has been
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Tabl• IS
Correlations Between Socialization Measures and Moral Reasoning

Measure of Moral
Reasoning

Correlation

CORRELATIONS

9
ES
SEA

MMPI Pd Scale

CPI SOCIALIZATION

10

MMV 11'12

.05 1

-.012

.383

.344

.325

.406

.11

1

n= 90, p > .05

2

n = 51, p

3

n = 94, p ..01

Form A

4

94, 2 ..t.01

Form B

5

n = 41, _21.05

one-tailed test

6

n = 41, p5.05

one-tailed test

7

_n = 70, p >.05

8

n = 51, _p

9

Hogan (1969)

10

Hogan (1970)

11

E3gan & Dickstein

12

Hogan (1973)

.05

(1972)

7

.078
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labeled as a psychopathic deviate.

A major feature of this disorder

is °reputed and flagrant disregard for social customs and mores'
(Hawk and Peterson, 1974).

The Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale of the

MMPI was designed to measure this trait.

Hogan (1969) did not find a

significant relationship between the MMPI Pd scale and the ES for either
of two samples, r=.11, n=7 and r=.07, n=51.
A study by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to test the hypothesis that
the MMPI Pd scale measures deviancy and not psychopathic deviancy yielded
data pertinent to this review.

As Table 16 demonstrates, delinquents had

both lower socialization indices (higher Pd mean score) and lower moral
maturity mean scores than either college students or mental health professionals.

The finding that the mental health professionals had both

significantly higher moral maturity scores and Pd scores than the college
student sample was interpreted by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to indicat
e
that the Pd and Pd+.4K (K measures ego functioning; Pd+.4K is the index
of psychopathology) indices measured deviancy and not necessa
rily psychopathic deviancy.

These indices measured deviancy but did not and cannot

distinguish the underlying motivations and schemata of this unconventionality.
The findings between socialization and moral judgment are conflicting.
This conflict may be due to the various measures of socialization and
moral judgment used which may not be measuring the same constru
ct.
Further research needs to attempt to clarify these conflicting results
.
Fromm's (1947) conceptualization of superego socialization entailed
a strong authoritarian personality orientation.

This authoritarian

orientation was more fully developed and explained by Fromm (1942) in
Escape From Freedom.
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Table 16
Relationships Between Social Deviancy and Moral Judgment*

Instrument

Types of Subjects
Students
Delinquents

MMS

360.01, 77.94_5_4

MMS

360.01, 77.941A,

Significance
Mental
Health Professionals

410.95. 49.27

410.95, 49.27

MMS
Pd

26.0, 5.05 1,d,

Pd

26.0, 5.05 s.d.

Pd + .dK

30.61, 5.02_54,

pd + .4K

30.61, 5.02 s.d.

Pd + .4K
*Hawk & Peterson (1974)

p 1.05
480.33, 41.85

p t.05

480.37, 41.85

pt.05
ipt.01

19.20, 5.08

19.20, 5.08

Pd

20.10, 3.28

gt.01

20.10, 3.28

a T.05
p t.05

24.185, 5.33
26.89, 4.31
24.185, 5.33

level

26.89, 4.31

p t.05
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A twritarianipi
The California F scale (Adorn°. Frenkel-Brunswik. Levinson 6
Sanford. 1950) was developed to measure authoritarianism as a personality
trait.

Kohlberg (1964) reported a significant. re..52, negative

correlation between MJS scores and the California F Scale scores.
The F Scale was also used by Hogan (1969) with his ES scale.

He

reported both a significant correlation, r=-.52. p =.01. for a nale
sample and an insignificant finding. r=-.30. n=2S. for a sample of
females.

No interpretation was offered for this sexual disparity.

Hogan's (1970) study of the relationship between the SEA and the F Scale
also determined a significant finding, r=.45 for Form A (SEA) and r
for Form B (SEA), n=90, p=.01 .

.35

These positive correlations were inter-

preted as follows: high scores on the SEA were associated with low to
moderate scores on the F Scale while low SEA scores were related to very
low scores on the F Scale.

Low scores on the SEA represented holding

ethics of personal conscience which Hogan stated as forming a part of
Kohlberg's stage 6 moral judgment level.
Another verbal measure of authoritarianism is found on the Belief
Systems Inventory (Kaats, 1969).

Using this measure, O'Conner (1971)

found that the actual rank order of MJS global scores based on BSI
Authoritarianism scale scores was 4,3, 1-2, and 5-6.

This result did

not match O'Connor's predictions (1 & 2, 5 & 6) nor did it reach the
significance level, p_ = .05, based on an analysis of variance of the
mean scores on the BSI Authoritarianism scale for the moral stages
overall.
The Law and Order Scale (LOS) has been used by Rest, et al (1974)
as another authoritarian scale.

Rest et al used this instrument with

their Defining Issues Test to investigate the relationship between
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moral judgment. attitudes, and values.

Significant correlations between

authoritarianism (1.01S) and moral judgment (D1T) were found for three
different samples. re-.60, -.48. and -.46. 0.01.
Milgram's (1974) obedience to authority research paradigm can be
used as a behavioral measure of authoritarianism.

Kohlberg (1969)

reported that seventy-five percent of stage 6 subjects versus thirteen
percent of stages 1 through 5 subjects discontinued shock administration
in a Milgram-type situation.

The compliance to administer shock was the

obedience to authority measure.
A study conducted by Podd (1972) investigated the relationship between moral judgment, Milgram-type obedience to authority, and Erikson's
ego identity statuses.

This research showed that those subjects classified

as preconventional on Kohlberg's MJS did not administer greater shock
intensities than those classified as postconventional.
stage subjects were not included in this comparison.

Conventional moral
The relationship

between identity status and compliance in the Milgram-task was also investigated.

Twenty-one subjects in

a foreclosure ego identity group

(individuals who are committed to goals and values of parents and significant others) were preconventional and conventional in moral stage while
five were either transitional and/or postconventional.

These foreclosure

subjects as a group displayed significantly greater, t=4.12 (18), p_ s.01,
obedience to a low authority experimenter (a student) than to a high
authority one (a professor).

This finding was contrary to the experimenter's

hypothesis.
In his explanation of his research results, Milgram (1974) stated that
moral judgment was not adequate to account for the results.

The crucial

point in this argument was that the morality of harming an innocent victim
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was constant regardless of the spatial relation of the victim to the
subject.

Essentially all subjects espoused the belief that to cause

pain to an innocent victim was immoral.

Yet, the stronnest manipulation

of the results (disobeying) was the simple change in spatial proximity
of the victim.

The closer the victim then the greater the proportion

of subjects who disobeyed.
Moral judgment was, however, an important component of Milgram's
explanation.

Milgram applied both an information theory approach and

a phenomenological approach.

The focus of a moral judgment was theorized

to be controlled by the perceived information and social field.

Proper

manipulation of the definition of the situation controlled the subject's
level of assignment of responsibility.

The subjects who did not disobey

shifted their moral concern from the results of their actions on the victim
to the results of their actions on the experiment.

This moral concern

shift was consistent with their perceived definition of the situation.
Milgram's conception of the basis of moral judgment was consistent
with Fromm's.

Morality was conceived as the acceptance of responsibility.

In order to feel and accept responsibility for one's actions, the person
must believe that his behavior and his responsibility originated from
within

his own motive system" (Milgram, 1974).

conative axis of morality.

This paralleled Fromm's

The failure to include the person's perception

of the definition of the situation in the assessment of moral judgment
may explain the inconsistent results reported by Kohlberg (1969) and Podd
(1972).

Podd found that perception of the confederate's willingness to

participate was important in distinauishing the behavior of identity
achievement versus identity diffusion subjects on the Milgram task.
Fromm claimed that the person with the productive character developed

7?
beyond the authoritarian conscience to an autonomouS conscience.

In

certain ways, autonomy can be considered as the opposite end of a continuum with authoritarianism.
Autonomy
A definition of autonomy offered by Kurtines (1974) approximated
Fromm's conceptualization.

Autonomy consists of making decisions and

judgments independent of immediate social pressure and considerations of
external influences.

Kurtines' research imlicated that autonomy was

personalogically complex.

Autonomy included self-control, moral

responsibility, achievement orientation, and dominance in interpersonal
style.

Dominance in interpersonal style, however, was not an attribute

of Fromm's productive character.

The studies to be reviewed, however,

have used a variety of measures of autonomy which may not all equally
measure the same construct.
The Omnibus Personality Inventory (Heist & Yonge, 1968) contained
a scale to measure autonomy.

Sullivan and Quarter (1972) found that

postconventional and preconventional subjects scored higher than conventional subjects.

Sullivan and Quarter did not report whether the

percentile differences between groups were significant.
O'Connor (1971) rank ordered MJS global scores on the Edwards
Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) autonomy scale.
order was stages 5 & 6, 3, 1 & 2, and 4.

The actual rank

An analysis of variance

failed to show a significant difference between autonomy scores by
moral stage.

Research by others (Haan, Stroud, & Holstein, 1973;

and Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968) indicated that stage 2 subjects in these
studies showed strong indications of autonomy.
Barron's Scale of Independence of Judgment (S1J) was used by Hogan
in his research of the relationship between autonomy and his measures
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of moral reasoning.
nifiCIntly.

Hogan and Dickstein's (1972) NM correlated

cy.36. 11=41

Sig-

p.01, with the S1J. Hogan (1973) 4PParently

presented these findings again for the same sample and data but the
coefficient was stated as .56.

n=41.

No explanation was provided

for this apparent disparity.
Conformity to Social Approval
Authoritarian prescriptions and proscriptions novern only a relatively small proportion of the total behavioral options available to a
person and the situations in which he may find himself.

Most of our

behavior is voluntary, governed by our own Predilection and our desire
for social approval.

Social approval is conferred by reference groups

on their members when these members
normative behavior.

engage in (conform to) preferred

From recognized conformity to social approval as a

diagonal dimension of autonomy.

The interpersonal behavior of the

productive character orientation was based on a deeper level than this
mutual stroking. behavioral mode.

The productive character functions

on a truly autonomous level, not merely on an

independent-from-

authority level.
Fodor (1971) conceptualized this type of autonomy as resistance to
social influence.

He operationalized this construct through attempting

to dissuade subjects from their judgment after the administration
of the
MJS.

Those subjects who were dissuaded at least once were grouped as

'Yielders', while those who were not dissuaded were labeled "Resisters".
The Resisters' mean MMS, MMS=210, s.d. = 31, was significantly, p=.01,
higher than that of the Yielders, MMS=181, _s.d.=27.

Fodor (1972)

replicated and extended these findings to delinquents versus nondelinquents.

The mean MJS moral maturity score for delinquents, MMS=162,

was significantly, .001. lower than for the nondelinquents. MMS=196

)4
although both score's fall within the stag* I range.
six of forty delinquents at least once (yielders).

lodor dissuaded twentyResisters had sig.

nificantly. jr.OS. higher MMS scores than the Yielding group. MMS•17
7.
1A.1.29. and MMS4.153. s.d.a27. respectively.
Saltzstein. Diamond. and Belenky (1972) used an Asch-type condition
to operationalize conformity.

Subjects participated in this condition

in either one of two treatments: interdependent and indepe
ndent.

In the

interdependent treatment, subjects functioned as a member of
a group
which had to reach a consensus while competing with other groups
.

The

independent treatment had the subjects competing as individuals
against
all other individuals.

Subjects were rewarded for 'correct' responses,

i.e., choosing the choice of the confederate in the Asch task.
Overall conformity was significantly related to moral judgment stage
score for both sexes combined, x2.8.41, p.02 .

Stage 3 subjects were

most likely to conform while those at stage 4 and 5 were least
likely to
conform.

The expectation that higher MJS subjects would conform more in

the interdependent treatment was not supported by the data.
The McDonald Conformity Scale (MCS) was developed to discriminate
between yielders and nonyielders in an Asch-type situation.

McDonald

(1971) found that conformity scores on the MCS were significantl
y correlated, r=.45, df=42, p=.01, with stronger endorsement of the ethics of
social responsibility on the SEA.

By implication, those possessing an

orientation of ethics of personal conscience are significantly less conforming on the MCS.
The Potter Locus of Control Scale (I-E) has been used by Alker and
Poppen (1973) ard Bloomberg (1974) in the study of moral judgment.
Neither study found a significant correlation between I -E scores and
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016IS global scams or DIT scores.
significant findings.

Both studies, however, report isolated

Alker and PoPoen (1973) reported that although

I -E scores were not significantly correlated with the overall WS scores,
I -E scores showed a significant. r .-.40, p..05, correlation with
principled (stage 6) versus premoral (stage 1 A 2) MJS scores.

Principled

subjects were more internal than premoral subjects on the personal 1-E
subscale.

There was no significant correlation between principled and

premoral subjects on the political subscale of the I -E.
Bloomberg (1974) used the DIT to measure moral judgment.

The only

significant finding. t=2.12 (51). p=.05, was that internals chose a
greater average percentage of items which exemplified stage 6 thinking
than externals: 8.7

versus 5.8

respectively.

The use of the I -E scale by Bloomberg may be based on a theoretical
misinterpretation of the nature of locus of control and thus misapplied.
Bloomberg (19/4) conceptualized conventional external locus of control
as "an orientation that looks to forces outside the self for definitions
of morality " (p. 1077).

The assumption that the I -E Scale measured

locus of control of morality is an untested extrapolation from Rotter's
locus of control of reinforcement.

The conceptulization of locus of

control by Alker and Poppen (1973) was more in tune with Rotter's.

They

posited locus of control as: "Does the individual believe that his own
actions will be casually efficacious in attaining the goals in pursuit
of which a given choice was made?" (p. 669).
A nonmetric representation procedure constructed by the computational
program TORSCA yielded some intriguing interpretations of Alker and
Poppen's data.

TORSCA transforms correlation
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coefficients into indices of similarity.

Similar variables are then

placed closer together in the resulting multidimensional space

YhIS

was in spite of the lack of significant correlations found by thew between
the 1-E and the MJS scores.

This technique presented external lotus

of control as being proximal to conventional morality.

Internal locus

0 control was grouped with nonconventiond morality (principled [61
and instrumental (2)).

Bloomberg's (1974) hypothesis predicted such

a curvilinear relationship.

The difference between the instrumentalist

and the principled person was between selfish opportunism and morally
creative choices respectively.

Fromm's theory supports such a distinc-

tion and relationship.
Guilt
Kohlberg (1964) reported that delinquents in his sample scored
as
premoral on the MJS.

Kohlberg reviewed other research which found that

delinquents expressed low self-guilt.

This relationship between moral

judgment and guilt was investigated by Ruma and Mosher (1967
) in delinquent males.

Four measures of guilt were assessed: a transgression inter-

view was analyzed 1) by content analysis

(CA), 2) by speech disturbance

(SD), 3) by a global clinical rating (GCR), and 4) the
"Hostility" and
"Morality-Conscience Guilt" subscales of the Mosher Guilt
Scale (MGS) were
administered.

The Mosher Guilt Scale purported to measure the subjec
t's

generalized expectancy for self-mediated punishment for violat
ion or
anticipated violation of internalized standards of proper
behavior.
Global MJS scores were significantly correlated with three
of these
guilt measures: content analysis,

r = .47, p

=.01, global clinical rating,

r = .43, p =.01, and the Mosher Guilt Scale, r =
.55, p_ =.01.
creased guilt was associated with a higher global MJS score.

In-

The insig-
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nificant correlation of the speech disturbance guilt measure with the
MJS WAS interpreted as due to its inapproortateness

as

an index of guilt.

These findings must be conservatively interpreted due to the
distribution of MJS stage scores an which the results are based.
sample consisted of:

The

Stage 1-0, Stage 2-12, Stage 3-11. Stage 4-12.

stage 5-0. and Stage 6-1.

RUM

and Mosher's findings therefore reflect

the relationship between guilt and moral judgment for stages 2. 3. and
4 only.

Post conventional quilt level was not represented in these

findings.
Haan. Smith. and Block (1968) used a Q-sort to study the personality differences between Free Speech Movement participants and nonparticipants.

These subjects were divided into groups on the basis of

their MJS global stage score.

Stage

6 females rated themselves on the

adjective "Guilty" as 4.10 on a seven step Likert scale.

This ranking

was significantly, 2 -.01, higher than that expressed by Stage 4 female
s
(2.45).

Males failed to show any significant differences across stages

on this adjective.

Haan, Smith, and Block interpreted these findings as

indicating that the development of

autonomous morality (Stage 6) might

be more "arduous" for females than males.

Another possible interpretation,

and clarification of "arduous," posits that moral autonomy is a less
secure
orientation for this%mple of women.

The ranking of Stage 6 females

(4.30) as opposed to Stage 4 females (3.16) on the adjective "doubting"
supports such an interpretation, E =.05.
This relationship between doubt and moral stage is encompassed by Fromm
in his postulation that possessing an authoritarian conscience produc
ed a
feelino of well-being and security.

This secJrity ensued from the knowledge

of the approval granted by the authority for believing as the authority

does and from conforming to the authority.

The quilt which Fromm

stated would be characteristic of authoritarians was guilt within the
system of authority.

The security results from being within the authority

system rather than being outside of it.
The relation between guilt and moral judgment as shown through these
findings is inconclusive.
search.

Two types of relationships need further re-

An attempt to isolate the two levels of guilt (inter- versus

intra-system guilt) previously mentioned needs to be undertaken.

Intro-

system guilt is the guilt experienced from failing to live up to one's
actualizing, productive potential.

Inter-system guilt. on the other

hand, is the guilt experienced from violating the rules of social authority.
Inter-system guilt is similar to Freud's conception of the superego, while
intra-system guilt is a higher

order of ego functioning.

The other

problem resides in determining the source of the difference between males
and females on

guilt and the nature of this difference.

Anxiety
Guilt has been defined by From

as the feeling which results from the

transgression of authority's (superego) rules.
relationship was said

The authoritarian dependency

by Fromm to be maintained by the authority's absolu-

tion granted for these transgressions.

This guilt results in fear that

this absolution may not be forthcoming and the resultant rejection causes
the feeling of anxiety (Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930).

Note that

anxiety has been defined differently within other, non-Freudian theories
(Polster and Polster, 1973).
Fromm's central thesis, however, was that Freudian
was only one stage of conscience.
this authoritarian conscience.

superego conscience

The productive character develops beyond

There will be no transgression anxiety for
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the productive character because there is no authority againSt whom
one can transgress.
But this does not preclude the productive character from experiencing anxiety.

The anxiety is

now of a different order and source.

Although From (1947) did not explicitly formulate this new anxiety.
It is proposed that May's (1967) conceptualization of normal anxiety
is congruent with Fromm's theory of the productive character.
May differentiated two types of anxiety: normal anxiety and neurotic
anxiety.

Anxiety was defined

the values

3

as an apprehension caused by a threat to

person identifies with his existence as a self.

Normal

anxiety was apprehension which was proportionate to the threat
engaged constructively.

and was

The difference between normal and neurotic anxiety

was not the type, level, or source of apprehension but the response to that
apprehension.

The person experiencing neurotic anxiety responds by

various techniques of blocking-off areas of freedom of awareness, experience, decision, and responsibility.
and intrapsychic conflict.

Neurotic anxiety results in repression

This denial of threat, anxiety, and response-

ability causes ( and is created by) a loss of the experience of one's
own significance.

Neurotic anxiety, therefore, can be seen to result when

a person does not confront a threat or crisis and resolve it for further
expansion of the self.
The research reviewed which has investigated the relationship between
anxiety and moral judgment has not delineated the levels and types of
anxiety proposed by Fromm and May.

Only the Sullivan and Quarter (1972)

study researched the anxiety relationship using Kohlberg's MJS.

This

anxiety-moral judgment relationship needs further extensive and detailed
research.

pi0
The A scale of the MMPI was used by mow (1960 to measure
anxiety.

The ES moral measure was significantly related to the MMP1

A (neurotic anxiety) scale for two samples, r • -.40,
-.41,

E •.01, and r =

E =.01. Hogan (1969) also found Taylor Manifest Anxiety (TM)

scores significantly correlated with the ES, r = -.49,

E =.01, for

a sample of medical school applicants but not for a sample of female
college seniors, r = -.?0,

E> .05. These findings were interpreted

as demonstrating that those measured as high in empathy (ES) had
low feelings of anxiety.
Sullivan and Quarter (1972) using the Anxiety scale of the UP!,
found that ten principled absolutists (stage 6) scored at the 56th percentile while nine mixed -stage postconventionals (pure stage 5, 5 [6]
and 6 [5] mixed stages), transitionals (mixed stages 5 [3], 3 [5],
5 [4], 4 [5], and 5 [2]), and conventionals (pure stage 3 and 4, and
mixtures ot 3 and 4), all scored at the 52nd percentile on the OPI
Anxiety level scale.

Instrumental relativists (pure stage 2 adults)

registered a 47th percentile mean score.

No significance levels were

presented.
Dogmatism and Tolerance
A technique for managing anxiety (the apprehension caused by threat
to the values of self) which can occur in today's age at transformation
of values is to seek the security of dogma.
as the crystallization of one's values.

May (1967) defined dogmatism

The dogmatic person denies the

freedom to become aware and to experience the information which would
not support his crystalline structure.
Fromm (1947) stated that the security provided by dogmatism was a
symbiotic security.

The dogmatist aligns himself with an authority greater
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and morepowerful than himself.
submission to others.

Ne Subjects Pies own integrity to a

In relations with those who do not share the
blocking-out

same dogmatic values, the dogmatist responds with o
technique.

This becomes expressed as a lack of tolerance.

Hogan (1969) found the CPI Tolerance scale significantly correlated with one of his components of moral judgment but not with another.
The CPI correlated with ES scores for two samples, r = .42 and r = .33.
p =.01. but Hogan's (1970) SEA was not significantly correlated with the
SEA, r = -.07, and

CPI Tolerance scale for either Form A or B of the
r = -.11, n = 94 .

Consistent with the dogmatism-tolerance dichotomy,

Hogan reported in the same study that ES scores were significantly and
negatively correlated. r= -.31, p =.05, n =48, with scores on Rokeach's
Dogmatism scale for a separate sample.
A high score on the SEA represented professing an ethic of social
responsibility as opposed to an ethic of personal conscience.

The di-

rection of thP results are consistent with Fromm's discussion of responsibility directed outward rather than towards self.

An individual either

feels responsibility toward the rules of social authority or feels responsibility towards the standards of his own productiveness.
O'Connor (1971) used the MJS as his moral judgment index and the
Dogmatism scale of the Belief System Inventory.

His rank order prediction

(3 & 4, and 5 & 6) was not supported by the data.

His prediction that

those at the moral stages 3 and 4 would be high in dogmatism is both consistert with either the findings reported for authoritarianism or the
theoretical exposition of a conventional moral organization by Kohlberg
(1963, 1968, and 1969).
The OPT Complexity scale was used by Sullivan and Quarter (1972) to
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measure tolerance for ambiguity and complexity.
judgment with the Kohlberg Heinz story.

They measured moral

Those subjects at the conven-

tional stage (pure 3 and 4, and mixtures of 3 and 4) ranked in the
53rd percentile.

Transitional stage subjects (mixed stages 5(3).

3[5]. 5[4]. 4[5]. and 5[2]) were at the 55th percentile.

Post-

conventional subjects (stages 5, 5[6]. and 6[5]), indicated a 59th
percentile rank.

Stage 2 instrumental relativists were characterized

with a 60th percentile, while pure stage 6 principled absolutists were
at the 62nd percentile.

The direction of these percentiles is consis-

tent with the actual rank order findings reported by O'Connor (4 and 3,
5 and 6).

Sullivan and Quarter hypothesized that stage 2 adults (instru-

mental relativists) were more like adults at the postconventional stage
than the preconventional stage.

These findings support that hypothesis.

Alker and Poppen (1973) also compared conventional moral stage
subjects against nonconventional moral stage subjects (5 and 6, with 1 and
2) on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale.
r - .08, p >.0E , was found.

Again, no significant relationship,

Comparing principled subjects (5 and 6)

against premoral stage subjects (1 and 2), they did find a significant
correlation, r = -.35, p =.05 .
The TORSCA dimensional analysis used by Alker and Poppen to help
interpret these findings was not conclusive.

The first solution grouped

dogmatism with external locus of control, machiavellianism, and right
political beliefs.

An orthogonal solution placed dogmatism closest to

humanism and conventional morality.

Alker and Poppen explained this

relationship as indicating that humanism and normativism as well-defined,
packaged ideologies represent ready-made solutions to life's dilemmas.
Continuing within an existential framework, they further concluded that
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humanism as an ideology can be used OS well as normstivism as a blockingout technique to escape from the burden of making a fret and unique choice.

Chapter V

Certitude
In this section the cognitive aspects of personality (ego strength),
the awareness of feelings, and the capacity to act on these conscious
feelings (will) will be reviewed.

These three cognitive components are

integrated in May's (1967) concept of certitude.

These three aspects

of certitude will be broken down into ego strength, intelligence, cognitive development, attention, ego stages, and awareness of feelings.
A review of May's expostion of the concept of certitude will clarify
how those components are an integrated whole.
May (1967), adopting Kierkegarde's thought, defined certitude as
the full development of the human potential.

This development requires

the creation of integrity through thinking, feeling, and acting as a
fully conscious gestalt.
larly.

Fromm's productive character is defined simi-

Certitude as here defined is also synonymous with self-actualiza-

tion (Shostrom, 1967).
May (1969) presented a parallel concept
cally based relation to moral judgment:

which has a more histori-

intentionality.

is the totality of a person's orientation to the world.

Intentionality
This orienta-

tion is the cognitive and conative structure which gives meaning to
experience, underlies the capacity to have intentions, and is the
meaningful action toward something.
The cognitive dimension of intentionality is what the intellect
grasps about the thing understood.
84

Cognitively, intentionality is a

efo
process of forming meaning, a process of understanding the outSide world.
Creating meaning is

defined as consciousness.

May continued,"The act

and experience of consciousress itself is a continuous molding and remoldour world, self related to objects and objects to self in insep-

ing of

arable ways, self participating in the world ds well as observing it..."
(p. 225).
Constructing meaning is not, however, a strictly cognitive process.
Meanings are also constitutimiof connotive dimensions.
associated with physiological -emotional feelings.
ever, can be directional.

Meanings

become

This association, how-

When the perception of inner bodily sensations

(emotion) immediately preceeds the creation of meaning, the creation of
the meaning is influenced by the emotional perception underlying this
meaning process.

Our experience of consciousness is an experience of both

cognitive and emotional dimensions.
Intentionality is further a motivation to action.
response towards the structure of one's world.

It is an assertive

This assertive response

is in the manner of taking care of something, to tend our consciousness.
"Cognition, or knowing, and conation, or willing, then go together.
could not have one without the other.
tant.

We

This is why commitment is so impor-

If I do not will something, I could never know it; and if I do

not know something, I would never have any content for my willing "
(May, 1969: 228).
Intentions are specific motivations towards specific parts of the
world which are generated and directed from one's orientation to the world,
one's intentionality.

An intention is a directing of one's attention towards

something with some purpose in mind.

The conceptualizations of intention

used by Piaget and intentionality by Breznitz and Kugelmass (1967), Kugel mass and Breznitz (1968), Kugelmass, Breznitz, and Breznitz (1965), and
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Gutkin (1973) reflect

this meaning of intention and not Hay's construct

of intentionality.
Ego Strength
Kohlberg (1958). Fromm. and May all used Freud's construct of ego
strength to discuss the cognitive aspects of personality and moral
judgment.

This usage results from the cognitive basis of realitrprinciple

functioning.
Kohlberg (1958 & 1963) stated that ego strength represents a set of
interrelated ego abilities.

These abilities included 1) the intelligent

prediction of consequences, 2) the ability to differentiate and relate
means and ends, 3) the ability to weigh probabilities, 4) the ability to
abstract general rules. 5) the ability to maintain stable, focused
attention, 6) the ability to choose greater remote reward over lesser
immediate reward (delayed gratification), and 7) impulse control. Research
which focuses both on the individual components of ego functioning and on moral
development exists only for intelligence

and attention.

Intelligence
Numerous researchers (Kohlberg, 1958, 1964; Keasey, 1971; Tracy &
Cross, 1973; Hoffman, 1970) have reported significant positive correlations between I.Q. test scores and MJS scores.
been, however, low to moderate.

These correlations have

O'Connor (1971), Selman (1971), Haan,

Stroud & Holstein (1973, failed to replicate these relationships.
Hogan (1969) reported that ES scores were significantly, r = .32,
correlated with the SAT Verbal scores but not with the SAT Quantitative,
the MCAT Verbal, or the MCAT Quantitative scores.

Hogan's (1970) SEA

was not significantly related to three measures of I.Q.
Fromm (1947) drew a distinction between intelligence and reason.

Intelligence is
synthesis.

a process of analysis.

Reason is a aleeper process of

Fromm claimed that intelligence is applicable to manipulation

but that only reasoe

was sufficient for the productive thinking of the

productive character.
Keasey (1975) has also challenged the validity of intelligence as
either a component or correlative of moral judgment.

Keasey presented

data to support the argument that I.Q. tests do not measure qualitative,
structural

cognitive development.

Different amountiof intelligence.

therefore, could not produce qualitatively different modes of moral
reasoning.

At most, intelligence may be related

to the rate of moral

development but not to the development per se.
Although Kohlberg (1958, 1964) has reported I.Q. - MJS correlations,
he (1958,

1963, & 1969) has theoretically emphasized the role of cog-

nitive development and not intelligence in the development of moral
judgment.
Cognitive Development
Keasey (1975) reported empirical evidence to directly support his
previous contention.

Keasey cited an urpublished study by Kuhn et al

which strongly suggested that formal cognitive operations are prerequisite for principled moral reasoning.

Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey

(1974) found that all principled (stages 5 & 6) moral judgment subjects
possessed "some" capacity for formal operational thought.

All subjects

evidencing formal operational thought, however, did not exhibit principled moral judgment.

They concluded that cognitive development was

1) necessary for moral development, 2) not sufficient for moral development,and 3) chronologically precedent to moral development. A similar
relationship was found between concrete operational thought

Hoffman (19751 presented

and stage 2 moral judgment (toasty. 1973).

a theory of altruistic motivation (moral empathy) which explicated the
necessity of concrete nperational thought for moral empathy.

If

young children have a natural tendency towards altruistic empathy
which progresses through a stage based on concrete operational thought,
then this altruistic behavior would seem to be incongruous with Stage
2 moral judgment.
Sullivan and Quarter (1972) investigated relationships between
MJS scores and Omnibus Personality Inventory (OPI) scores.
'Thinking Introversion" scale of the OPI measures
for reflective thought and abstractions.

The

a subject's tendency

Conventional (Stage 3 & 4 and

mixtures thereof) moral subjects ranked in the fifty-first percentile.
Postconventional (Stage 5, 5[6], and 6[5]) subjects scored at the fiftysixth percentile,while principled absolutists (Stage 6) scored at the
fifty-eighth percentile.
fifty-sixth percentile.

Stage 2 instrumental relativists ranked in the
The significance level of these percentile

differences, if any, was not reported.
Fromm (1947) stated that product-ke character thinking was characterized by objectivity, logical analysis, and the development of a
deeper structural view.

Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) used psychi-

atric interviews to assess the ego processes of coping, defense, and
fragmentation.
operations.

This assessment included ratings on a number of cognitive

They obtained significant, p= .05, positive relationships

between MJS scores and the ego coping processes of 1) objectivity, 2)
intellectuality, and 3) logical analysis.
explicitly defined.

None of these terms were
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Attention
Hay (1969) emphasized the essential importance of attention for
perception and conceptualization.

Consciousness and cognitive activity

consist of a figure-ground constellation.

This constellation is cog-

nitively explorable and understandable only through attention.

Grim.

Kohlberg, and White (1968) postulated that the positive definition of
ego control was not impulse control but attention.

They stated that

cognitive performance was dependent on decentered

acts of attention.

In a review of child development, Kohlberg (1964) reported that the
maintenance of stable, focused attention had been repeatedly found to
be

significantly correlated with various measures of moral character.

The MJS was not one of these measures.
Grim, Kohlberg. and White (1968) intensively investigated the relationship between attentional processes and moral character.

They

specifically compared twelve measures of attention and five measures
of morality (not moral reasoning) with three age groups.

The attention

measures consisted of four reaction time (RT) variables and eight
galvanic skin response (GSR) variables.
based on two teacher-rated

The five morality measures were

questionnaires (on untrustworthiness and

disobedience) and three experimental cheating conditions.

These measures

were taken on a sample of first-grade pupils, sixth-grade pupils, and
college adults (mean age 31).

Not all measures were gathered for each

group.
For the measure used with the first grade pupils, eight of a
possible twenty-seven correlations were significant.

Ten of a possible

thirty-six attention-morality correlations were significant, p= .05,
in the predicted direction for the sixth-grade pupils (Table 17).
of these correlations were significant for both age samples, while

Four
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Table 17
Major Correlations Between Attention and Morality Measures at Two Ages

Measure

6th grade

1st grade

Carrelations replicated at both ages
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and high RT variability (S0)

.38

(.30) .59**(.59**)

High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and increase of RT (4-1)

.50**(.37) .41**(.43")

High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and increase of nonspecifics (4-1)

.25 (.37) .49**(.52")

High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and high movement artifacts

.43**(.40)

.41**(.27)

b
High cheating, all tests, and high
RT variability (SD)

.61**(.61") (.16)

b
High cheating, all tests, and RT
increases (4-1)

.36 (.33) (.44")

b
High cheating, all tests, and increase of nonspecifics (4-1)

.43**(.44") (.34)

Correlations found only at older age
a
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)
and long RT (X)

.74**(.53") .15 (.01)

High cheating, all tests,b and
high nonspecifics (X-)

.42**(.36) (.12)
continued

6th ,grada1s_t rade
High

(heating. all tests.b and high

movement artifacts GSR

.47**(.46) (- 38)

Correlations found only at younger age
High cheating, all tests,b and
high basal GSR

-.13(-.12)

(.484,*)

(a) Correlations of disobedience ratings and the given variable
are presented in parentheses.
(b) Correlations in parentheses indicate sums based on only the
circles and Lie Test used at both ages.
From: Grim, Kohlberg, & White (1968) Table 2.
**p<.05.
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three were specific to the sixth-grade sample and one to the firstgrade sample.
An unrotated factor analysis of the full correlation matrix
produced a primary factor which Grim. Kohlber9. and White (1968) labeled
as "general behavior control."

The major variables which defined the

factor were the two moral behavior ratings (untrustworthiness and disobedience) and three measures of attentional instability (RT variability.
RT increase, and increase in nonspecifics (1st - 4th).
behavioral control sianificantly,

Lack of general

clustered with attentional

instability for both the first-grade and sixth-grade samples.

Five other

variables were significantly clustered on this primary factor for the
sixth-grade sample only:

I) cheating, circles test; 2) cheating, lie test;

3) cheating, block test; 4) RT mean; and 5) GSR movement artifacts.

This

sample-specific finding was explained as due to the lower reliability
of the cheating tests for the first-grade sample.
A subsequent varimax rotated factor analysis defined three factors.
The first rotated factor was characterized as "task conformity."

It

loaded on both psychomotor measures of steadiness (RT increase, RT mean,
and movement; the last two for the sixth-grade sample only) and on the
teacher's ratings of stable conformity to authoritative social expectations.
The second rotated factor isolated the experimental cheating measures
of morality.

This factor was designated as one of "inner stability."

It

was interpreted as follows: "It might be suggested that the morality component of the second factor represents a more internalized disposition than
the performance dispositions picked up by the first factor.

Where the

first factor seems related to the capacity of the child to exert restraint,
the second factor seems more voluntaristic.

The child who resists an
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opportunity to augment a test score by cheating must have both a willingness and capacite(p. 246).

Note the similarity of this inter-

pretation of experimental findings to the theoretical interpretation of
intentionality by May (1967. p. 228) described earlier.
A third rotated factor was interpreted as being an artifact of
the measures and statistical treatment.

It was, however, labeled as

"restlessness" and construed as analogous to impulsiveness.
Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) analyzed their findings to determine the extent to which the differences were due to developmental
influences as opposed to "personality" factors.

Analysis of the

correlation matrix revealed four sets of variables: I) developmental,
2) asymptotic developmental, 3) terminating developmental. and 4)
nondevelopmental variables.
Developmental variables were those which increased continuously
until adulthood.

The two psychomotor variables (RT variability and RT

increase) were continuous developmental variables.

These variables

were stated to represent second-order measures of stability or consistency of performance.

They concluded that this indicated a slowly develop-

ing factor of stability of attention.
Asymptotic developmental variables were those which increased until
approximately

sixth-grade and then insignificantly thereafter.

These

variables were grouped in discussion with the terminating developmental
variables which increased to sixth-grade and then terminated.
psychomotor variables of mean RT, mean nonspecific, and

The three

movement, and

the one psychophysiological variable (mean nonspecifics),which were
associated with moral behavior measures at grade 6 but not at grade 1, were
either asymptotic or terminating developmental variables.

These variables

awe interpreted as being primarily indicators of pure psychomotor inability rather than instability of attention.

First graders would not

have the neuromuscular coordination necessary to hold their fingers still.
Sixth-graders would have developed this psychomotor stability ability.
Variations between individuals at the sixth-grade level, therefore,
represent

instability of attention.

Grim. Kohlberg. and White (1968)

concluded that "the asymptotic variables relating to morality at Grade
6 did so because they then began to be determined by the stability components" (p. 248) (the developmental variables).
The general conclusions of Grim. Kohlberg. and White were primarily
focused on the interpretation that attention variables showed more clear
and regular age-developmental trends than do their moral variables.

This

was viewed as indicating that honesty (one of their moral variables) was
not dependent upon character factors such as quilt or anticipation of
punishment.

Since they did not investigate this alternative explanation,

their findings may represent spurious relationships.
They hypothesized that stable attention promoted honesty by enabling
a higher threshold to distracting thouants of the opportunity to cheat.
They viewed the temptation to cheat as an interesting and distracting
stimulus rather than as an arousal of an impulse.

Resistance to temptation,

therefore, was considered an ego process of "ideational -volitional attention"
rather than emotional impulse control or inhibition.

"Cognitive maturity of

verbal moral values or judgment interacts with the attentional-volitional
capacities discussed to determine cheating conduct"(p. 251).
Grim, Kohlberg, and White's construct of ideational -volitional attention has the conceptual constituents of May's (1969) concept of intentionality.

This interpretation is further substantiated by the fact that both

9i
authors Quote the same passages of James (1963) on volition (will) and
attention (May. 1969. p. 218; Grim, Knhlberg. and White. 1968. p. 251).
konlberg (1969) reported that attention was nonlinearly and significantly correlated with moral judgments.

This result was not further

elaborated as to samples tested and measures of moral reasoning.
Haan. Stroud. and Holstein (1973) gathered data on "hippies"
with thirty different ego process measures.

One of these ego measures

was the coping process of concentration (an attention-focusing operation).
Their sample of "hippiess"moral judgment global stage scores were divided
into three comparison levels: stage 2, stage 3, and stages 3(4) and above.
Concentration was more significantly, p
than the other ten ego coping processes.

.01. related to MdS scores
The level of concentration

increased as moral judgment increased.
Up Stages
The ego stage development theories of Erikson (1963) and Loevinger
(1966 & 1976) have been used in research on moral judgment by Sullivan.
McCullough, and Stager (1970);

Podd (1972); and Haan, Stroud. and

Holstein (1973).
Loevinger's (1966) model

postulates seven stages of ego develop-

ment: 1) symbiotic, 2) impulse ridden, 3) opportunistic, 4) conformist,
5) conscientious, 6) autonomous, and 7) integrated.

Sullivan, McCullough,

and Stager (1970) applied Loevinger's theory and Ego Development Test
(EDT) in their moral development research.

They hypothesized that

Kohlberg's and Loevinger's stage formulations encompassed "overlapping
content areas of personality."

Moral judgment (MJS scores) significantly

correlated with ego development (CLQ scores): r = .66, n = 120,T= .01.
This relationship decreased to r = .40, n = 120, a= .01, when age was
partialed out.

The relationship between moral development and ego
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development increased between age samples.

MIS scores correlated

La .19 with CO scores for 1? year olds, r • .48. a • 40. j- .01.
for 14 year old subjectse and to .S4. Au 40, ;L.- .01. for the
old sample.

17 year

These moderate correlations supported their conclusion

that those scoring high on either measure did not score at a similarity
high stage with an extremely high frequency.
Haan. Stroud. and Holstein (1973) administered the MJS and CLQ
to an older sample of "hippies" between the ages of 16 to 35 (modal age
= 20).

Table 18 presents the distribution of these subjects by ego and

moral stages.

A chi-square test of this distribution

failed to show

any significan!,p_ =.05, differences in either ego stages or moral stages
cross-classified.

They concluded that

the moral and ego stages do

not

represent identical or parallel sequential phenomena in this sample "
(p. 600).

Their conclusion is

based on the assumption that adults who

scored as stage 2 are reasoning at the preconventional level of adult moral
judgment.
This conclusion should be reviewed taking into consideration the position
of Turiel (1973) on adult stage 2 scorers.

Turiel argued that

some indi-

viduals in late adolescence experience a conflict between society's conventions and the inequalities and hypocrisies within society.

Moral confu-

sion and relativity follow this conflict because these individuals fail to
distinguish between conventional and moral reasoning.

Turiel (1975)

defined conventions as norms regulating sexual mores, dress codes, respect
modes, sex and age roles,

and

national and religious rituals and customs.

Society also incorporates within its normative system most of the moral
domain: honesty, the value of life, responsibility, and individual rights.
The moral relativism

which results from the rejection of society's normative

7

2

2

3

2.2-3,3s

Table 18

4

7

19

3/4s

21

6

7

8

4s+

58

12

16

30

Total Ns

Haan, Stroud, & Holstein

30

Ego Stages

and moral stages:
Distribution of hippies by ego

Moral
Stages
2, 3/2s
3s
3/4s+
Total Ns

al, (b) stage 3,
moral sequence are: (a) premor
Note: The divisions for the
staaes are:
alistic and beyond. The ego
personally concordant, (c) leg
nal between
and conformist, (b) transitio
(a) impulsive, opportunistic,
conscientious and beyond.
conformist and conscientious, (c)

ge
System causes confusion and a lack of committment to the moral aspects
within that system (Sullivan and Quarter. 1972)
This stage of moral reasoning, rather than being a "regression"
as theorized by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969). may be a state of transition:
a groping for cohesive moral principles and a reorganization of the
moral ideology which excludes social conventions.

Sullivan and Quarter

(1972) argued that adults or late adolescents classified as stage 2's were
structurally a hybrid postconventional stage.

These hybrid postconvention-

al subjects. Omnibus Personality Inventory profiles were more like thoTof
postconventional

subjects than conventional subjects.

Holstein (1973) conducted an analysis of their

Haan, Stroud, and

ego functioning data to

test Turiel's (1973) hypothesis against Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969)
theory.

Their analysis supported Turiel's position that these instrumental

relativists are in transition from stage 4 to stage 5 moral thought.
Having performed this analysis, however, Haan, Stroud, and Holstein did
not then reanalyze their ego stage (CLQ) data.

Such a

reanalysis may

have modified their ego stage conclusion above.
Such a

reanalysis by the present author shows that of the thirty

"hippies" classified as instrumental relativists, 3 are typed as either
impulsive, opportunistic, or conformist in ego stage,

while 19 are in

a state of transition from the conformist ego stage to the conscientious
stage, and 8 subjects are either conscientious autonomous, or integrated
in ego stage.

If Haan, Stroud, and Holstein's (1973) data in Table 18is

reorganized to place these instrumental relativists as transitional between
stage 4 and stage 5, a relatively clear parallel sequential pattern emerges
(Table 19).

A chi-square

reanalysis, however, failed to find significant,

x2 = 3.1 (4), at .05, concordance between ego and moral stages.
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Table 19
Reanalysis of Ego Stage-Moral Stage Distribution: Staoe 2 Reclassified as
Transitional Postconventional

2,3.4

EGO STAGES
transitional

Conventional

2

7

Transitional
(instrumental relativists)

3

19

8

30

Postconventional

2

4

6

12

Total N's

7

30

21

58

MORAL STAGES

4-5 5,6,7 Total N's
16
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Podd (1972) investigated the relationship between Erikson's (1963)
-go growth stages and Kohlberg's moral judilpeet stages.

He pursued

this relationship through focusing on Marcia'S (1966) identity statuses.
Erikson's eight stages of ego growth

were operationalized by Marcia

(1966) into four ego identity statuses.

These four stages focus on the

process of adolescent identity crisis resolution.

Identity crisis

resolution is accomplished through a process of committment in such areas
as occupational choice, religious beliefs, and political ideology.

The

identity statuses are: 1) identity diffusion - the individual has no commitment regardless of crises; 2) foreclosure - the individual has experienced
no crisis but is committed to goals and values of parents and significant
others; 3) moratorium - the individual is in crisis with vague commitments;
and 4) identity achievement - the individual has gone through a crisis and
is committed.

Podd postulated that moral ideology was a part of the ego

identity construct.
Identity achievement status subjects had significantly higher

MJS

mean ratings than subjects in all other statuses combined, t = 2.25
(107),a =.05 .

A Newman-Keuls multiple-comparisons test indicated that

identity achievement subjects received significantly, a= .01, higher
mean MJS scores that either foreclosure or identity diffusion subjects
but not moratorium identity status subjects.

The moratorium status sample,

however, made significantly, p =.01, higher mean MJS scores than those
in the foreclosure and identity diffusion statuses.

For this sample of

male college students, those in the identity statuses reflecting a
higher degree of ego identity received significantly higher mean moral
judgment ratings than those in the statuses designated as reflecting a
lower degree of ego identity (identity achievement -moratorium- foreclosure
identity diffusion), t = 4.29(107), p - .01.
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An analysis of the distribution of 11US stage scores within the
respective identity statuses resulted in a complex pattern of relationships.

The identity diffusion status sample had more subjects at the

preconventional and less at the postconventional level of moral thought
than expected by chance, x2 • 5.82 (1). p • .02 and x

2
a

8.08 (1). R • .005.

There were also a greater number of identity diffusion subjects who had
transitional MJS scores between conventional to postconventional moral
reasoning than expected on the basis of chance,

= 8.60, (1), R =.005.

Podd hypothesized that foreclosure subjects would show significantly
greater tendency to use conventional moral reasoning.

This hypothesis was

not statistically supported, although foreclosure was the only identity
status in which there were more conventional than either preconventional
or postconventional subjects.

There were, however, significantly fewer

foreclosure subjects classified into the postconventional moral judgment
stage than expected by chance, x 2 = 4.32, (1), a =.05.

The moritorium

subjects were distributed across the moral stages within chance expectancies.
More identity achievement subjects were classified at the postconventional moral level than predicted by chance,
p_ = .0005

There were fewer preconventional,

and transitional, ;e=9.01, (1),

= 16.27, (1),
= 4.14, (1), R =.05,

= .005, stage subjects distributed

within the identity status group than expected by chance.
Podd futher analyzed the variability of subjects' issue scores on
the MJS.

These analyses revealed two significant relationships.

Sig-

nificantly fewer subjects in the identity achievement status were variable
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a • 7.00 (1).

• .01, and significantly mare in the marator1um status

were variable, 312 • 4.63 (1).

• .05, than predicted by chance.

Awareness of feelings,
Ego strength is only one aspect of certitude.

Feeling sensitivity

and acting on these cognitive and feeling dimensions are the completing
dimensions.
Shostrom's (1967) borrowed concept of congruence aptly encompassed
these last aspects of certitude.

Congruence is the ability to feel our

emotions physiologically, to experience them consciously, and to communicatt(act upon) them accurately.

Kohlberg (1964) reported that stage 2 delin-

quents showed a lack of such affectional reactions (undefined).
Hoffman's (1970) investigation of conscience in 7th graders tested
hypotheses about feeling sensitivity and expression.

Hoffman used two

Kohlberg dilemmas and two other dilemmas which were scored with modified
Kohlberg procedures to assess moral stage.

Five measures of guilt were

administered: maximum guilt, terminal guilt, ego-alien guilt, impulse
tolerance, and repression.

The last two were interpreted as measures

of feeling censitivity.
The measure of tolerance of anti-moral impulses did show a significant difference, p_ = .001, in awareness of feelings between postconventional
(Hoffman's humanistic subjects) and conventional moral stage male subjects.
Responses to a story in which the "hero" desires to win a race and cheats
to accomplish this goal were scored for both an initial expression of
pleasure at winning and a subsequent response of quilt for having cheated.
Postconventional male subjects expressed both the pleasure and the guilt
feelings.

Conventional male subjects expressed greater quilt but did not

express any positive feeling from having won the race.

This was interpreted
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as indicating that young adolescent, conventional-moral -stag* Subjects
had such a low tolerance of anti-moral impulses that they could not even
experience the pleasure resultant from performing these impulses.
Postconventional subjects have appropriate impulse tolerance to both
experience positive and negative affects.
Conventional moral stage subjects had higher scores than postconventional subjects on four repression indexes, but the differences
were not significant.
Gutkin

(1973) attacked Hoffman's (1970) interpretation of the

tolerance of anti -moral impulses on the distinction between impulse
and intention.

Gutkin defines "impulse" as a thought or desire with no
This definition, however,

instrumental behavior necessarily attached to it.

does not sufficiently discriminate it from his definition of intention.
Intention entails anticipated goal -oriented consequences.
provided a defining

Halleck (1895)

component which corresponds more closely to May's

(1969) definition of intentionality.

An impulse, Hallack (1895) stated,

entailed no deliberation of the consequences of the potential action on
others,either goal -oriented or not.

An anti -moral impulse then would be

any thought that violated an internalized norm.

Postconventional subjects

(Hoffman, 1970) expressed more awareness of depriving another of the
deserved prize of winning the race (intention) than did the conventional
subjects who focused on their anti -moral impulses.
therefore, are not

Hoffman's results,

inconsistent with the findings between moral stage

and intentionality.
The ego functioning processes scaled by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein
(1973) included measures of affective operations.

These nine operations

consisted of three each of ego coping, defensive, and fragmentation modes.
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No significant differences were found for moral stages between either
substitution, reaction formation, and unstable alternation ar suppression,
repression, and depersonalization.

Conveitional moral stage (stage 3?)

subjects, however, had significantly. p

=As. higher

effective preoc-

cupation scores than either instrumental relativists (stage 2-S) or
postconventionals.

Affective pleoccupation

sublimation and displacement.

was trichotomized with

Haan. Stroud. and Holstein did not inter-

pret this finding, although affective preoccupation was presented as an
ego fragmentation operation.

Affective preoccupation's context within

the above trichotomy suggests that it can be interpreted as impulse domination.

This would be consistent with Hoffman's (1970) findings.

Chapter VI
THE_ NATURE
_
_OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS
on,am.“41. •••••••••

The third dimension which Fromm (1947) proposed distinguishing
between the unproductive character and the productive character orientation was

the nature of our relation and interaction with others.

can relate and interact in three ways:

One

in symbiosis (e.g. to lose the

self either in submission to or dominance of others); in withdrawal
(e.g. to protect the self through either distance or destruction of
others); or in love (e.g. the affirmation of the truly human self through
caring, knowing, and respecting others' truly human selves).
Fromm's unproductive character lives in either a symbiotic or a
withdrawal relationship with others.

The productive character nourishes

a love relationship with others which is not romantic love (Fromm, 1947
and 1956).

Productive love is an active power to give active concern for

the life growth

and integrity of that which we love under the condition

of preserving one's own integrity.

The person whose character has not

developed beyond the stage of the receptive, exploitative, marketing or
hoarding orientation

cannot experience love in this way (Fromm, 1956).

Since the unproductive character was conceived as possessing an authoritarian
conscience, the relationship with authority would be central.
Fromm recognized that the symbiotic relationship with the authority
could be expressed through two types of manipulativeness (Machiavellianism).
If one blocked his freedom and responsibilities through submission to others,
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then he would manipulate others either through servility and parasiticalmess (Receptive Orientation) or through possessiveness (Hoarding
tation).

Orien-

If on the other side, one blocked his freedom through dominance

of others, then his manipulativeness would be expressed through either
overt exploitation (Exploitative Orientation) or covert opportunism
(Marketing Orientation).

May (1967) similarly stated that Western man

has historically blocked awareness of his own perception and consciousness, and freedom and responsibility through controlling and manipulating
the environment.

The environment included nature, others, and self.

Shostrom (1967) conceptualized human existence as residing within
the dichotomy of manipulation versus actualization.
Fromm's unproductive and productive

This closely parallels

life orientations.

The manipulator is

contrasted with the actualizer on four fundamental characteristics (see
Table 90).

Shostrom presented four nanipulative systems which strongly

parallel Fromm's four unproductive character types:
Manipulative System

Unproductive Orientation

Passive

Receiving

Active

Exploiting

Indifferent

Hoarding

Competitive

Marketing

The passive manipulator attempts to control others through feigning
helplessness and dependency.

The active manipulator, however, exercises

control through creating obligations, threatening harm, and exercising rank.
Indifferent manipulation involves using withdrawal of contact (not
hearing, forgetting, not understanding) and being indifferent (claiming
not to care).

The actual games used by an indifferent manipulator belie his

caring and possessiveness.

The competitive manipulator continuously calculates

107
Tablt 20
Fundamental Characteristics of Manipulators and Actualizors Contrasted*

Manipulators
1.

Actualizors

Deception (Phoniness.
Knavery).

1.

The mani-

Honesty (Transparency. Genuineness. Authenticity).

The actual-

pulator uses tricks,

izor is able honestly to be his

techniques, and maneu-

feelings, whatever they may be.

vers.

He is characterized by candidness,

He puts on an act.

plays roles to create an

expression, and genuinely being

impression.

himself.

His expressed

feelings are deliberately
chosen to fit the occasion.

2.

3.

Unawareness (Deadness, Boredom). 2. Awareness (Responsiveness, AliveThe manipulator is unaware of the

ness, Interest).

really important concerns of liv-

fully looks and listens to him-

ing.

self and others.

He has "Tunnel Vision." He

The actualizor

He is fully

sees only what he wishes to

aware of nature, art, music, and

see and hears only what he

the other real dimensions of

wishes to hear.

living.

Control (Closed, Deliberate).

3. Freedom (Spontaneity, Openness).

The manipulator plays life like

The actualizor is spontaneous.

a game of chess.

He has the freedom to be and

He appears re-

laxed, yet is very controlled

express his potentials.

and controlling, concealing his

master of his life, a subject

motives from his "opponent."

and not a puppet or object.

He is

continued

10.

Actualizors

Obnipulators
4. Cynicism (Distrust).

4.

Trust (Faith. Belief).

The manipulator is basically

The actualizor has a deep trust

distrusting of himself and

in himself and others to relate

others.

to and cope with life in the

Down deep he doesn't

trust human nature.

He sees

here and now.

relationships with humans as
having two alternatives: to
control or be controlled.

*Drawn from Table 1, p. 23-24, Shostrom, 1967.

lt,
and tries to outwit others either through active strategies or passive
ones.
Shostrom (1967 and 1972) stem to have focused on Fromm's third
dimension of moral character structure in his theortzing.

Although

Shostrom does not explicitly cite Fromm (1947) for his theorizing, he
does acknowledge that Fromm (1957) was the inspiration for his thought
development in Man, the Manipulator (1967).
Our relations with others is a broad construct consisting of four
broad dimensions:
empathy.

manipulativeness, aggression, social desirability, and

Each dimension has been divided and measured in numerous ways.

In particular, empathy has been widely discussed, divided, and tested.
Empathy is reviewed here by separating it into egocentrism and role-taking
empathy.

These four dimensions Llosely parallel the underlying dimensions

of types of manipulators and unproductive character types.
Manipulativeness
Kohlberg (1968) generalized the egocentric, self-enhancement nature
of the stage 2 moral orientation.

This relationship was supported by

Fontana and Noel (1973), who found a significant correlation, r = .24,
= .05, between MJS and Mach V scores for stage 2 moral subjects.

They

did not explain how they performed correlations between single stages of
moral reasoning and Mach V scores.

Significant correlations were not

found for stages 3, 4, 5 and 6, r = .04, -.04, -.13, and -.10 respectively,
n = 93.

The Machiavellian scale measures the orientation in interpersonal

relations which uses a manipulative, exploitative approach.

These find-

ings must be cautiously evaluated until Fontana and Noel's correlation
analyses are explained.
Studying a similar population and relationship, Alker and Poppen (1973)

presented their results In both the total Mach V score. the Machiavellian
Tactics subscale score, and the Machiavellian Views subscale score.

%one

of these scores were significantly correlated with NUS scores. r • -.04.
-.09. and .04 respectively, n • 192.

These scores were not significantly

correlated or a comparison of conventional ( 3 • 4) and nonconventional
(1. 2, 5 & 6) moral stage subjects
n a 192.

r = .07, .01. and .12 respectively.

A comparison of premoral (1 & 2) versus principled (5 & 6) moral

stage subjects, however, did yield a significant correlation for the
Machiavellian Tactics subscale scores, r = -.35, p = .05. The overall
Mach V score and the Machiavellian Views subscale were not significantly
correlated to this premoral/principled comparison, r

-.23 and .01

respectively.
The initial TORSCA dimensional solution added some interpretation to
these findings.
locus

The Machiavellian scores clustered with dogmatism, external

of control, and right political views.

This solution was not consis-

tent with previous findingsreported by Alker and Poppen which indicated that
the

Machiavellian person flourished in situations where others were

constrained by rigid compliance to norms since the Machiavellian was not
constrained by such norms and profited most in contexts which were ambiguous.
An orthogonal analysis of the same data resulted in a potentially salient
relationship.

Machiavellianism clustered most closely with principled •

morality in this analysis.
terms of freedom of choice.

Alker and Poppen interpreted this finding in
Both the Machiavellian

and the principled

moralist make choices free from the constraints of conventional morality.
Both orientations also accepted full resonsibility for their choices.
The difference between the two orientations rests on the nature of the
choices, either morally creative (principled morality) or selfishly

opportunistic (Machiavellianits).
The productive character was morally creative in Fromm's theory.
Morality itself was defined as the productive use of one's powers to
reason, to love, to imagine and create.

The self-actualizor is morally

"constructive" in his relations with others, himself, and his environment.
The more productively and thus actualizingly one lives, the more developed

becomes one's conscience.
Aggression
Aggression and self-destructiveness were, to Fromm, the counter forces
of productiveness.

Using the same phraseology as later used by May (1967),

Fromm attributed aggression to the "blockage" of man's spontaneous experience
of his sensory, perceptual, emotional, physical, and cognitive capacities.
Aggression and self-destructiveness in whatever covert, insideous ways were
the direct outgrowth of the unproductive character.

Shostrom (1967) defined

manipulation as a system of dealing with people and oneself which is selfdefeating in certain ways.

Fromm observed that aggression against oneself

and others is conjunctive; Shostrom's thought on manipulation is concordant
with this view.
Anchor and Cross (1974) in investigating moral judgment examined a
construct with this conjunctive relationship: maladaptive aggression.
Maladaptive aggression was defined as behavior towards another which had
three characteristics: 1.
gain, 2.

the aggressive initiator received no instrumental

from his penalizing of the victim, and 3.

the aggressive initi-

ator was himself penalized for behaving aggressively.

Anchor and Cross

operationalized maladaptive aggression through a modified Prisoner's
Dilemma game.

Subjects were given the opportunity on every tenth trial

to take away ten dollars from the opponents' account.

This ten dollars

II?
went to the "bank" and not to the subject who exercised this option.
The "aggressive" subject was in turn deprived of two dollars which Was
Placed in the "bank."

The subjects were not directly competing with

each other; both subjects were allowed to keep their earnings.
Subjects with lower MJS global scores aggressed their partners
significantly more than those higher in moral judgment, F
(2/111). p

.001.

8

18.36.

preconventional subjects penalized more than

conventionals,t = 2.58 (81), p

.025, and postconventionals, t = 5.29

(47), p = .005, and conventional MJS subjects aggressed significantly
more than postconventionals, t - 4.80 (94). p = .005.

Anchor and Cross

concluded, however, that moral judgment in itself was insufficient to
explain maladaptive aggression.
Social Desirability
Fromm (1947) detailed a high need for social approval as a characteristic of the unproductive receptive character.

He explained that this

need was an outgrowth of the unproductive character's insecurity in his
own ability to provide self-support.
phraseology.

Shostrom (1967) used very similar

The manipulator controls others because he needs their

support because he does not trust himself for self-support. Yet, he
does not trust others and therefore manipulates to insure their support.
Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found significant differences between the Q-sorts of subjects at various moral stages on the MJS.

The

descriptive adjective phrase "needs approval" was significantly, p = .05,
different across moral stages for males' ideal -self sorting.

The order

from lowest to highest need for approval was stage 6, 2, 5, 3, 4.

The

ideal to be "self-confident" showed a similar pattern for males: stages
5, 2, 6, 3, 4.

Females did not show these significant patterns.
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Hogan (1969) reported that IS scores correlated significantly
with scores on the Edward's scale for Social Desirability for two
samples. r • .50. p • .01. p • 70; and r • .37. p
tively.

.01. n - 51 respec-

The sample of females showed the lower correlation.

The ES

was also, however, significantly correlated with the 'Self-acceptance'
scale of the CPI for the same two groups.

These results are not

consistent with Shostrom and Fromm's theories.
These results, however, are inconclusive.

The ES scale, as

earlier criticized, seems to measure role-taking ability and sociability
rather than empathy.
self-confidence.

High ES subjects would be expected to show high

This sociability and confidence may, however, reflect

confidence in one's ability to control others' providing of support.
It may show successful manipulation, although the need for social
approval would still be present.
Results from another of Hogan's (1970) studies supports this latter
interpretation.

Only the SEA Form B showed a significant, r = .22,

p = .05, n = 90, but extremely low correlation with the Edward's Social
Desirability scale.

This finding was not duplicated for the SEA Form A.

The SEA distinguishes between two sets of ethical orientations: personal
conscience and social responsibility.

Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968)

data indicates that stage 6 subjects would have the lowest need for social
approval and that stage 5 subjects would have a low need. The SEA
marginal findings support this finding.

The CPI 'self-acceptance' scale

was not significantly correlated with the SEA.

This finding can be

interpreted as due to the lack of a sufficient range of moral development
stages:

personal conscience versus social responsibility.

Fontana and Noel (1973) generally replicated Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968)
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personality-morality relationships.
faculty. and administrators on

Fontana and Noel compared studemt4,

a number of demographic and personality

variables, and on moral judgment.

They did not report an instrument to

instrument correlation between MJS scores and Machiavellian Social
Desirability (MSD) scores.

Individual MJS stage to MSD scores were.

however, computed by a questionable, undescribed procedure.

Stage 2

scores correlated signifcantly with MSD scores, r = -.24. e =An, which
was the only significant relationship.

If the stage 2 moral person

is analogous to Fromm's exploitative character and Shostrom's active
manipulator then his control of others is through
not social amenities.

power domination and

He does not need other's approval to acquire their

support.
The order of correlation between MJS and MSD scores was stage 2,
3, 4, 6 and 5.

This order varies in important ways from Haan, Smith,

and Block who found an order of 6, 2, 5, 3, 4.

This variance may result

from the distinction between self-ideal description (Haan, Smith. and
Block) and actual self-description (MSD)

The correlation between stage

5 subject's MJS scores and MSD scores was marginally significant, r = .20,
=.07.

The marketing character and the competitive manipulator (stage 5)

must rely on establishing social good will in order to be successful.
Tracy and Cross (1973) administered the Children's Social Desirability
Questionnaire (CSDQ) to their sample of 12 to 14 year old subjects ,long
with the MJS.

The CSDQ scores were not significantly correlated, .r = -.20,

n = 76, with MJS scores.

A median split of low versus high CSDQ scores

showed that low scorers, however, had significantly higher MJS mean scores
(low = 281 MMS versus high = 255 MMS).
from stage 1 to stage 4.
relationships.

MJS scores for this sample ranged

This latter finding is consistent with the previous

IIS
Young adolescents are at a critical level of moral development.

Turiel (1969) and Itohlherl (1958. & 1963) have sham that this is a
period of rapid development

Tracy and Cross (1973) found that CS00

scores were significantly correlated. r . 24. ..05, with the MJS
difference scores between two administrations.

Those subjects with

higher social desirability scores demonstrated greater jumps in MJS
scores.

Subjects developing from preconventional to conventional moral

reasoning would be expected to reflect this relationship.
Eppathy
"Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to
oneself.

It implies responsibility, care, respect and knowledge, and the

wish for the other person to grow and develop" (Fromm 1956, p. 116).
The unproductive form of relatedness to others, according to From, is
manipulation.

Shostrom (1967) stated that actualizing love is charac-

terized by empathy.

He defined empathy as a "charitable, altruistic form

of love, which cares deeply for the other person as a unique human being.
...charity or compassion"(p. 122).
This definition of empathy includes much more than role-taking
ability.

The distinction was made earlier in this paper between role-

taking empathy and moral empathy.

Moral empathy is the consideration

of the consequences of one's actions for the welfare of others.

The

concept of "love" in Fromm (1947) and May (1969) and of empathy in
Shostrom is considered to be moral empathy.

Kohlberg (1958) stated

that 'moral set' was higher than social role-taking but dependent on it.
Empathy on the most basic level can
trism versus role-taking empathy.

be dichotomized into egocen-

Egocentrism is behaving and interacting

almost completely within the individual's private perspective, neither

Communicating the self-assumed perspective to Others nor considering

the perspective of others into one's interaction. On the other end
of the continuum would be role-taking empathy which is the ability to
incorporate the perspective and feelings associated with a role other
than one's own into one's own perspective.

Since Piaget (1932) has

shown that children develop from egocentric behavior to role-taking empathy
the review of the research will follow this developmental pattern.
Egocentrism
Kohlberg (1958) reviewed Piaget's and Mead's theories of moral
development.

Piaget (1932) theorized that higher moral reasoning re-

quired the ability to be aware of and use different points of view
(role-taking).

Mead (1934 ) developed a similar emphasis on reflexive

and projective thought.

Moral thought, according to Mead, is a process

of inner intercommunication among the self and those to be effected by
the consequence of a decision (role-taking).

Both theorists predicted that

children developed from an egocentric perspective to a more social, roletaking perspective.

Piaget (1932), Ruben and Schneider (1973),and Moir (1974)

have established this relationship.
As an adult personality trait, egocentrism can be considered as an
unwillingness to consider the cognitions and feelings of others
viewing everything in relation to oneself.

and as

The egocentric adult is cap-

able of role-taking empathy but either willingly or neurotically chooses
to disregard and disrespect others.

Such egocentric individuals would be

expected to be aloof, reserved and unresponsible in their interaction with
others.
Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found that stage 2 females rated themselves significantly higher on the adjective "reserved" than the females of
all other stages.

Stage 6 males, however, had the lowest self-ratings on

11?
on "reserved" end the highest self-ratings on

the edjective -responsive.-

The ideal-self descriptions of stage 2 subjects indicated some
potential pwholoqical conflicts.

Although male stage 2 subjects

desired to be "aloof." they simultaneously. however, communicated the
ideal of being "responsive."

The order on this adjective was stage 2

(i.36). stage 6 (5.31). stage 3 (5.20). stage 5 (5.04), and stage
4 (4.50).

The difference between stage 2 and stage 4 was significant.

..05 .
Fontana and Noel (1973) factor analyzed a similar adjective selfdescription sorting resulting in seven factors.

One of these factors

they labeled "Egocentrist" because it was characterized by lack of both
sympathy and moral empathy.

An undescribed procedure of calculating

only individual correlations between moral stages and egocentrist
individuals was performed.

This procedure is questionable.

The

egocentrists were significantly correlated, r = .24, p_=.05, with stage
2 moral reasoning.

The remaining order of declining positive correlations

between egocentrists

and

moral stages was

stage 3, r = .04 , stage

4, r = -.04 , stage 6, r = -.10 , and stage 5, r = .13.
Role-Taking Empathy. Consistent with Piaget's and Mead's theories,
Kohlberg (1958) found moral development to be dependent on role-taking
ability.

The subjects' teachers rated them on role-taking ability and

social participation.

These ratings showed a significant, F = 44.18,

=.01, difference between stages with
with moral development.

role-taking empathy increasing

Selman (1971) hypothesized that role-taking

ability was an age-developmental, social -cognitive process paralleling
moral development.
the

He defined role-taking as the ability to

understand

interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's

eyes.

Role-taking would necessitate the cognitive abilities to

make
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specific inferences about another's capabilities, attributes. es.
Pectatims. feelings, and potential reactions.

These inferences must

be based on the cognitive ability to attend to, shift, balance, and
evaluate both perceptual and cognitive social-object input.

Role-taking

development involves an increasingly accurate perception of both what
another will do in a specific situation and how one's own actions will
effect the

attitude of another towards oneself.

Selman (1971) administered two role-taking tasks to a sample of 8
to 10 year olds.

The responses were structurally scored and dichotomized

into reciprocal and nonreciprocal categories.

The reciprocal category re-

flected role-taking ability.
The two levels of role-taking ability for both tasks were significantly
associated with the preconventional versus conventional moral reasoning.
Eighty percent of the preconventional subjects had non -reciprocal scores while
74

of the conventional moral reasoning subjects had reciprocal scores.
A subsequent, longitudinal study of the preconventional subjects indi-

cated that no subject attained conventional moral reasoning without reciprocal
role-taking.

Selman (1971) concluded that reciprocal role-taking was a

necessary and developmentally prior ability to conventional moral development.
Tracy and Cross (1973) administered two role-taking measures to 12
to 14.66 year old students.

One of these was an adapted ES scale for children,

the other was a projective story measure.

A median split of scores on these

two measures failed to significantly distinguish between moral maturity
mean scores, and the correlations between the two role-taking tasks and MJS
scores were not significant.

Tracy and Cross (1973) suggested that their

failure to replicate Selman's (1971) findings probably reflected both the
variation in operational definitions of role-taking and the general lack
of construct validity for role-taking.
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Mbir (1974) investigated the relationship between non-moral roletaking and moral role-taking ability.
ability was the MOS.

His measure of moral role-taking

Two of the five non-moral role-taking measures

were those used by Selman(1971).

Only one of the measures used by Selman

was significantly. r • .446, p z.01. correlated with moral maturity scores
with intelligence controlled.

Two of the other three measures with intel-

ligence controlled were significantly correlated ,r = .543. p -.01. and
Moral maturity scores were significantly

r = .417. p. =.01.with MMS scores.
correlated. r = .639, p -.01, with
with intelligence controlled.

all role-taking scores combined and

Moir interpreted these findings as indicating

that nonmoral and moral role-taking abilities are a structure d'ensemble
defined by intrinsic structural connections.
Maitland and Goldman (1974) hypothesized that social participation in
a peer group working towards consensus would foster role-taking and provide
social role input to moral development.

Subjects of ages 15 to 17 years

were administered the OMJS and were assigned to one of three conditions on
the basis of paired pretest OMJS scores,

either an open-ended discussion

group, a consensus orientation discussion group or no group participation.
Only the consensus condition significantly increased pretest to post-test
OMJS scores, 55.538 to 60.538, t = 2.241(11), p - .05.

Maitland and

Goldman questioned the adequacy of the role-taking explanation in moral
development.

They claimed that the consensus and open-ended discussion

conditions both provided equal opportunities for role-taking.

Yet only

the consensus condition significantly affected moral development.

Further-

more, the OMJS scores for those in the open-endeddiscussion condition did
not significantly increase over those who were in no group and who thus had
no role-taking opportunities.

They vaguely suggested that a will or desire

lit
factor was present in the consensus condition
that was not in the openended diScwSsion condition.
Head (1934) and Hoffman (1975) both presented
evidence to support
the hypothesis that role-taking empathy was an
ability which was substantially developed before adolescence. Sever
al studies have reported
the relationship between role-taking empathy
as an adult personality trait
and moral judgment.
Kohlberg (1969) in his discussion of moral judgm
ent and the Milgram
obedience-to-authority experiment, stated that
subjects with high versus
1Jw empathy scores showed no significant diffe
rence in obedience. Since
Kohlberg neither specified the instrument used
to measure empathy nor defined
the type of empathy being investigated, further
evaluation is speculative.
Kohlberg did argue, however, that empathy was
an affective aspect of moral
judgment. A person's affective strength, however,
was not the determining
element of behavior. Kohlberg (1969) and Milgram
(1974) both concluded
that the cogniti4e definition of the Milgram-ty
pe situation determined
behavioral choice.
Role-taking empathy involves not only recognitio
n that others have
their own perspective but also the ability to perce
ive. discertl and have
insight into others' perspectives. Two measures of
this type of roletaking are Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale and the Peopl
e Are Easy to Judge
(PAEJ) scale on the Philosophy of Human Nature Scale
s. O'Connor (1971)
found that subjects' level of moral judgment on the
MJS was distributed
in a rank order from highest to lowest on the PAEJ
of stage 3, 4, 1 and
2, and 5 and 6. This order failed to match O'Connor's
predicted order
of 1 and 2, 3, 4. 5 and 6.

Since subjects with conventional moral reason-

ing can be considered externally oriented, it could
theoretically be predicted that they would

require a higher effectiveness in social acuity.

The lack of a significant relationship between PAL,) scores and MUS
scores may therefore be a function of the inappropriateneSs of the
prediction.
Hogan (1973). and Grief and Hogan (1973), have investigated the
relationship between

the Empathy Scale (ES) and Measure of Moral Values.

Social acuity as measured by the ES was significantly. r 2 .58. p '.05.
n , 92, related to MMV scores of maturity of moral judgment (Hogan 1973
and 1975) while Grief and Hogan (1973) found correlations of .48 and
.51 for two

samples, total n = 71.

Empathy was one of the ego processes examined by Haan. Stroud, and
Holstein (1973).

It was theoretically considered a type of ego-coping,

self-reflective, intraceptive operation.

Subjects were divided into three

moral stage groups: stages 2's, stage 3's, and

stage 4's and above.

A marginally significant, p =.10, F ratio was calculated for these three
groups on the measure of empathy.

The stage 2 groups had the lowest empathy

score while the stage 4 and above group had the highest.

Those findings

partially support the actual rank order found by O'Connor (1971).

More

substantial support was precluded by grouping all stage 4, 5 and 6 subjects
into a single category.

This ordinal relationship appears to generalize

from the Air Force cadet subjects of O'Connor to the "Haight-Ashbury
Hippies" in Haan, Stroud,

and Holstein's study.

DePalma (1975) reported research findings between scores on the DIT
and the ES without providing statistical analysis of these findings.
found that subjects high on principled moral reasoning (D1T
were more likely to be high on the ES.

He

p scores?2:48)

This implied, significant relationship

was made somewhat ambiguous by the finding that subjects with principled
moral reasoning scores below 48 were equally divided on high versus low
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empathy scores.

Mogen (1969 and 1973). and Grief and Kogan (1973),

Lontend that empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
mature moral reasoning.

It is but one of four components required for

mature moral reasoning.
DePalmes findings initially seem to contradict the findings of
O'Connor (1971), and Haan. Stroud. and Holstein

(1973).

diction may be an artifact of the research and analysis.

This contraBy grouping

all stage 1 - 4 subjects together in the below 48 DIT score group.
DePalma's analysis eliminated the potential discovery of a distribution
of high versus low ES scores by DIT stage.
The research findings for role-taking ability are inconsistent for
both pre-adolescent and adolescent samples.

Much of this inconsistency

may be due to the variety of measures of role-taking ability used:
behavioral, teacher ratings, projective measures, and objective selfreport measures.

Another contributor to these variant findings may

be the various ways the MJS and DIT scores are categorized for analysis.
Future research needs to further investigate the relation of role-taking
empathy to moral development.

Chapter VII

PROBLEM
STATEMENT
__
_
This study has one primary objective: to test the relationship between
moral reasoning structures and character (personality) structures.
primary objective encompassed four

This

subgoals: (1) a comparison of moral

reasoning instruments. (2) a test of a trait theory of moral character.
(3) a test of the relationship between moral reasoning structure and
level of self-actualization. and (4) a test of moral reasoning structures
and personality organization.
Problem 41: Comparison of Moral Reasoning Instruments
Four (MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV) of the seven measures of moral judgment reviewed earlier were selected for comparison in this study (see
Table 12).

These instruments index the same construct of moral reasoning

and have been used to investigate a similar range of research interests.
This past research is not, however, comparable or generalized because
the relationships between the MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV have not been
systematically determined.

The goal of this stage of the present study

is to determine these inter-instrument relationships.

These main consid-

erations determined the selection of these instruments for comparison:
1.

The instrument had to claim to measure moral reasoning and
not a subtrait of moral reasoning.

2.

The author of the instrument had to report a claim that his
instrument measured the same construct as Kohlberg's Moral
Judgment Scale.
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3.

The instrument had to be available to the author for inclusion
in the study.

Several related instruments were not used because they did not meet
one or more of the above criteria.
The Empathy Scale (ES) was eliminated because it failed to meet the
first decision criterion.

Hogan (1969) claimed that the ES measured only

one dimension of moral judgment.

The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA)

was likewise eliminated because it measures a single trait of moral
reasoning.

Although Hogan proposed that the two ethical attitudes

indexed by the SEA

appeared to parallel Kohlberg's distinction between

stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning. Hogan philosophicallyargued that neither
attitude represented a higher form of moral reasoning.

The SEA, therefore.

failed also to meet the second decision criterion.
The Defining Issues Test

(DIT: Rest. et al., 1974). however, was

disqualified based on the third

criterion.

Rest et al.

(1974; Rest,

1975, 1976) claimed that the DIT measured the complete concept of moral
reasoning and measured the same Kohlbergian construct.
however, a different response task.

The DIT requires,

The MJS responses require a spontan-

eous production type of response, whereas the DIT response involves comprehension and preference tasks.

Unlike the instruments included in this

study, Rest (1975, 1976) has conducted extensive DIT-MJS comparisons.
He reported a correlation of .68 between the

DIT and the MJS.

The moral

judgment instruments included in this study lacked such extensive validity
and reliability comparisons.
Another instrument not available for this study was the Measure of
Conscience (Hoffman, 1970).
with the

Gash (1976), however, has compared the MJS

Measure of Conscience and found significant associations between

12S
the two instruments.

This association was particularly strong at the

ends of the scales which indicate the greatest moral development.
The PUS, SMJS. 0046, and MMV met all three decision criteria and
were, therefore, included in this study.
validity criterion measure because of its

The MJS was designated as the
extensive history of use,

revision, and testing (Kohlberg. 1976).
Each instrument involved somewhat different problems to be investigated.

The SMJS presented two problems.

Reported data on the

SMJS is based on pre-college age, adolescent subjects (Gilligan, et al.,
1971).

The increased intellectual and social sophistication resulting

from reaching adult maturity may change the psychometric properties of
the SMJS.

The present study will broaden this data base by sampling adults

ranging in age from twenty to fifty-one.
Turiel (1975) reported a study which failed to indicate the same
developmental pattern for the SMJS as for the MJS.

Turiel hypothesized

that this finding could be interpreted as showing that the SMJS does not
actually measure a moral domain, but rather a social custom domain which
would not show a developmental pattern.

The moderate, significant cor-

relation between the SMJS and MJS reported by Gillian et al. (1971) was
not replicated in the study cited by Turiel.

The correlation between

the MJS and the SMJS, along with the directional change in SMJS scores,
needs to be replicated and extended to another sample.

This study encom-

passes this aspect in its design.
Although Maitland and Goldman (1974) reported a comparison of OMJS
scores and MJS maturity scores, this comparison was not based on a direct
comparison in which the same group of subjects took both tests.

They

compared their OMJS scores with the MJS norms for a similar age group.
This type of comparison provides suggestive supporting evidence, but
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not empirical evidence.

The OHO and MJS, therefore, were administered

to the same sample of subjects and then statistically compared.
The OMJS reported scores have only been based on 12 to 19 year old
high school students.

The reported psychometric properties are, there-

fore, sample age specific.

Administering the OMJS to older. adult

subjects would expand the age base upon which the psychometrics of
the instrument are based.

Again, the increased intellectual and social

sophistication of adult subjects could change the reliability of the instrument.

This hypothesis was tested in this study.

While Hogan and Dickstein (1972) claimed that the MMV was a parallel
technique of the MJS. they failed to conduct either a direct or indirect
comparison of the two instruments.
stantiated.

Their

claim is untested and unsub-

This study conducted a direct comparison of the two instru-

ments to determine the estimate of method variance and isomorphism between
the scores of the instruments.
Problem yq:

Test of a Trait Theory_of Moral Character

The majority of research reviewed in this study investigated either
one personality trait or a narrow selection of personality traits.

The

results of these investigations have been inconsistent for many of the
traits (such as ,
,uperPco

strength, ego strength, guilt, and intelligence).

There are at least four hypotheses to explain these inconsistent findings:
(1)

the different instruments used to measure moral reasoning may

account for the differences between studies, (2) the different instruments
used to measure the same personality trait may account for the differences
between findings, (3) the differences in sample populations tested may
account for the differences in results,

and (4) there may be no one to

one relation between single personality traits and level of moral reasoning.
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Kohlberg (19SP) hypothesised the relationship between a variety of
personality traits and stages of moral judgment.

He warned that traits

like autonomy and conformity would not show consistent relationships
because both traits are ambiguous.

They are ambiguous in the sense

that Kohlberg distinguished two types of autonomy and noted that
different stages would conform to different sources of influence. He
noted the same type of problem with the need for the social approval trait.
Kohlberg saw emotive traits like sympathy, guilt, and anxiety as bearing
an uncertain relationship to moral reasoning because of their multiple
definitions both within psychology and in the vernacular.

Ego strenath

was the only trait which Kohlberg (1958, 1963) emphasized as bearing
an important relationship to moral reasoning.

He did not, however,

specify this relationship.
Kohlberg (1958) hypothesized important similarities between the
traits of stage 2 and stage 5 individuals.

The pattern or organization

of these similar traits with other traits

distinguished one stage

the other.

from

Kohlberg (1958) concluded his theorizing about the relation-

ship between personality traits and moral judgment levels by hypothesizing
that "the general elements of the type may hang together to form a distinct
and unitary whole, or

a concrete 'personality type'"(p. 229).

Kohlberg (1969) again treated the relationship between personality
traits and moral judgment indicating deeper theoretical considerations.
He proposed that only age-developmental personality traits would show any
consistent relationship to the developmental moral judgment stages.
Personality traits which are single dimension, polar traits would not have
the formal -structural base paralleling the developmental, structural basis
of moral judgment stages.

Kohlberg suggested that two personality domains

might possess a structural basis: affective and interpersonal schemata.

In
He did not list any traits which eight be within the interpersonal domain
and only two traits for the affective domain
Was

quilt and empathy.

Guilt

not defined and the chantrin Kohlberg's thinking (1958. 1969) was

not discussed.

He concluded by hypothesizing that consistent relation-

ships should be found only between the few structural. developmental
personality traits and stages of moral reasoning.

He essentially denied

a personality trait theory of moral reasoning.
From (1947) also denied a personality trait theory of moral reasoning.
He emphasized a conative organization theory of moral reasoning.

The

organization of traits is the fundamental entity of character, the single
traits follow from the specific motivational structures.

From proposed

five conative structures listing the traits in each (see Table 9).
This study attempted an initial test of the personality trait theory
of m(ral reasoning.

The possible inconsistencies due to the different

instruments used to measure moral reasoning and personality traits in
previous research were controlled by administering a single sample of
subjects the same set of personality and moral judgment instruments.
comparisons were then computed on this comparable data.

All

Separate personal-

ity trait scores were then calculated across the stages of moral reasoning.
Selection of Instruments for a Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and
Personality Structures.
A study which attempts to empirically test the relationship between
such broad constructs as personality and moral reasoning is confronted with
the problem of selacting appropriate instruments to measure these constructs.
Each construct represents a separate problem.
The detailed analysis of the four moral judgment instruments compared
in Chapter IXof this research project formed the basis for selection of

the most adequate moral reasoning instruments.

The MS INS eliminated

because of its poor reliability and failure to discriminate between
stages of moral reasoning as determined by the MJS.

The MRV showed

promise as a reliable instrument,but it tog failed to significantly
demarcate the moral judgment stages determined by the MJS.

The SKJS,

however. replicated previous research (Gilligan, et. al. 1971) indicating
acceptable reliability and comparable identification and discrimination
of moral reasoning stages with the MJS.

The small percentage of subjects

scoring lower on the SMJS than on the MJS is consistent with theoretical
and empirical reports (Kirkendall, 1967; Wisbroth, 1970; Barclay, 1975;
D'Augelli & Cross, 1975; Turiel, 1976).

The MJS interjudge agreement rate

is substantial, adequate for research purposes, and comparable with that
reported for other studies (Kurtines & Grief, 1974).
The combination of MJS scores with the SMJS scores constituted the
final resolution for the most appropriate index of the moral reasoning
construct.
1.

This decision is based on the following six reasons:
the specific construct of moral reasoning under investigation
is the one proposed by Kohlberg

2.

the MJS was constructed and standardized by Kohlberg

3.

the SMJS was co-authored by Kohlberg to measure a specific
content domain to which moral reasoning was applied

4.

the majority of studies reviewed in this study were based on
the MJS, only two studies reported findings based on the MMV

5.

the psychometric properties of both the MJS and SMJS in this
study are appropriate

6.

the reliability of the index (stage) scores should have been
increased by the judicious doubling of responses on which they
were based by combining the MJS and SMJS scores.
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The seemingly endless number and variety of inStrumeWs used to
measure personality presents a formidable problem to researcherc.

An

Initial problem is the decision between selecting a single trait
measure such as empathy or autonomy versus a multi-factor instrument
like the 16 PF or Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.

Having made this

in;tial decision, the researcher is then faced with selecting appropriate
instruments for his purposes from the wide number and range that exist
within either type.
This study began as a broadly conceived project to identify personality profiles and conative organizations.

This original conception

determined the selection of one or more multi -factor instruments.

A

sufficiently wide range of single trait instruments to measure personality organization would have required an inordinate amount of time of
the subjects.

The increased reliability and construct validity of single

trait measures was sacrificed for the more time-efficient, global, multifactor instruments.
Practical and theoretical considerations determined the final selection
of personality instruments.

The practical consideration concerned the

selection of a widely used, extensively tested, instrument which would
index as full a range of personality traits as possible.

The theoretical

selection sought to investigate the productive, self-actualization aspect
of personality which provided a theoretical organization of this study.
The Cattell (1965) 16 PF most closely met the practical criterion.

The

16 PF is one of the most extensively tested instruments, Cattell having
continuously verified and revised the 16 PF.

The 16 PF is further frequent-

ly used in a wide range of research indicating widespread recognition and
acceptance.

Cattell (1965) purposely constructed the 16 PF to measure what
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I% gloorally considered the caselete range of personality dimensions.
These dimensions consist of sixteen general cognitive-emotive-behavioral
factors.

Any findings between the 16 Pf scores and the moral judgment

stages is widely generalizable on a theoretical plane to the vast array
of research using the 16 PF.

The 16 Pr Form A (1968 edition) was administered.

The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI: Shostrom, 1965) appeared
to be the best selection to meet the theoretical goals.

This study

is based both on Fromm's character model of morality and Kohlberg's
moral judgment developmental model.

Fromm's distinction between the

improductive versus the productive character has strong parallels to
May and Shostrom's theory of self-actualization as was noted in the
literature review.

There is a strong implication of greater moral

efficacy with increased self-actualization in the writings of May (1967),
Shostrom (1967), and Mahoney (1974).

Self-actualization as a formal

ethical theory has a long history from Aristotle to the Neo-Hegelians
(Baldwin, 1940) through Kierkegaard (Shostrom, 1967) and Bradley (1951).
Shostrom (1965) specifically constructed the POI to measure the humanistic psychological construct of self-actualization.

Shostrom (1968)

reports substantial reliability and validity findings for the POI.

There

is a growing body of research based on the POI.
In addition to these strictly instrument related considerations, the
POI was also selected for historical reasons.

Shostrom developed his theory

of actualization with an acknowledgement of Fromm.

Shostrom stated "I was

moved to write it [Man, the Manipulator) after reading an article, "Man Is
Not a Thing", by Erich Fromm, in the March 16, 1957 Saturday Review"
(1967, p. xiii).

This influence is further demonstrated in the parallel

of Fromm's four unproductive character types with Shostrom's
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(1967) four manipulator typos.

The

theoretical continuity from Fromm

to Shostrom and May is maintained in another way through the P01.

The

time orientation construct in the POI is based on May's theorizing (May.
Angel & (llenberger. 1958).

Yet, another continuity in moral development

personality research is created between the Peck and Havighurst (1960)
research and the P01 since both relied on the inner-directed and otherdirected dimension of Reisman et al (1961).

The POI consists of fourteen

scales measuring fourteen dimensions of self-actualization.

The P01

(1965 edition) was administered.
Problem 43:

Moral Reasoning and Level of Self-Actualization

Implicit in self-actualization theory is the idea of concomitant moral
development as a facet of self-actualization.

The humanistic theory of

self-actualization is a psychological model of human potential.

Self-

actualization has a much longer intellectual history as an ethical theory
(Baldwin, 1940).

The theorizing of Fromm (1947) and Shostrom (1965) has

been directed toward integrating the psychological and ethical aspects
of self-actualization.

Child (1973) noted

that Kohlberg's theory of moral

development did not grow out of humanistic psychology, but that it has a
distinctive humanistic character.

The moral judgment theory is a develop-

mental theory with analogous parallels to Maslow's
fillment development.

Child concluded that

hierarchy of need ful-

the reserch associated with

Kohlberg's theory provides some of the most substantial cnd pertinent
evidence for the value of a humanistic approach to the psychological study
of personality and social interaction"(p. 25).
The extensive use of the theoretical ideas of Fromm, May (1969) and
Shostrom (1967) which are essentially self-actualization oriented in the
exposition of this study made it desirable to test the relationship between

II!
moral judgment stages and levels of self-actualization.

This hypothesis

was included in the design by administering the Personal Orientation
Inventory (P01) constructed by Shostrom (196A) to the subjects along
with the moral reasoning instruments.

The P01 subscale scores of subjects

within each stage of moral reasoning were compared across stages and
an overall self-actualization score was likewise analyzed.
Problem 14:

Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and Personftliti Structures

Model
The primary objective of this study is to empirically test the relationship between moral judgment staaes and personality organization.
Such a test involved four steps: (1) a test of a trait theory of moral
character (see Problem 02), (2) the search for anidetermination of
personality profiles for each moral stage group. (3) the statistical
comparison of the stage-specific, personality profiles determined, and
(4) a test of a character-moral reasoning structure model through an
analysis of its predictive power.

The specific character organizations

proposed by Fromm (1947) were not empirically under investigation.

Any

parallels between his theoretical model and the empirical model will be
discussed.
The discovery of personality profiles associated with moral judgment
stages is a very different type of problem than that required for a test
of the trait theory (see Problem 02).
two stages of analysis.

The discovery procedure required

The first stage generated the empirical structure

of scores on the POI and the 16 PF.

A factor analysis of these subscale

scores provided the underlying structures.

The failure of the test of the

trait theory of character to substantiate this model warranted a deeper
structural analysis.

This analysis was also felt to be appropriate be-

cause Shostrom (1965) reported only a matrix of correlations between

1)4
the POI and the 16PF.

A factor analysis of the pool of both POI and 16Pf

subscale scores would determine whether any

of these subscales measured

factorially similar domains.
Although this involved factoring Cattell's 16PF factors, this
procedure seemed appropriate in light of the criticism of Howarth (1976).
He questioned the statistical assumptions and factoral

methods employed

by Cattell in his generation of sixteen personality factors.

Howarth's

review of research on the factoral structure of the 16PF items indicated
that the most frequently found number of factors was five, seven, and ten.
Howarth reanalyzed the 16PF items using more recent statistical guidelines,
criteria, and computational procedures than the

quated ones used by Cattell.
than sixteen factors.
therefore, sacred.

This

earlier, somewhat anti-

reanalysis resulted in only six rather

Cattell 's sixteen personality factors are not,

Howarth's research reduced the concern that the factor

analysis of the present study

would generate second-order factors.

The second stage of this discovery process determined the factor scores
for each of the moral reasoning stages.

This required an analysis of

variance to be computed on the factor scores.
composite scores were then examined.

The patterns of these

This did not, however, provide a

statistical comparison of the stage profiles.
In order to determine whether there are statistical differences between the stage-specific, personality profiles, a discriminant analysis
will be used.

The discriminant analysis determines and maximizes the

differences between groups.

The salient structural differences between

the personality profiles, therefore, will be identified while leaving a
residue of shared personality traits and structures between the groups.
The discriminant analysis also provides a statistical test of the profile

in
differences between groups.
The first three steps of the structural model test provide evidence
to substantiate the empirical presence of the model.
to then test the power and efficiency of
predictive power.

In the present study

The final step iS

the model and to examine its
the prediction of moral reasoning

stages by personality structures is the directional test of predictive
power.

The information needed for this test is contained within the aiscrim-

inant analysis.

Since Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning consists of six

stages within three levels of reasoning. it seemed desirable and appropriate to test the predictive power of the character model both for the six
stages and the three levels separately.

Chapter VIII
Method Section

Descriptive Statistic!
Subjects.

The sample consisted of thirty-one continuing education

students enrolled in Psychology 510, thirty-nine continuing education students enrolled in Psychology 521, and
enrolled in Psychology 450.

ten continuing education

students

Eighty-four percent (65) of these subjects

were elementary and/or secondary teachers, counselors, and administrators.
Eleven percent (9) were military personnel while five percent (3) were
divided amongst a wide range of occupations.
There were forty-five female (57 ) and thirty-four male (43 ) subjects.
Of these, fifty-five were married (70 ), fourteen were sinale (18 ), six
were divorced (8 ), and two were widowed (4%).
distributed as follows:

Religious affiliation was

Catholic-10 (13), Baptist-32 (421, Methodist-

10 (13%), Christian Church-5 (6 ), other Protestant denominations-14 (18 ),
and no affiliation-6 (8 ).

The age range was from twenty-one to fifty-one

with the mean age being 30.45 (Table 21).
Administration
All instruments were administered in a group form.
istration required using a written format for the MJS.

This group adminAlthough individual

interviews were preferred by Kohlberg (1973), he stated that group, written
administration was suitable for verbally proficient subjects.

This sample

of college enrolled students was assumed to be comprised of verbally
proficient subjects.
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merel Aages by Mean Age
_
Mean Age

Moral Stage
2

26.5

3

29.0

3-4

31.5

4

28.7

5

34.5

Pure stages only

F = 2.738

p_..055

Mixed stages in-

F = 2.117

R = .087

cluded
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Each group of subjects u4S told that data WS being c011ected for
a Master's thesis.

Each was further instructed that this study was

investigating the relationship between various personality variables and
subjects' views on

selected social problems and issues.

The MJS,

MMV, and OMJS were contained in a mimeographed booklet which attempted
to disguise their nature by being titled the "Social Attitudes Questionnaire" (SAQ).

Appropriate instructions preceded the instruments to

further this deception (see Appendix CN.
Subjects were explicitly instructed that their supporting reasoning
for their judgments was more important than the judgments alone.

Subjects

were requested to be as explicit and detailed in their supporting reasoning as possible.

The instructions further noted that there were neither

correct, nor right or wrong answers, and that the SAQ was purely an
opinion survey.

Confidentiality was assured and subjects were asked to

be completely honest and to express their true feelings.
The administration procedure varied at each test site due to the time
restrictions and

other limitations.

Each administration pattern,

therefore, will be discussed separately.
Pattern A.

Following the general instructions, half the subjects were

administered the POI while the other half were given the 16 PF.
sets of personality tests were then exchanged.

The two

The "Social Attitudes

Questionnaire" was subsequently presented the subjects.

The long administra-

tion time (312 to 4 2 hours) required that some subjects take the SAQ
home with them.

These subjects were explicitly instructed neither to

discuss with nor collaborate with

anyone else.

The protocols were

collected at the next class session.
Pattern B.

An accomplice gave the general instructions

and then
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administered the SAO package.
home with them.

Again. some Subjects took the instrument

The following week, the author administered the P01

and then the 16 Pr to the subjects.
Pattern C.

A member presented both the general instructions and

all instruments to the subject.
sessions

The instruments were given over two

with the SAQ being taken home by some subjects.

Scoring
MJS
: The protocols were initially scored by two judges.

A third

judge scored those protocols for which the first two judges either
failed to agree on major stage assignment or had major-minor stage
reversals.

The judges applied different scoring procedures due to

their respective training.

Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976a)

stressed that

research papers should specify which scoring method was used.
The MJS scoring procedures have been modified and revised twice since
the original version by Kohlberg and his associates.

Kohlberg (1976)

discussed the differences, similarities, advantages, disadvantages, and
consequences of these three scoring methods.

The original formulation,

called the Aspect-Scoring System, consisted of twenty-five

(or twenty-

seven, Kohlberg 1971) aspects which served as classification criteria.
An aspect was defined as a consideration that people made about moral
judgments (Kohlberg 1971).
issues.

These aspects were clustered under eight

An issue is a designation of a content area (see Appendix A

for the aspects and issues).
Responses to dilemmas could be scored either by sentence scoring or
story rating.
study.

Story rating was used by one of the primary judges in this

The rater read through the complete protocol for one story

isolated the main consideration (issues) produced by the subject.

and
Each
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of the aspects associated with that issue were then scared against the
proto-typical manual responses.

Any variation of stage scores across

Issues within a story were intuitively weighted to yield a dominant and
a minor stage score for each story (see Kohlberg. 1976 for an example
of this technique).

An overall global score for a subject was deter-

mined by rereading the complete. four-story protocol and intuitively
weighting

the

subject's responses as a whole across stories.

This scoring procedure was modified by Kohlberg (1976) to more
closely approximate the construct validity of moral development.

An

apparent excess of extraneous content (aspects) was yielding stage
classifications which were not invariant in longitudinally measured
subjects.

The modified scoring method was disseminated in 1972

(Kuhmerker, 1976a).

Called Intuitive Issue Scoring, it further developed

the issues of the previous Aspect scoring system.
issues or

The original eight

types of content were expanded to eleven issues postulated

to be found in every society and culture.

The unit of scoring was

little changed, e.g., all the ideas a person used concerning an issue
in a story.

The major change was a change from defining the stages on

the basis of aspects to one of defining the stages on the basis of issues.
Kohlberg (1976) claimed that Intuitive Issue Scoring was theoretically
the most valid method of scoring.

It could be applied to

dilemma and was thus instrument free.

any moral

Simultaneously, it was, however,

too intuitive to provide satisfactory psychometric test characteristics.
One disadvantage mentioned by Rest (1976) was the fact that this scoring
method scoredthe content of the responses which included varying issues
for different subjects.

Kohlberg further revised the scoring system to

partially incorporate this criticism.
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This third version of scoring has been labeled Standardized Issue
Scoring.

The manual for standardized issue scoring was ready for distri-

bution in 1975 ((ohlberg, Colby. Speicher-Dublin, and Lieberman. 197S).
The manual was based on a standardized interview that probes only two
Issues for each story.

The protocols are scored using a criterion con-

cept which is the reasoning pattern that is most distinctive of a given
stage.

This criteria established a structural as opposed to a content

scoring basis.

Kohlberg (1976) noted that this newest scoring method

returned to certain features of the 1969 procedure but with controls.
These controls guarantee that each subject is explicitly probed for two
and only two identical issues thus making all protocols more comparable.
The second control replaced the aspect-content criterion for a structural
criterion.
This review of these scoring methods is necessary to explain the scoring system used by the other primary judge.
version of the Standardized Issue
1973 and Nov. 15, 1974.

This judge used an interim

Scoring (Candee, 1975), dated Jan. 30,

The life and punishment issues are probed in the

interim version while life and law are elicited in the current method
for the Heinz dilemma.

This change of issues does not change the control

of invariant issues scored across subjects.
Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976b) has warned that judges using the 1969,
1972. and 1975 versions can possibly come to different stage scoring
conclusions.

The divergence would primarily occur at two points.

First,

many protocols scored stage 4 by the aspect system are scored stage 3
by the 1972 and 1975 versions.

The second discrepancy occurs in disting-

uishing adult stage 2 thinking from stage 5.

The aspect scoring classified

many responses as stage 2 which would be scored stage 5A by the more recent
systems.
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Th. three Judges in this study were

4w4fr

and met to standardize their own scoring.

the shifts in scoring

The 1969 and 1974 interim
All

systems were discussed and hypothetical dilemma responses debated.

raters scored protocols using a standardized issue scoring form (see
Appendix D).

This insured that all judges scored identical issues.

It

was hoped that these procedures would minimize discrepant classifications.
The major difference in scoring between judges was that the judge
using the 1974 interim system made decisions on stage scoring for a story
on a non-intuitive basis.

A story was scored a pure stage if 75

issue responses were of a single stage.
when responses distributed in a 60

of the

A major-minor score was attributed

to 40% pattern.

The subject's global

score across stories was determined by the same decision criteria.

Dis-

crepancies between the two primary judges were aikibuted to stage typing
decisions and not to actual scoring.

Such discrepancies were resolved

through the independent scoring of the third judge.
SMJS.

The SMJS was scored by both judges following the manual

(Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, & Belensky; 1971).
standardized issue scoring form (see Appendix

n).

All scoring used a
The SMJS scoring

form varies from the MJS form in that the SMJS has more than two issues
per story.

This maintained that all judges scored identical issues.

As in the MJS scoring, the two primary judges used different decision
criteria for assigning a stage classification after issue scoring had
been completed.

The judge using the 1974 interim procedure assigned stage

classifications on the 75%-25' criterion described in the previous section.
The other judge used the intuitive method previously described.
MMV.

Both judges scored the fifteen conversational responses using

the procedure described by Hogan and Dickstein (1972).

•

The responses
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were scored two points if any one of four ore.awfimed moral concerns was
clearly impressed: 1) concern for the sanctity of the individual.
2) judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law.
3) concern for the welfare of society as a whole. and 4) capacity to see
both sides of an issue.

A response was assigned one point if any one of

the four concerns was easily imp!ied.

Each response

was

scored only once

regardless of the number of concerns contained in a response.

This

method yields a score from 0-30 for the fifteen statements totaled.

The

average scale score assigned by the two judges for each subject was
used as the best available index of the MMV.
Interrater
MJS & SMJS.

The interrater reliabilities on the MJS and SMJS protocols

were examined using the procedures followed by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968)
and Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, and Belenky (1971).

Agreement was de-

fined as "either complete (both major and minor), major code only, or reversals of major and minor designations" (Haan et al, 1968, p. 182).
The rates of agreement are shown in Table 22.
The raters had agreement rates of 68
for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying
(1974) Form A.

for the Heinz Dilemma

and 56

Dilemma chosen from Kohlberg's

This compares with a product-moment correlation of .79

for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying

dilemma reported by Kohlberg (1958).

These differences in interrater reliability for these two dilemmas are
probably not random but reflect that:

This may be due to the differential

values of the questions in representing the typologr(p. 91).
For the SMJS stories, the raters had agreement rates of 69

for

Dilemma 'B' (sex in the context of a marital relationship) and 60' for
Dilemma 'C' (premarital sex and pregnancy).

These reliabilities compare

difference in

perfect agreement

Major Stage Agreement
a.
D.
minor stage

a.
major stige one

maior-minor reversal

One Stage Disagreement

b.

stage difference
Two Stage Disagreement
Unscorable
Defined Agreement

Table 22
SMJS-MJS Interscorer Agreement Levels

4 (5%)

26 (33%)

24 (30%)

Heinz

19 (24')

4 (5%)

21 (26-)

20 (25')

Bob & Karl

8 (10 )

16 (197)

6 (8%)

26 (33)

22 (281

3 (3%)

9 (11%)

20 (25%)

1 (1%)

27 (34)

20 (251

59 (74%)

2 (3%)

7 (9%)

12 (14)

11 (13%)

22 (28%)

26 (33%)

Global

11 (13%)

11 (14')

1 (1 )

48 (59%)

Standard Stories

14 (18%)

5 (6%)

54 (69)

Sexual Stories
Single Woman's
Marital
Pregnancy
Sex

0

45 (56' )
54 (68 )
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with rates of 88-.: for Wow* '8

and 80 for alleged 'C' reported by

6111igan et al (167)).
Since the subjects' scores on the two sets of stories were highly
similar, as is discussed later, the four stories were combined for a
single global rating of moral judgment.
ment

in assigning global scores was 74 .

The rate of interrater agreeThis rate of agreement compares

favorably with the 71% reported by Rest. Turiel. and Kohlberg (1969)
and stated as an acceptable degree
(1974).

of reliability by Kurtines and Grief

Protocols on which the raters disagreed or had major-minor stage

reversals (for example. one rater gave a subject a major stage rating of
4 and a minor stage rating of 3 while the other rater reversed these majorminor ratings) were scored by a third experienced rater.

When the third

rater's scoring agreed with either of the two primary judges, that
agreement was accepted as the 'true' moral judgment rating of a subject.
This procedure resulted in a final global score agreement rate of 91 .
Since there were few clear representatives of principled thought in
the sample ( i.e. stages 5 and 6), all subjects scored as major stage
five by one judge and either a major or minor stage five by the other
judge were classified as stage five for all subsequent analyses.

For the

same reason, a similar procedure was used for assigning subjects to stage
two.

Thus the subjects assigned to stages two and five are not necessarily

pure types, but are subjects

judged by both judges as having large compo-

nents of these stages in their moral thought.
or stage six subjects in this sample.
subjects across moral

There were no stage one

The resultant distribution of

stages is presented in Table 23.
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Table 23
Distribution of Subjects by Moral Stage

Moral Stage

Number of Subjects

1

0

2-5A

4

3
4-3 mix

12
29

4

16

5B

12

6

0
7

Unscorable
Total

80

Chapter IX

Results
Compftrison of Moral ReasoninsLipstruments
Analyses of the moral reasoning instruments involved two types:
(I) a test of the internal reliability of the instrument, and (2) a test
of between instrument construct validity.

Item-total reliability con-

stituted the primary test of internal reliability where appropriate
(OMJS ana MMV).

Internal reliability for the MJS and SMJS were determined

using a less formal analysis.

Inter-instrument comparisons used both

correlational analysis and analysis of variance.
The internal

reliability of the MJS and SMJS are estimated together.

g
This estimation is based on the percentages of agreement in scorin
between the two judges presented in Table 22.
ment varied from 30

story.

story to 25

for the Heinz

Karl Stealing versus Lying'

The range of perfect agreefor both the 'Bob and

story and the 'Single Woman's Pregnancy'

Examination of agreement percentages for major stage agreement

with a difference in the minor stage revealed a similar range of percentages.

The Bob and Karl story again has the lowest agreement rate with

either 33% or
26" while the other three stories have an agreement rate of
34.

two
A chi-square analysis of the number of cases in each of these

between
levels of agreement failed to indicate any significant difference
agreement rates (see Table 24).

A test of rates of both one stage and

(Table 25).
two stage disagreement revealed the same level of consistency
internal conFor the two judges scoring these MJS and SMJS stories, the
147
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Table 24
Test of Interscorer - Interdilemma Agreement Rates
kgreemeet
Type

Weral Igloos
Heinz Bob & Karl

Marital Sex

Unwed
Pregnancy

Global

Total

Perfect
Agreement

24

20

22

20

26

112

26

21

26

27

22

124

4

4

6

1

11

26

Agreement

54

45

54

48

59

262

X2 = 14.06 (8)

p a' .05

Difference
In
Minor Stage
Major-Minor
Reversal
Total
Define
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Table 25
Test of Interscorer

Interdilemme Disagreement Rates

Abral Dilemma

Disagreement

Marital Sex

Unwed
Prepancy

Global

Total

Type
Heinz Bob & Karl
Major Stage
One Stage
11

19

16

20

12

78

14

11

8

9

7

49

0

5

1

3

2

11

Totals

25

35

25

32

21

138

X2 = 9.27 (8)

p

Difference
Two Stage
Disagreement
Unscorable

b

.05
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'latency of their scoring and of the between-stories consistency Is
reliable.

All Of these four stories are used to calculate the global

moral judgment score for each subject.

All four stories are reliably

consistent in their story-to-global agreement rates.
The more traditional alpha reliability coefficient is used to
determine the instrument reliability for the OMJS and mmv.

The item-

total correlations for the OMJS are presented in Table 26.

These range

from a low of .06 for item 6 (Obedience to Military Authority) to .54 for
item 10 (Landlord's Rignt of Freedom

the correlations are significant at the p - .05 level except two
P = .29 and item 14, p = .08 (Lying

All

to Rent) with a mean of .30.

item 6.

to Deceive Another of Money).

alpha coeficient, however, is a low .48 for the present sample.

The

This

low alpha reliability is improved slightly to .51 by eliminating item 6
which is the least related item.

The scale's reliability is not improved

by additional deletion of items.
The internal reliabilities of the OMJS for this sample are substantially lower than in Maitland and Goldman's original study, r -.71.
present alpha of .48 is dangerously low for a research instrument.
differences

The
These

in reliability found in the two studies may be due to the

adult sample's more sophisticated comprehension of all choices.

Maitland

and Goldman's adolescent samples may reflect a comprehension ceiling consistency across items rather than an actual moral judgment.

The obtained

reliability in the present study, however, raises serious doubt concerning
the reliability and usefulness of the OMJS.
The item-total correlations for the Measure of Moral Values (MMV) were
computed for each rater and for the rater's pooled scores on each item.
Table 27 presents these sets of item-total correlations.

The correlations

for judge 'A' range from .24 for item 9 (Death Penalty) to .52 for item

'Si
Table 26
Objective Moral Judgment Stale
ltem-Total Correlations

1 tern
1

.411

.00008

2

.3905

.0002

3

.415

.0009

4

.3091

.0031

5

.5279

.00001

6

.0605

.2979

7

.2044

.0353

8

.4707

.0001

9

.3291

.0015

10

.5457

.00001

11

.3261

.0016

12

.21541

.029

13

.24201

.0158

14

.15493

.0863

15

.48142

.00001

Table 27
MMV Item-Total Correlations
A • 8 Averaged

Scorer A

Scorer B

1

.51425

.45202

.50322

.00001

2

.48303

.52962

.55370

.00001

3

.38490

.60204

.55321

.00001

4

.51966

.33986

.43997

.00002

5

.43348

.29469

.34057

.001

6

.52032

.49469

.53696

.00001

7

.49719

.43412

.49894

.00001

.52761

.34344

.48896

.00001

9

.23986

.36769

.35492

.00062

10

.45450

.55001

.53652

.00001

11

.47970

.46804

.46199

.00001

12

.42726

.49578

.51260

.00001

13

.47360

.30717

.42357

.00005

14

.49205

.33587

.36900

.00038

15

.37621

.38017

.38812

.00019

Item

P.

8 (Incompetent Doctor and Illegal Abortion).

For judge 'IV, the

for Another's
correlations ranged from .29 for item 5 (Taking Credit
way).
Ideas) to .60 for item 3 (Displacement of Poor by Sup.whigh

The

t. item
averaged scores of the judges showed the followinp range: lowes
All of the item-total correlations are sig-

5; highest. items 2 and 3.
nificant, p

.02.

The total scale scores assigned by the two raters

are correlated r = .66.
for the
The coefficients of reliability were computed identically as
The alpha reliabilities are .69 and .68 for

item-total correlations.

rater A and B respectively.
of .72.

The pooled scores have an alpha reliability

or for
The alpha coefficient was not improved for either rater

.
the combined ratings by deleting peripherally related items
Relations Between the Four Instruments
MJS-SMJS Ccfparison.

The global scores on the MJS served as the

criterion for a comparison with the SMJS scores.

The findings of this

(1971) but with
comparison are similar to those found by Gilligan et at
important differences.

Eighty-four percent (59 cases) of the subjects

ard moral
in this study reasoned at the same level for both the stand
dilemmas (MJS) and the sexual moral dilemmas.
of 47

of adolescent girls and 50

et al study.

This compares with a rate

of the adolescent boys in the Gilligan

by
Eight (11 ) of 70 classifiable subjects were judged

on the MJS
both raters as consistently lower on the SMJS stories than
on the SMJS stories by
stories, while three subjects were judged as higher
both raters.

different
Seventy-three percent of the small group that have

the SMJS.
scores on the SMJS than on the MJS, scored lower on

Seventy-

adolescent boys in
nine percent of the adolescent girls and 80% of the
the SMJS than on the MJS.
the Gilligan et at (1971) study had lower scores on

1 1,1

Even though the percentage of subJects who scored differently on the two
scales decreased substantially in the present study, the percentage of
those who scored lower on the WS than on the MJS remained very similar
in both studies.

An additional 16 subjects are scored consistently lower

on the SMJS stories by one of the judges, while five additional subjects
are judged higher on the SMJS stories by one judge.

In all cases, the

difference between the mean scores assigned to the two sets of stories
was

one stage or less.
In spite of the tendeicy for subjects to score lower on the SMJS than

on the MJS, the two instruments are correlated. r

.66.

The moral

maturity scores determined in the Gilligan et al. study for the standard
stories and sexual stories were correlated,
and r = .482 for the boys.

r = .405 for the girls

The increaseicorrelation in the present study

is probably attributable to the greater consistency in MJS and SMJS scores
for the present adult sample than for the adolescent sample of Gilligan
et al.
Turiel (1975) has challenged the validity of the SMJS.

He contends

that (a) the greater variability of response scores and (b) the trend for
subjects to receive lower scores on the SMJS suggests that reasoning about
sexuality is not moral but normative.

He further cites a study which

found that stage changes were not sequential for Gilligan et al's subjects
over a two year period.

The present results show that for an adult sample

there is not a greater variability in scores and that the lower trend in
SMJS scores is small.

A suggested hypothesis to explain this greater

consistency of adult subjects than adolescent subjects across content
domains is that increased experience in sexual relationships provides
the necessary experiential information to assimilate the sexual domain
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Into the peneral moral reasoning structure.

In childhOod and early

adolescence. reasoning about sexual relationships and dilemmes
my be
largely normative.

As these sexual relationships become part of the

individuals experience, they loose their normativeness and

assimilate

into the moral reasoning schema of the person.
The present findings further substantiate the reliability of
the
SMJS and counter Turiel's (1975) claim that the SMJS is not an appropr
iate
measure of a moral domaii.

Kohlberg et al. (1972) and Gash (1976) pro-

vided evidence indicating that judgments made about certain moral domains
(prison dilemmas and closeness of relationship) were less develop
ed than
judgments made about 'normal' dilemmas.

The present data suggest that

the area of sexual relations is a moral domain which is also less developed
in some individuals but becomes more developed for most individuals after
adolescence.
Since the comparison of the MJS and SMJS revealed that the subjects'
scores on the two instruments were similar, the combined global score
compiled across all four dilemmas served as the stage classification for
comparison with the

MJS and MMV. One-way analyses of variance were used

to test the relation between the subjects' global scores on the MJS-SMJS
and on the scores of the OMJS and MMV.

The subjects' classification on

the moral stories served as the independent variable in each analysis.
Six subjects who could not be classified

were eliminated from these

analyses.
MJS-OMJS Comparison. Contrary to Maitland and

Goldman's (1974)

theoretical predictions, the subjects' scores in the present study on
the OMJS were not significantly related to their global MJS-SMJS scores,
F = 1.82, (4,64), p. = .15.

Table 22 presents the OMJS wean and standard

IS6
Table Pi
OPIJS Scores as a Function of Stage
Classification on the Morally Ambiguous Stories
Moral Judgment

iS's

Mean

SD

Standard Error

Stage
2

4

3

70.00

6.4807

3.2404

12

64.4167

8.1849

2.3628

29

67.8276

14.3977

2.6736

4

16

67.1875

10.1929

2.5482

5

12

73.000

7.6277

2.2019

TOTAL

73

68.0959

11.3935

1.3335

3-4 mix

deviation scores as • function of the MJS-SMJS scores.

Scheffes post-hoc

comparison procedure indicated that none of the moral stage groups had
OMJS means significantly diflitrent from one another.

An Omega-square

analysis revealed that only 4.4/ of the variance in the OMJS %cores was
attributable to the subjects'

global classification on the MJS-SMJS.

A separate analysis of variance was run on the OMJS scores eliminating the MJS-SMJS mixed 3-4 stage subjects.
inappropriateness of such a

While the statistical

reanalysis is recognized, an attempt was

being made to determine the impact of these mixed stage scores.

Run

with the purer stage scores only, the F-ratio increased to_F_. 2.079.
_p_ '.117.

Although this is a substantial increase in F-ratio, the OMJS

still fails to discriminate the MJS-SMJS stages.

The non-significant

relationship between the OMJS and the Kohlberg protocols is largely
ascribable to

the OMJS's low reliability and large within-group variance.

This absence of relationship still shows that the OMJS does not validly
assess the Kohlberg moral reasoning stages.
MJS-MMV Comparison.

The findings for Hogan and Dickstein's Measure

of Moral Values suggest that this instrument has greater potential.

Table

29 presents the MMV means and standard deviations as a function of stage
classification on the MJS-SMJS global scores.

Analyses of variance were

again computed for both the mixed 3-4 stage scores included and excluded.
Unlike the OMJS, the MMV has significant relationships with the MJS-SMJS
scores in both analyses, (mixed stages included, F = 4.50, (4, 64), R=.003;
and pure stages only, F = 6.292, (3, 64), R=.001).

Post-hoc analyses

using Scheffe's test found that only the stage 2 and stage 5 subjects differed
significantly, R=.01.

1Se
Table 29
measure of Moral Values Scores as a Function
of
Stage Classification on the Morally

Moral Judgment

OS's

Mean

AmpiquOuS Stories

SD

Standard Error

Stage
2

4

5.3750

.6292

.3146

3

12

8.7500

3.320

.9584

3-4

29

9.2759

3.8651

.7177

4

16

9.3438

3.8588

.9647

5

12

13.2500

3.7809

1.0915

TOTAL

73

9.6438

4.0229

.4708

IS!
An Omega squared analysis revealed that MJS-SMJS stage classification accounted for 16.71 of the variance in NM scores.

This increased

substantially to 23.21 when the analysis excluded the 3-4 mixed stage
subjects.

Finally. the OMJS and MMV are not

r . .135.

The MMV is, however, significantly correlated with the MJS-

significantly correlated.

SMJS global scores (mixed 3-4 stage included. r = .399. p - .0002; pure
stages only, r = .53. E =.0001).

Haler (1q75) reported MMV scores for

college females to be significantly correlated with the MJS. r = .51.
p =.01. but not for college males, r = .22, p =.05.

The present study

found no such sex differences.
The relationship of the MMV to the Kohlberg protocols is strong.
particularly so since the reliabilities of the two instruments are only
moderate.

The reliability of the MMV can, however, be improved with only
The present 15-item format can be reliably scored in about

limited costs.
five minutes.

Doubling the length of the scale using similar items would

increase its reliability to .83, and the scale could still be scored with
a fraction of the effort required for scoring the Kohlberg protocols.
The MMV in its present form, however, can be used as a quick, reliable,
and valid index of mature moral judgment.
Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) demonstrated that adults scored as stage
2 in moral reasoning were more probably in transition from stage 4 to stage
5 and thus should be properly classified as

stage 5-A.

The MMV data suggest

that the four subjects in the present sample are not stage 5-A because they
have the lowest MMV scores rather than scores intermediate between stage
4 and stage 5.

This ambiguous stage 2 (5-A) classification on the

and the MMV needs further clarification.

MJS

ISO
Since the MMV scores are continuous, the scale does not delineate
MJS stage boundaries.

The present MMV

means and standard deviations

cannot be used to establish MMV ranges which can be used as equivalents to
the MJS stages.

The PV cannot., therefore, be used alone in any research

which attempts to investigate Kohlberg's stages as stages per se.

Re-

searchers committed to the investigation of stages cannot use the MMV
as the primary assessment technique.

Those who wish to investigate the

continuous concept of moral maturity should find the MMV sJitable and
convenient for their purposes.
Comparison of POI and

16 PF Traits with Moral Stages

MJS-POI Comparisons.

Four analyzes were conducted on the POI scores

to test the self-actualization character model: (1) a Pearson ProductMoment Correlation of POI subscale scores with moral stage scores and
(2) an

analysis of variance.

The observed rank order of mean POI scores

for each stage was also examined.

The only analysis of the POI mean

profiles for each moral stage group was a

visual comparison.

The

standardized means for each moral stage group. the correlation coefficients,
the F ratios, and observed order of POI means a , presented in Table 30.
The most simplistic and direct hypothesis tested examined the hypothesis
that self-actualization scores would possess a linear relationship to
moral reasoning stages, i.e. self-actualization increases as the maturity
of moral reasoning increases.

A correlational analysis revealed only

one significant and moderate correlation (Sy scale. r = .27, p= .05) between developmental level of moral reasoning and self-actualization as
measured by the POI.

As the level of moral judgment increases, the ability

to be synergistic (i.e. to transcend dichotomies) increases.

The cor-

relational analysis, therefore, provided very little supportive evidence
for the linear hypothesis.

A

Sy

NC

SA

SR

FR

Ex

Say

0

Tc

Ti

Scale

POI

46.9

46.1

39.7

37.8

54.5

51.8

50.7

51.6

49.5

43.3

56.7

41.7

45.3

47.8

2

55.0

55.3

53.9

50.9

54.2

51.5

55.3

53.5

55.3

54.6

56.1

42.4

51.6

48.9

48.1

48.1

47.5

50.5

48.1

50.2

49.6

47.7

46.8

48.1

46.5

54.4

48.7

51.6

3-4

Moral Stages

45.7

48.8

49.9

47.3

47.8

49.5

48.7

45.3

46.9

49.0

46.1

55.0

48.8

52.3

4

on
on of MJS Classificati
POI Scale Means as a Functi

Table 30

continued

53.5

49.7

55.3

51.5

51.1

50.3

51.3

53.8

54.3

50.9

53.2

45.7

51.1

48.1

5

1.36
2.70*
2.20
1.61
.14
1.15
1.93

1.53
2.04
2.15
1.68
.18
1.01
1.90
3.39*
1.17
2.45

-.07
.05
.06
-.08
-.02
.00
-.07
.06
-.11
on

-.13
.02
.09
-.12
-.03
-.04
.00
.02
-.17
.00

.01
.00
-.03
-.11
-.06
-.11
.11
.20*

.03

.00

-.01

-.13

-.08

-.15

.20

.27*

SAV

Ex

FR

S

SR

SA

NC

N - 73

b

p_ = .05

N= 44

a

A

-.06
-.01

3.55*

2.87*

.05

.00

-.12

-.17

I

-.07
.02

3.63*

2.98*

-.05

.01

.12

.16

0

1.25
2.31

2.96*

.42

.46

-.01

.02

.04

.07

Tc

Sy

.51

.48

-.06

.07

.01

F Ratios
Mixed Stagesb
Pure Stages Onlya

.01

Correlations
Mixed Stagesb
Pure Stages Onlya
3-56
2,3,4,5 3,4,5A,5B 2-5

Ti

Scale

POI

continued

-fable 30

2.3-4.4.5.3
4.2.3-4.5.3

2.3-4.4.3.5

2.4.3-4.3.5

4.3-4.5.3.2

4,3-4.5.3.2

4.3-4.2.5.3

4.3-4.2.3.5

3-4.4.2.5.3

2.3-4.4.5.3

4.3-4.5.3.2

2.3.5.3-4.4

2.3-4.4.5.3

2.5.3.3-4.4

Order

Observed

If 7

The correlational results Presumed the assumption that the stage
moral reasoning subjects were indeed genuine stage 2

2

subjects.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) concluded that most adults scored as stage
2

were nor, correctly classified as stage

5-A.

Stage 5-A reasoning

Is reasoning which has content but not structural similarities to stage
2

reasoning and is expressed only by individuals who have developed

stage 4

reasoning.

Developmentally, therefore, the subjects judged as

stage 2 in this study are more probably stage 5-A subjects.

The scores

of these subjects should be re-ordered to indicate their true developmental
position.

A

reanalysis using the same correlational procedures failed

to disclose any new significant linear relationships.

Moral development

received no support as a linear function of self-actualization.

These

findings resulted both when the scores were computed including the mixed
stage 3-4 scores and when the mixed stage 3-4 scores were excluded from
the analysis.
An alternative hypothesis proposed that the relationship between
moral judgment and self-actualization is not a simple. linear function.
An analysis of variance allowed a more statistically powerful technique
to test this hypothesis than correlat ;- onal analysis.

ANOVA's were computed

both including and excluding the mixed stage 3-4 scores.

Seven significant

F ratios, R..05, resulted out of twenty-eight compl!tations (see Table 30).
Two of these significant findings duplicated the significant correlations
on the Synergy scale.

Fouf significant results appeared for the two bi-polar

scales of Outei-Directed and Inner-Directed.

The remaining significant find-

ing was for the Existentiality scale with the mixed stage 3-4's included.
Existentiality measures one's flexibility in using good judgment in applying
values and principles to one's life.

Since the Outer-Directed. Inner-
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Directed scales are polar opposites, only three dimensions of self.
actualization show any significant relationship to moral development:
Inner-Outer Oirectedness. Synergy. and Existentiality.
The remaining two analyses, an examination of observed order of mean
stage POI scores and a visual comparison of stage POI profiles. are most
directly described by referring to Figure 2.

This visual examination re-

veals some unexpected relationships between moral development and selfactualization subscale scores for stage 3 subjects.

Stage 3 sub-

jects have the highest mean scores on five of the twelve scales: Self_
Actualization Value. Existentiality, Spontaneity, Acceptance of Aggression.
The most morally developed subjects

and Capacity for Intimate Contact.

in this study (stage 5) have the highest scores on three of the scales:
Feeling Reactivity, Nature of Man. and Synergy.

Stage 2 (5-A) subjects

have the highest scores on two subscales: Self-regard and Self-acceptance.
While these stage 2 (5-A) subjects are highest on these two scales,
they are the lowest on four scales:

Self-actualization Value. Nature of

Man, Synergy, and Acceptance of Aggression.

The stage with the largest

frequency of lowest scale scores is, however, stage 4.
stage are lowest on five scales:
Self-Regard,

Feeling

Subjects in this

Reactivity, Spontaneity,

Self-Acceptance, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. They also

have the lowest score on Existentialitv with the mixed stage 3-4 subjects.
The stage 5 scores are not the lowest on any scale and are either the
highest or second highest on all but onescale: Self-Acceptance.
Table 31 shows the distribution of POI subscale scores by moral stage.
The 'Inner-Directed-Outer-Directed
parison.

scores are eliminated from this

com-

This distribution demonstrates important differences between the

self-actualization profiles and tendencies between stages 3-4 and 4, and
stages 3 and 5.

Although there are almost no

statistically significant
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Table 31
Self-Actuallzatlon (P01)
Scores by Moral Stages
Moral

Below

Between

Between

Between

Stage

50

50-52

52-54

54-58

2 (5-A)

7

3

0

1

3

0

3

2

6

3-4

9

2

0

0

11

0

0

0

1

6

2

2

4

5(5-B)

1(7
differences between the scores of moral stage groups on the

individual

subscales, this distribution of the scores for each moral stage group
over all subscales indicates substantial differences in their selfactualization scores.

A chi-square check for significant differences

between the moral stage distributions on subscales was not appropriate
oecause of the high number of cells with zeros.
These profile scores and comparisons provide suggestive and moderately supportive evidence for the self-actualization - moral aevelopment
relationship.

This evidence is, however, not statistically significant.

MJS-16PF Copparisons.

The same four types of analysis as performed

on the POI scores were executed with the 16 PF subscale scores: (1) a
Pearson Product-Moment correlation of 16PF subscale scores with
moral stage scores, (2) an analysis of variance on the mean subscale
scores for each moral stage, (3) an examination of the observed order of
mean 16 PF scores for each stage, and (4) a visual comparison of the 16 PF
mean profiles for each moral stage.

The standardized means for each moral

stage group, the correlation coefficients, the F ratios, and observed
order of 16 PF means are presented in Table 32.
Unlike the POI scales which have a theoretical directionality from
less
self-actualized to

more self-actualized, the 16 PF is not a unitary,

dimensional scale.

The sixteen factors are statistically independent with

no predetermined, theoretical directionality.

There is no underlying,

value theory which distinguishes each factor scale from more desirable to
less desirable.

The correlation analysis is performed with these reserva-

tions taken into consideration.

No directional hypothesis of 16 PF sub-

scales for moral stages is proposed.

The correlational analysis is test-

ing for linear relationships in either direction.

The 16 PF subscale scores

52.8
55.0
53.0
51.1
43.2
49.7
56.8
40.4
55.3
47.9
44.1
54.6
54.9
47.9
49.2

52.7
47.5
48.1
49.5
49.8
52.9
49.2
50.6
47.3
47.1
49.8
50.0
47.3
48.5
53.9
49.7

52.6
53.2
49.0
48.6
50.4
52.1
49.3
47.9
53.4
48.0
50.7
53.4
47.6
47.5
48.8
51.2

48.8
43.6
51.1
45.8
51.3
46.1
52.6
47.8
47.7
44.1
51.6
50.0
50.1
49.2
49.5
49.4

41.P
51.9
46.5
61.8
52.0
42.3
54.3
46.5
53.1
51.8
43.3
46.0
58.7
48.5
44.2
43.7

A

B

C

E

F

G

H

I

L

M

N

0

Q4

Q3
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Table 32
16PF Scale Means As a Function of MJS
Classification

-.14
-.24*
.25*

-.01
-.13
.00
.16
.09
.04

.21
.00
-.12
-.01
.22
.06
.09

M

N

0

N= 44

N= 73
- .05

a

b

Q4

Q2
Q3

.25*
-.12
-.03

-.25*
.22*

.35*

.19

.20*
-.03
-.07

-.14

-.22

-.27*

-.31*

L

Q1

.29*

.30*

.28*

.34*

I
-.27*

-.06

-.10

-.15

H
.27*

-.02

.00

.01

J

2.54

-.19

-.19

.00

.03

.00
.01

.25*

.30*

.12

.18

C

-.02

.10

.11

.15

.10

.19

B

-.03

2.97*

.15

.35*

-.00

A

a-

1.97

-.24*

-.26*

-.02

.38

1.40
1.20

l.00
2.28

.59

1.87

1.79

2.07

.42

1.22

2.63

3-56

2-5

Mixed Stagesb

3,4,5A,56

Pure Stages Onlya

2,3,4,5

Scale

16PF

.48

1.17
1.16

1.94
2.36

.63

1.87

3.30*

1.94

.39

3.29*

.06

2.09

1.06

2.69

2.88

F Ratio:
Mixed Stages b
Pure Stages Ohlya
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Table 32

3-4.2+4.3.5
2.5.3-4.3.4
2.5.3.4.3-4

5.2.3.4.3-4
4.3-4.3.5.2

2.5.4.3-4.3

3.4.3-4.2.5

5.4.3.2.3-4

2.3.3-4.4.5

4.3-4.5.3.2

2.5.3.3-4.4

4.3-4.5.3.2

3.3-4.4.5.2

2.4.3-4.3.5

3.4.2.5.3-4

2.5.3.3-4.4

Order

Observed

are analyzed for both the scores for pure moral Stage subjects only
and for all moral stage subjects including those with mixed 3-4 global
scores.
Four significant, moderate correlations resulted from thirty-two
computations.

Two scales ('I.' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; r = .34

and 'L.' Trustino versus Suspicious r = .31) are significant for both
the pure stage and mixed-stage analyses.

Tender-mindedness increases

with moral development while suspiciousness increases as one moves down
the moral judgment stage hierarchy.
As with the POI scores. the 16 PF scores were reanalyzed changing the
stage 2 scores to an intermediate stage 5-A between stage 4 and stage 5-6.
This reanalysis produced sixteen significant correlations out of thirty-two
computations.

This number of significant correlations is

a dramatic in-

crease over the four calculated with stage 2 as the lowest rather than the
next to highest moral stage.

The six scales for which there are significant

correlations for both the pure stage and mixed-stage computations are discussed first.
These six scales consist of: 'A,' Reserved versus Outgoing; 'E,'
Humble versus Assertive; 'I,' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; 'M,'
Practical versus Imaginative; 'Ql,' Conservative versus Experimenting,
'Q2,' Group-Dependent versus Self-Sufficient.

Being both reserved and

assertive increases as moral development increases.

Even though being

tender-minded increases from the lowest stage to the highest moral stage
when stage 2 is the lowest stage, this same linear relationship holds
when stage 2 is the second highest stage.

This finding suggests that the

results are not influenced significantly by the stage 2 group scores which
consist of only four subjects.

This contradictory finding introduces

171
a problematical element to the interpretations of these correlitiemal
results.

Continuing a review of the findings. imaginativeness and ex-

perimentingness increases as moral development increases.

Self-

sufficiency tends to increase with moral development.
Three scales have significant correlations only for either the
pure stage comparison or the mixed stage analysis but

not both.

With

the mixed 3-4 stage scores eliminated. intelligence 'B' increases with
moral development

Two significant results exist only for mixed 3-4

stage scores included.
the moral stages.

Suspiciousness 'L' again increases as one moves down

This is the same anomaly that arises with the tender-

minded correlation above.

Being self-assured increases with moral develop-

ment.
An analysis of variance permitted an examination of between-moralstage-group scores without the necessity of these being linear in any
direction.

ANOVA's were computed both including and excluding the mixed

stage 3-4 scores.

A total of five significant F ratios resulted from

thirty-two computed and none of these five were significant for the mixed
stage 3-4 scores both included and excluded.

The only sinnificant re-

lationship, F = 2.97, p =.05, for the mixed stage 3-4 scores excluded
is for subscale 'E,' Humble versus Assertive.
nificant correlation for 'E.'

This supported the sig-

The significant F ratios for 'A' (Reserved

versus Outgoing), 'B' (Intelligence), and 'L' (Trusting versus Suspicious)
replicated the significant correlations for these scales.

The 'G' scale

(Expedient versus Conscientious) has a significant F ratio with no concomitant significant correlations.

Stage 4 subjects are most conscientious

while stage 5-A and 5-B subjects are the most expedient.
These statistical analyses were complimented with visual comparisons
of both the 16 PF profiles for each moral stage and the observed order of
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These comparisons added little

16 PC Scores by moral judgment stage.
additional clarity to the analysis.

Two types of visual examinations

are possible: (1) a comparison of the paths of each moral stage

to

disclose parallel paths. and (2) a comparison of the moral stage profiles
to determine the most normal and least normal profiles.

The lack of

unitary directionality of the 16 PF prevents other types of visual analyses.
There are not the strong parallel profile paths for the 16 PF (Figure
3) between stages 3-4 and 4, and between stages 3 and 5 as there are for
the P01.

The parallel paths of the stage 3-4 and 4 profiles will re-appear

in the factor analysis and discriminant analysis generated profiles.
Although there is no theoretical directionality in the 16 PF, comparisons could

be made with the norm.

Table 33 presents the number

of subscale scores within distributions around the norm for this sample.
Even though a statistical test of this data is desirable, a chi-square
test is not valid because of the large number of cells with zero frequencies.
This data, however, does indicate that the stage 3-4 and stage 4 subjects
constitute the

norm for this sample.

from the normative group.
appears for the POI.

The stage 2 subjects are farthest

A similar radical profile for the stage 2 group

It should be kept in mind that this group, however,

consistsof only four subjects.

C

B

A

N
0

Forthright

Self
Assured

Q3

Impulsive

Unfrustrated Q4

Q2

Group
Dependent

Conservative Qi

M

I

Practical

Trusting

Shy
Tough-Minded
Self Reliant

Low
Superego Strength

Sober

Reserved
Less
Intelligent
Low
Ego Strength
Submissive

• 3
I.

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

2.

PF Subscales
Moral Stage Profiles Across the 16

Figure 3

Frustrated

Self
Sufficient
High
Will Power

Suspicious
Bohemian
Imaginative
Socially
Shrewd
Insecure
Quilt

Sensitive

•

High
superego Strength
Socially

Enthusiastic

Asserti“.

More
Intelligent
High
Ego Strength

Outgoing

174
Table 33
1614 Subscale Score Distributions by Moral Stages
Below

Norm

Above

Between

46*

46-54

54

Stage?

5

8

3

Stage 3

3

13

0

Stage 3-4

0

16

0

Stage 4

0

16

0

Stage 5

4

7

5

* Z scores

Faqa! Analysis of_ ?ersonlitimyrots
A central problem in using rector analysis is determing the number of
factors and the

most replicable and adequate factors.

research encountered these problems.

The present

Although this research has primarily

used Fromm's typology and the findings of Peck and Havighurst (1960),
this research was not designed to test a hypothesized number of factors
deduced from From and Peck and Havighurst.

This area of character struc-

sis
ture was not felt to be sufficiently investigated to warrant such hypothe
testing.

The present factor analysis. therefore, is an exploratory analysis.

Gorsuch (1974) discussed the problem of determining the proper number
of factors and presented a number of methods for making this

determination.

Four decision criteria were chosen on the basis of Gorsuch's explication:
(1) to extract only thogefactors which account for non-trivial variance.
(2) to eliminate factors that account for such small portions of the
variance as to be theoretically uninteresting, (3) to extract only those
and
factors which would be most probably replicable in future research,
fully
(4) to extract only those factors which were theoretically and meaning
interpretable.

The procedures used to accomplish these goals follow.

The initial analysis consisted of an unrestricted factor computation
of the

subscale scores for both the POI and the 16 PF for all subjects.

The calculated eigenvalue for the nine factors ranged from 9.14661 to
.57747.

The fifth factor was the last factor to have an eigenvalue of

greater than

1.00.

Now that the maximum number of factors for the sub-

scale scores had been determined, it was necessary to decide whether thi
was the 'proper' number.
The 'proper' number of factors was estimated using the scree test.
n
The scree test (Gorsuch. 1974) is a procedure which can provide a solutio
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with the minimum number of factors accounting for the maximum amount
of variance based on the factor's roots.

The resulting scree for

the nine factor analysis is presented in Figure 4.

This scree test

unfortunately does not provide a clear-cut solution

When there are

more than two breaks in the plotted roots. it is difficult to decide
which break represents the 'proper' number of factors (Gorsuch. 1974).
Additional evidence is required to determine whether the 'proper' number
of factors in this analysis is five or six as indicated by the number
immediately preceding where the straight line begins.
Gorsuch (1974) suggested an additional method in the above situation which involved examining varying numbers of factors.

This pro-

cedure involves five steps: (1) compute a factor analysis with no
specified number of factors to be extracted (in the present study, this
resulted in nine factors), (2) examine this factor matrix for trivial
factors, (3) subtract the number of trivial factors from the total number
of factors in step 1, (4) recalculate the factor analysis using a specified factor format indicated by step 3, (5) examine this new factor
analysis for trivial factors and adjust the factor analysis again if
trivial factors are still present.
An examination for trivial factors in the nine factors clearly eliminated one of the nine and suggested three others.

Trivial factors are

defined as: (1) those factors without a unique set of defining variables.
and (2) those factors which do not have at least two loadings above .5.
This loading minimum level was selected to maximize replicable factors
based on the number of subjects and variables in the analysis.
factors with their subscale loadings are presented in Table 34.

The nine
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Figure 4
Scree Test of Unrestricted Factor Analysis with
Nine Factors
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Table 14
Defining Variables of Nine Factor Analysis

Factor 1
0
I
Ex
Fr
S
Sa
A
C
Sr
0 (16PF)
Factor 2
A (16PF)
H
F
Q2
Factor 3
G
Q3

-.94022
.94264
.78418
.67533
.73615
.68573
.63727
.80965
.53924
-.53305
.65882
.76055
.64680
-.51897
.75987
.78615

Factor 6
Ti
Tc

.67159
.50601

CONFORMITY
conforming - assertive (authoritarian)
conservative - experimenting

-.83872
.75709

Factor 7
.87622
Factor 8
Nc
Factor 9
A (POI)

SUPEREGO STRENGTH
expedient - superego strength
self-conflict follows own urges - high self
concept (follows self concept) impulse
control

.65928
.57880

Factor 5
Q1

SOCIABILITY
reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
shy (inferior) - sociable. spontaneous.
emotionally expressive
sober (introspective) - sociable (impulsive)
group-dependent vs. self-sufficient

ANXIETY
trusting vs. suspicious
(unfrustrated) - (frustrated)

Factor 4
Q4

SELF -ACTUALIZATION
other directed
inner directed
flexibility in applying values
sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
ability to spontaneously express emotions
self-acceptance of one's weaknesses
acceptance of own aggression
capacity for intimate meaningful relationships
ability to like one's self because of
one's strength as a person
confident vs. apprehensive (guilt proneness)

.55865

.67880

TIME ORIENTATION
time incompetency
time competency
CONVENTIONALITY
conventional - imaginative (bohemian)
PERCEPTION OF NATURE OF MAN
ability to be synergic in understanding
of human nature
ACCEPTANCE OF AGGRESSION
acceptance of own aggression

Factor nine by definition is a trivial factor since it is not
defined by a unique set of defining variables.

The sole defining

one.
variable for factor nine is also a defining variable for factor
Factor six is defined by two variables which are statistically deThe variables are defined depend-

pendent due to the scoring system.

ted
ently and scored dependently resulting in their being intercorrela
at almost 1.0. (Shostrom. 1965).

Nunnelly ( 1967) lists this as one
This examination further reduces factor

way to derive spurious factors.

six to being defined by only one variable.

Both of these subscales

further load greater than .46 on factor one.

Factor six was, therefore,

is.
tentatively classified as a trivial factor at this stage of analys
Factors seven and eight are defined by only one variable each.

A

final judgment on these two factors was withheld, however, since this
factors
factor analysis consisted of a factor analysis of Cattellis 16
rather than discrete variables.

To an extent, the factors determined are

Cattell's
second -order factors, although none of the nine factors match
(1965) second -order factors.

In this situation, a factor with only one

defining variable may be a theoretically significant factor.
A second factor analysis (Table 35) with a specified seven factor
format was computed based on the above analysis.

Failure of either factor

seven or eight to replicate on this second analysis was considered as
evidence against their existence as a nontrivial factor.
both
A comparison of the nine versus seven factor analyses disclosed
ability
the stability of defining variables within a factor and the replic
of the factors themselves.

Factor eight in the first analysis did not

replicate in the seven factor analysis.
therefore eliminated as trivial.

The 'Nature of Man' factor was

The 'Conventionality' factor, however,

replicated in the seven factor analysis.

This supported its existence
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Table
Defining Variables of Seven Fatter Analysis

•••••••••••••ftyp

Factor 1
0
1
SAV
Ex
Fr
S
Sa
Sy
A
C
Factor 2
A (16PF)

Q2
Factor 3
0 (POI)

.73874
.74537
.68586
.73100
.74344
.68401
.54696
.52203
.79519
.82583

SELF -ACTUALIZATION
outer directed
inner directed
affirmation of self-actualization values
flexibility in applying values
sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings
ability to spontaneously express emotions
self acceptance of one's weaknesses
ability to see life's opposites as related
acceptance of own aggression
capacity for intimate, meaningful relationships

SOCIABILITY
reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive
expressive
.65553
shy (inferior) - sociable. spontaneous, emotior.ally expressive
-.55232
group-dependent vs self-sufficient
.60572
.61077

EGO STRENGTH
outer directed
inner directed
ability to like one's self because of strength
self-confident (adequate) - apprehensive
(guilt proneness)
-.78672
composed (unfrustrated) - tense (frustrated)

-.54502
.53863
Sr
.50647
0 (16PF) -.68488
Q4

Factor 4

Q3

.79325
.73784

Factor 5
T1
Tc

-.78529
.85012

Factor 6

SUPEREGO STRENGTH
expedient-superego strength
impulse control, follows own urges — high selfconcept, follows self-ideal
TIME COMPETENCY
time incompetent
time competent

.65649

CONFORMITY
submitted vs. dominant

.68719

CONVENTIONALITY
conformity (accomodating)--assertive (authoritarian)

Factor 7

lel
as a substantive factor.

The 'Time Competency* factor which had been

tentatively classified as a trivial factor previously, re-appeared
as a distinct factor.
An examination of the remaining factors indicated that their
respective defining variables were very stable. Eight of the defining
variables for the "Self-Actualization" factor remained the same.

The

four defining variables for the 'Sociability' factor and the two variables
of the 'Superego Strength' factor remained invariant.

The composition

of the defining variables for the 'Conformity' factor and the 'AnxietyEgo Strength' factors, however, changed.

The loading of the 'conservative-

experimenting' variable dropped below the established inclusion level for
the 'Conformity' factor.

The change in the defining variables for the

'Anxiety-Ego Strength' factor chanced more drastically.

The 'trusting-

suspicious' variable fell below the acceptable loading level while two
unique variables (self regard and quilt proneness) and two non-unique
variables (inner-outer support) rose above the inclusion level.

This

brought this factor into question as to its stability and replicability.
A final check for the 'proper' number of factors was perfomed by
recomputing the factor analysis with a factor format of five.

This

procedure would permit an examination of the last three factors extracted
in the seven factor format analysis.
Factor seven (Conventionality) was not extracted in the five factor
analysis and its defining variable did not load heavily on any resulting
factor.

The 'Conformity' factor, however, retained its previous status

while the 'Time Competency' factor became subsumed under the "SelfActualization" factor.

The defining variables of the remaining four

factors maintained a high level of stability (Table 36).
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Table 36
Defining Variables of Five Factor AnalysIS
Factor Analysis Interpretation

nitOF1All

Factor
Factor 1
Ti
Tc
0
I
SAV
Ex
Fr
S
Sa
A
C

-.55002
.63463
-.81976
.82270
.63118
.86196
.71382
.75058
.68596
.70217
.83124

Sr

.51266

Sy

.53022

Factor 2
.63092
.69201
A (16PF)
Q2

.57601
-.49105

Factor 3
.65175
0

-.74304

Q4

-.78589

Factor 4
Q3

SELF-ACTUALIZATION
time incompetency
time competency
other directed
inner directed
affirmation of self-actualization values
flexibility in applying values
sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
ability to spontaneously express emotions
self acceptance of one's weaknesses
acceptance of own aggression
capacity for intimate, meaningful relationships
ability to like one's self because of one's
strength as a person
ability to see life's opposites as related
SOCIABILITY
sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive,
expressive
shy (inferior)-sociable, spontaneous, emotionally expressive
reserved-sociable, emotionally expressed
group-dependent vs. self-sufficient
EGO STRENGTH-ANXIETY
low frustration tolerance, low ego strength
(emotionally less stable)-high ego strength,
emotionally mature
self-confident (adequate)-apprehensive (guilt
proneness)
composed (unfrustrated)-tense (frustrated)

77346
.67370

SUPEREGO STRENGTH
expedient - superego strength
impulse control, follows own urges-high selfconcept (follows self-ideal)

.65557

CONFORMITY
conforming (accomodating)-assertive (authoritarian)

Factor 5

On the basis of evidence presented to this point, five factors were
determined to be the minimum number of appropriate factors.

This

decision was, however, modified by theoretical and statistical considStatistically, a factor analysis of known factors results

erations.

in second-order factors.

Not all of the prior factors would be expected

to collapse into second-order factors.

Factors in the present analysis

which are defined by only one variable (a factor in previous research)
are, therefore, considered as valid factors.

Gorsuch (1974) stated

that determination of the number of factors, particularly in situations
where there were as few variables as thirty, should be mediated by
theoretical purposes.

The 'Time Competency' and 'Conventionality'

factors have hypothesized theoretical significance in the current research.

The final decision, therefore, was to use the seven factor

results in all further analyses as the most appropriate number of factors.
These factors are described in Table 35.
Analysis of Moral StaGroup Factor Score Means
The factor analysis grouped the sample of thirty variables into
seven sets of correlated variables (factors).

This prccedure permits a

valid statistical analysis, based on sample size to variable ratio,
of the variance between moral stage groups.
Factor scores were computed for each subject using the SPSS Factscore
Program.

The means for each group were calculated and an ANOVA was run

for each factor.

The Z-score means for each factor by each moral stage

group are presented in Table 37.

The 'Self-Actualization,'

Superego,'

ant
'Conformity-Assertiveness,' and 'Conventionality' factors were signific
across moral sti.ges.

The 'Anxiety' factor was marginally significant,

while the 'Sociability' and 'Time Orientation' factors were not significant.
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Table 37
Means of Factor Scores by Moral Stages

riior

ViTtaqes

'RM.....

AP'

•••

4

•

5

•••

+, .1.... 1.0.M"

••• 4M. -IL

Observed Order

F -ratio

2

3

3-4

1

-.331

.618

-.254

-.270 .211

2.482

.05

2,3-4.4,5.3

2

-.517

.047

-.184

.144 -.234

.A77

.51

2.5.3.4,3-4

3

1.062

.146

-.252

.246

2.124

.08

3-4,4.3.5.2

4

-.642

-.219

.148

.348 -.547

2.596

.04

2,5,3.3-4.4

5

-.616

-.034

-.014

.078 -.039

.357

.83

2,5.3.3-4,4

1.472

-.186

-.049

.120

3.756

OUR

4,3,3-4,5.2

6
7

-.726

-.229

-.238

.043 .704

3.982

.006

2,3-4,3,4,5

-.158

-.226
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The profiles of each moral stage group by factors are presented
in Figure S.

This graph shows that the 'Ego-Strength' factor is

relatively invariant except for stage 2.

Since the stage 2

an is

based on four subjects, the marginally significant finding for 'Anxiety'
must be conservatively interpreted.

The 'Conformity' factor would also

not be significant without the stage 2 scores.

This significant differ-

ence on this factor therefore, should be cautiously viewed until a
further study with a largarnumber of stage 2 subjects can be analyzed.
A visual analysis of the profiles in Figure 5 indicates a number of
theoretically interesting findings.

The first of these finaincsto be

considered is the remarkably parallel profiles of the stage 3-4 and
stage 4 subject means.
of these findings.

There are at least three possible interpretations

These subjects may actually have personality profiles

consonant with stage 4 subjects.

A second explanation suggests that those

subjects classified as mixed stage 3-4 subjects would have been more
appropriately classified as stage 4.

Kohlberg's (1976) contention that

using different scoring systems and particularly the earlier systems could
result in misclassification of stage 4 subjects seems substantiated by
this finding.

Another interpretation of this finding, that indi-

viduals in transition

from stage 3 to stage 4 reasoning undergo person-

ality changes consonant with stage 4 subjects,cannot be tested on the basis
of the data from this study.

A longitudinal study would be necessary to

provide such data.
A second finding indicates that stage 3 subjects have profiles
similar to stage 4 subjects except for an unexpectedly high self-actualization score.

In addition, the 'Superego' factor mean for stage 3 sub-

jects is lower than for stage 3-4 and stage 4 subjects, while the 'anxiety'
scores are higher.
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Time

Strength
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Sociability
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Figure 5
Moral Stage Profiles by Factor Scores
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The profile for stage 5 subjects shows a distinctive difference in
personality.

For the first four factors, the profile of stage 5 subjects

Is practically a mirror iridoe of stage 4 subjects.

Stage 5 individuals

are higher in self-actualization and in bohemianism or unconventionality.
Stage 5 subjects also appear to be less unreasonably dominated by superego
than stage 4 individuals.
Finally, there is a mild symmetry in vector paths between stage 3
and stage 5 subjects for the first four factors.
cally the same time-orientation mean.

Both groups have practi-

The difference between the two

groups resides in the means for the "assertiveness" and "conventionality"
factors.

Both of these means are lower for the stage 3 group.

The most variant profile is that of the four stage 2 subjects.

All

of the factor means for the stage 2 group are either the highest or lowest
for all groups.

They have the lowest scores on 'self-actualization,'

'sociability,' superego,"time-orientation' and 'bohemianism' (conventionality factor).

Alternately, they have the highest scores on

'anxiety' and 'assertiveness.'

All individuals except stage 2 subjects

had almost identical 'Time-orientation' scores.

These extreme scores must

be considered tentative based on the small sample size for the stage 2 group.
Analysis of Moral Stage Discriminant Centroid Means
The factor analysis and the resulting factor score profiles for the
moral stages provided a statistical basis for the major personality dimensions of this sample.

A discriminant analysis was subsequently calculated

in order to statistically determine which of the personality dimensions
constituted the major statistical differences between the moral stage groups.
This discriminant analysis further permitted a general, if preliminary.
test of the character-moral reasoning model by determining the ability of the

1N
personality factors to predict moral stage classifications.
Discriminant analysis statistically maximizes the variance among
groups by combining the given variables into linear functions.

These

ute
functions represent the dimensions along which a priori groups distrib
with minimal overlap of distributions.

Since the functions are dependent

on the a priori groups, a change in the set of groups can effect the
resultant functions derived.

The profiles in Figure 5 suggested the:

the stage 3-4 group and stage 4 group be equated as one group.
the actual analysis the stage 3-4 group was eliminated.

In

Two separate

discriminant analyses were, therefore, computed to examine the effect of
such a consolidation.
An initial discriminant analysis used all the moral stage groups.
This procedure extracted four discriminant functions (roots).
a discriminant analysis are interpreted similar to factors.

Roots in
Table 38

Only loadings equal

presents the correlation matrix for the four roots.
to or greater than .50 were used to interpret roots.

The centroid means for each moral stage group across discriminant
functions are presented in Table 39.

Root one is defined by the "superego,"

"assertiveness," and "ego-strength" factors.
defines the second root.

The

conventionality" factor

The third root is specified by the "self-actual-

ization" and "conventionality" factors.

The "ego-strength" and "superego"

factors loaded heaviest on the fourth root.

Table 39 indicates that

only the first two roots significantly discriminate between the groups.
Since the last two roots are non-significant explainers of between -group
variance, they are not considered in further analysis (Nunnally, 1967 ).

Table 38
Mixed Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix
--Toots
3

Factors

4

Factor Label
Self-Actualization

1

.1985

.4179

.7501

.0816

2

-.3425

-.0153

.0845

-.1971

3

.4987

-.0938

.1226

.6868

Ego Strength

4

-.5365

-.1659

-.1596

.6496

Superego Strength

5

-.1773

.1705

-.0316

.0688

Time-Orientation

6

.5342

-.4751

-.2083

-.1902

7

.1432

.7332

-.5861

.0569

11.06

1.06

BWG
Variance
Accounted For

57.76

30.12

Sociability

Compliance-Assertiveness
Conventionality
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Table 39
Mixed Stage Discriminant Function Means by Moral Stages

Moral
Stage Group

Discriminant Functions
2
3

2

1.661

-1.366

-.047

.035

3

.104

.180

.674

-.006

3-4

-.381

-.276

-.027

-.143

4

-.467

-.020

-.201

.121

5

.741

.645

-.264

-.094

x2
_

34.98

20.47

8.26

d.f.

10

8

P.

.000

.009

6
.219

.835
4
.931
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The

first met Consists Of a dimension with high superego, high

compliance, and low ego strength representing one polar end and low
superego, high assertiveness, and high ego strength at the other end.
This multi-variable dimension accounted for 57.767 of the between-group
variance.

Root two, the other signficant discriminant function. is a

single variable. "conventionality" dimension which accounts for 30.12'
of the variance.
The discriminant analysis determined that the variance between
groups can best be represented in a two dimensional space.

Figure 6

shows the two significant centroids of the moral stage groups plotted
in this two dimensional space.

This visual representation indicates the

relative position of each group in this space and the relative distance
(variance) between the groups.
Before explicating this set of findings, the results of the second
discriminant analysis which used only the pure stage groups (stage 3-4
eliminated) will be presented.

This second analysis derived three roots

(Table 40), again with only the first two beina significant (Table 41).
Root one has been reduced to a single-variable dimension in this analysis,
with the "superego" and "ego-strength" factors falling below the a priori
inclusion level.

The "conventionality" root has remained unchanged.

The

percentage of variance accounted for by these first two roots remains
substantially the same as in the first analysis.

The distribution of the

moral stage groups within the two dimensional space (Fioure 7) is isomorphic
to the spacial distribution from the first discriminant analysis.

This

evidence substantiates the previous interpretation that the stage 3-4
subjects are predominantly equivalent to stage 4 subjects.

19.
Figure 6
Mined Moral stage Groups
by
Centroid Means
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Table 40
Pure Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix

1

Roots
2

3

1

-.0586

.4224

-.6917

Self-Actualization

2

.3525

-.0835

-.0179

Sociability

3

.4595

-.0449

-.2221

Ego Strength

4

-.4687

-.3707

.2702

Superego Strength

5

-.2485

.1049

.1144

Time Orientation

6

.8327

-.3056

-.0219

7

-.0583

.6366

.6348

56.09

30.43

13.48

Factors

BWG
Variance
Accounted For

Factor Label

Compliance-Assertiveness
Conventionality
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Table 41
Pure Stage Discriminant Function Means By M3ral Stages
Discriminant Functions
2

Moral Stage

1

2

1.7901

-.6681

-.1981

3

-.1426

.2703

-.6796

4

-.3603

-.1880

.2367

5

.5273

.8174

.1952

X2
0.F.

24.085

14.874

9

7

.004

.038

3

7.305
5
.198

Figure 7
Pure Moral Stage Groups
by
Centroid Means
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These findings for both discriminant analyses can be described
Stage

simultaneously because of their similarity.

2 individuals based

on the data may be described is possessing high ego-strength. low superego
strength, high assertiveness, and high conventionality.

High con-

ventionality in this context represents a very practical approach to life.
showing a strong pre-occupation with 'down-to-earth' concerns.

This

suggests that stage 2 individuals are not conventional due to social
compliance but rather because being conventional is the most successful
mode of achieving personal goals within their social context.
interpretation is correct,

If this

then the actual behavior shown by stage 2

individuals would vary widely as their social class and social reference
group varied.

The stage 2 subjects in this study appear to be behavior-

ally moral to their social reference group and society in general.

Stage

2 individuals in a 'street corner, gang society' (Whyte, 1955 and Hannerz,
1969), however, would be behaviorally moral within their reference group
but not within the perspective of the majority society.

This interpretation

presents an hypothesis for future research.
Kohlberg (1969) classified stage 3 and 4 within the conventional
level of morality.

The current evidence from this study indicates that

while both stages are conventional in their moral reasoning, the conative
dimensions behind and/or associated with these stages

of moral reasoning

are fundamentally different.
Of all groups, the stage 3 subjects are the most 'normal' individuals
as defined by statistical distributions.

They are neither high nor low

in either ego-strength, superego strength or assertiveness.

They are only

mildly "bohemian" but primarily are more spontaneously conventional.
Their conventionality is not motivated by a compulsive superego.
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Stage 4 subjects are in marked contrast to the stage 3 individuals
In this regard.

While stage 4 subjects are normal in their conventionality,

this appears to be due to an overly compliant, compulsive superego and low
ego-strength.
Post-conventional individuals as represented by the stage 5 subjects
in this study show a very different personality profile.
moderately high ego-strengtn

They have

and assertiveness, with moderately low

superego strength. Stage 2 subjects showed a substantially lower,
ineffective functioning of superego while the post-conventional
individuals, also low in superego, demonstrated a mediating influence
of rational, reality testing (ego-strength) on the dictates of the
superego.

Further, the largest difference between the stage 2 and

5 subjects concerns conventionality.
least conventional.

The stage 5 individuals are the

They are not controlled by external, objective

goals like the stage 2 subjects but are more concerned with internal,
subjective essentials.

In a behavioral situation which involved a con-

flict between their internal principles and social, external rules, the
stage 5 person would more likely follow his universalistic principles.
This would result in the appearance of unconventional, immoral behavior
to the society at large.
This two-dimensional portrait of the personality profiles of the
moral stage groups can be further fleshed out by incorporating the
information from the earlier seven factor profiles.

Both stage 2 and

5 subjects are lower than average on sociability, although not
significantly.

The stage 2's pre-occupation with personal, practical

goals may interfere with their social inclinations and social expression.
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The inner-directed interests and fidelity to those self-realities nay
decrease stage S subjects' 'evel of sociability.

Stage 3 and 4

individuals show an average level of sociability.
The self-actualiz,tion factor showed significant differences between
groups. As would be expected from the descriptions of stage 2 and 4
subjects,
both are low in self-actualization.

A compulsive superego and weak ego-

strength may account for the low level of self-actualization of the stage 4
group.

The intense concern for objective, material goals without the

balance of subjective, self-potential goals would preclude tne achievement
of self-actualization by stage 2 individuals.

Unexpectedly, the stage 3

group possessed the highest level of self-actualization.

An hypothesis for

this result is that the comfortable, untroubled conventionality and interpsychic balance of the superego and ego may facilitate the development of
one's potentialities.

Post-conventional individuals also possessed a higher

level of self-actualization than average.

The inherent awareness of self,

subjective essentials, and self-motivated desire to achieve these inner
potentials could explain the higher self-actualization scores.

Their lower

score than the stage 3 group is hypothesized to reflect the stressful conflict between inner-directed principles and the prevailing principles of a
less than just and loving society.

This interpretation is consistent with

Fromm's (1947) theory that the socio-cultural

milieu in which one lives is

a limiting factor in the development of the productive personality.

Our

findings suggest that this restricting conflict is most severe for postconventional individuals.

CHAPTER x
Discussion of Results and Conclusions
Test of Character Trait Hypothesis
The evidence provided by the series of analyses in
this study
support the hypotheses of Kohlberg (1969) and From
(1947) that testing
individual personality traits will fail to demon
strate consistent and
significant differences between moral stages.

This failure also

appeared in the review of the many personality trait
studies.

The

correlations and ANOVA analyses computed on the indiv
idual POI and
16PF scales indicated few significant differences.

Figures 2 and 3

demonstrate, however, important differences betwe
en the aggregate scale
scores between moral stages.
These visual, non-statistical findings are statistica
lly substantiated
by the factor analysis profiles and especially the
discriminant analysis.
An examination of trait scores would lead to the
conclusion that few, if
any, relationships exist between personality and moral
reasoning stages.
This is exactly the hypothesis predicted by Kohlb
erg and From.

The

alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship
between personality
structures or schemas and stages of moral reasoning
received statistically
potent support from the discriminant analysis.
Test of the Self-Actualization Hypothesis
The implications by Shostrom (1965), Fromm (1947) and
May (1967)
that increased self-actualization is an inherent schem
a of moral development received equivocal support.

Significant, consistent differences

between moral stages appeared only for the Synergy scale
.
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Stage 5 subjects

?DO
Piave the highest scores for this ability to transcend dichot
omies in
order to see the opposite of life as meaningfully related.

This

finding is consistent with the hypothesis that moral develo
pment requires
more cognitively adequate schema capable of evaluating and integr
ating
the complexities of moral

ituations and principles.

This absence of evidence for specific traits is counter balanced
by the moral stage POI profiles (Figure 2 and Table 31) which indica
te
a strong pattern of relationships between self-actualization and
moral
development.

Stages 4, 3-4, and 2 have consistent profiles of low

self-actualization scores. Stages 3 and 5 have consistent patterns of
scores above the norms for this sample.

Most unexpectedly, the moral

stage 3 subjects have the highest self-actualization scores.

Moral stages

3 and 5 subjects additionally have parallel path profiles except
for the
scales 'Spontaneity' and 'Self-Acceptance' on which the stage 3 paths
rise while the stage 5 paths fall.

A similar parallel path pattern

emerged for the stage 3-4 and 4 scores.

There are three points out of

thirteen vectors which major divergence in path direction between
the
two profiles occurs.
Reactivity,'

This divergence occurs on the scales of 'Feeling

Nature of Man,' and 'Acceptance of Aggression.,

Despite these strong nonstatistical patterns, the statistical test
which used the discriminant analysis failed to substantiate the nonstatistical evidence.

This adds to the equivocal nature of any conclusions.

The self-actualization factor failed to reach the significance
level
(p

=.2l) set for the discriminant analysis.

Self-actualization is not

a dimension which statistically discriminates between the moral stage
groups.

Future research, however, is needed to try to overcome this

equivocal evidence.
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Future research is particularly important to test the supportive
profile patterns in Table Iland Figure 2 because of the hypotheses
this evidence suggests.

TWO hypotheses are proposed from this admittedly

equivocal data: (1) based on the stage profiles. stage 2 is a transitional
stage between stage 4 and stage 5 as proposed by Kohlberg and Kramer
(1969); and (2) that moral development is personality-based and involves
conative and affective dimensions as well as Kohlberg's cognitive dimensions.

Providing that this evidence can be replicated and statistically

validated in future research, it seems unlikely that the radical shifts
in POI scores between stage 2 and stage 3 would occur.

A more consistent

interpretation posits that the so-called stage 2 profile is a transitional
one between stages 4 and 5.

The direction and magnitude of the changes

supports this transition between the least self-actualized profile
(stage 4) to the next highest self-actualization profile (stage 5).

An

interpretation which accepts the hypothesis that individuals develop from
one of the lowest self-actualized stages (2) to the highest self-actualization
stage (3) without moving through intermediate levels of self-actualization
and moral stages is theoretically tenuous.
The second hypothesis that there are multiple developmental paths
(conative, affective, and cognitive)to the moral stages is a theoretically
much more significant one.

Kohlberg (1969) claims a single, unitary

developmental path, namely cognitive development.

This cognitive theory

has been proposed for childhood and adolescent development and has received
empirical support.

Kohlberg, however, has not been able to explain why

individual adults stop developing before reaching principled moral reasoning.
Kohlberg's theory needs such an explanatory proposition to fully elaborate
his unidimensional developmental model.
The equivocal self-actualization data suggests that instead of this
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unidimensional development. there is a personality WSW, multidimensional development of moral judgment.

Fromm (1947) presents

this hypo'hesis that character is a conative structure which determines
the level of moral development.

An individual's moral reasoning cannot

progress beyond his conative structure.

Once an individual develops the

stage of moral reasoning congruent with his conative structure, any
further development requires that the conative structure change.

This

hypothesis better fits the self-actualization profiles presented in
Figure 2.

This interpretation states that an individual will develop

to and stabilize at a moral reasoning stage 4 because of his conative
structure.

He will cognitively develop through the Kohlberg schema,

including stage 3 but will terminate at stage 4 because of his personality
structure.

Stage 3 individuals likewise will stabilize at this stage

rather than further developing because of personality factors and not
cognitive factors. The stage 5 adult individual will cognitively develop
through all of the previous moral reasoning stages until he stabilizes
at a moral reasoning stage psychologically consistent with his conative
structure.

A further hypothesis would be that stage 3 adults are more

likely to eventually develop to stage 5 reasoning than stage 4 adults
because of the greater similarity between the personality structures of
stage 3 and 5 individuals.

Adult individuals with a conative structure

congruent with stage 4 reasoning will develop through the 5-A moral
judgment stage before stabilizing at stage 5-6.
Test for Character Model
The factor score profiles and discriminant analyses have demonstrated
significant differences between the personalities of moral staae groups.
A final question now considered is:

how successfully can the knowledge
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of the relevant personality dimmnsion% be used to piste individuals withie
the moral stage groups? If there is an actual personological model
that
either parallels or underlies Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages,
then such
a model should be able to correctly predict a person's moral stage solely
on the basis of his pertinent personality dimensions. The discriminant
analysis provides the information necessary to test this hypothesized
model.
The discriminant analysis computes a classification matrix which
shows
how successfully the discriminant functions can predict the a
priori groups.
Table 42 presents the matrix for the discriminant analysis of
all moral
stages included.
20

A purely random prediction would correctly classify

of the subjects into the moral stage groups.

The prediction rate

for this specific model of all stages is 53, which is significantl
y greater
than chance (z = 5.4842, R = .000).

A closer examination of the table

indicates that the poorest prediction rates occur for stages 3-4 and 4.
The single highest misclassifications are of stage 3-4's as stage 4
(24 ) and of stage 4's as stage 3-4 (31 ).

This further substantiates

an earlier interpretation that those judged as stage 3-4 by the current
judges would have been more appropriately classified as stage 4.

With

only three cases as exceptions, all misclassifications form a normal
distribution in which the a priori moral stage represented the median
and the mode.

Although only slightly over half of the total cases were

correctly predicted by the personality model, the misclassifications
constitute a normal distribution which substantiates the model.

Over-

lapping distributions (misclassifications) should be contiguous.
The classification matrix was recalculated using only the pure stage
scorings (Table 43).

This procedure was done in order to test the

effectiveness of the model without the ambiguous stage 3-4 group.

The

O4
Table 42
Discriminant Classification Matrix for Mixed Stages Included

Actual
Classification
by Personality
Dimensions

2

3

3-4

4

5

Total
Cases

2

2

1

0

0

1

4

50';

25;,

0

O

25

0

9

2

1

0

12

0

75,

3-4

0

6

13

7

3

29

c.,
,

0

20.69

44.83

24.14

10.34

4

0

3

5

7

1

%

0

31.25

43.75

6.25

5

0

2

0

2

8

0

16.67,

0

16.67

66.67

20

17

13

3

Total

2

18.75,

21

16.67,;, 8.33

Multivariate Theta = .5342
Z = 5.4842
P = .0000 (one-tailed test)

16

12

73

?OS
Table 43
Discriminant Classification Matrix for Pur
e Stages Only

Actual
Classification
by Personality
Dimensions

Predicted Stage
2

3

4

5

Total

3

0

0

1

4

..

75%

0%

0%

25

3

0

9

3

0

75,z,

25;

0

0

3

12

1

0

18.75,

75'

6.25

0

2

i

9

1h.6/-

8.33'

75

2

O.
4

5

Total

3

14

16

11

Multivariate Theta = .750
Z = 6.6884
P = .0000 (one-tailed test)

12

16

lz

44
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successfulness of the model increased to 751 as compared
to a random
probability of 25%.
stages 3 and 4.

This may reflect the scoring difficulties pointed out

by Kohlberg (1976).
(75%).

Six out of the eleven misclassifications involved

The predictions are consistent for each
stage,

The model, therefore, has consistency
throughout and not only

overall.
Kohlberg's developmental model consists of three developmen
tal
stages with two levels in each.

Focusing on the three stages

(Preconventional, Conventional, and Postconventiona
l), the predictive
Power of the personality model improves.

Thirty-nine of the forty-four

cases in the pure-stages analysis are correctly class
ified by the model.
The predictive percentage increases from 75

to 88.6 .

The prediction

rate increases even more substantially when makin
g the same comparison
with the mixed -stage scores included.
53% to 86.

Seventy

The correct percentage rises from

percent of the incorrect predictions in the

mixed-stage analysis are classified correctly withi
n the broader preconventional, conventional, and postconventional stage
s.

Both models

are consistent in their level of prediction (88;,
and 86).

Overall, the

character-moral reasoning model receives impressive
ly substantial support.
Deficiencies of the Present Study and Directions of Futur
e Research
This research has attempted to test the relationship
between two
broad theoretical models:
organization.

moral development structures and personality

In attempting such an extensive study, there are a numbe
r

of potential weaknesses.

The sample chosen is one area of concern.

The sample of teachers, counselors, and administra
tors is a highly
homogeneous, skewed sample of the population.

They represent a relatively

homogeneous socioeconomic class, educational background
, intelligence
level, occupation, and geographical region.

The results of this study

are. therefore, potentially limited to this very specific
sample.
Future research should expand the sample by testi
ng a wider range
of subjects.
levels:

Subjects should be chosen from the five major socio
economic

poverty level, working class, middle class, upper middle
class,

and upper class.

Even within the middle class and upper middle class
the

range of occupations represented by the sample should
be expanded.

The

educational level of future subjects should be broadened
to include below
high school, high school graduate, and college gradu
ates.
subjects' intelligence should also be expanded.

The range of

Geographical variables

should be more extensively examined to include both
regional variables
and urban versus rural differences.

Although the present sample has an

age range from twenty to fifty-one, Dortzbach (1976
) reported research
which indicated generational differences in moral judgm
ent.

This

suggests that a thorough test of the theory should
test subjects beyond
the age of fifty.

Marginally significant differences of moral stage by

age was found in the present sample (see Table 21).

Age may be a more

important variable than has previously been suspected.
The sample of subjects is as important as the sampl
e of instruments
selected for the research.

A thorough test of moral judgment instruments

in this study forms the basis for confidence in their
selection.

Con-

fidence in the personality instruments chosen is not
founded on such
empirical grounds.

The 16PF is a highly reliable, widely used instrument
.

It is, however, an omnibus measure.
such omnibus tests.

There are a wide range of other

The POI is a more specialized instrument chosen for

the specific construct which it measures.
Research on such an important topic as these theories
should not be
based on only one or two measures of personality.

These results should

be tested for generaliiability by using other personality tests.
Another direction for future research is to select instruments which
specifically measure the relevant personality traits identified in this
study.

An analysis of the results of a battery of specially select
ed

trait measures might provide a more detailed, clear resolution of
the
moral stage personality profiles.
The most severe restrictions of the present findings are products
of the analysis.

Two basic deficiencies are associated with the analysis:

the total number of subjects and the number of subjects in each
stage.
Both factor analysis and discriminant analysis are the main statistical
methods of this study.

The

reliability of both types of analysis

increases as the total number of cases analyzed increases.

Gorsuch (1974)

stated that the sample used in factor analysis should be no less than
100
and should be at least five times greater than the number of variab
les.
Neither condition is achieved in this study, and this represents
a major
deficiency.

Future research should, therefore, use an appropriate sample

size.
The reliability of discriminant analysis increases with the number
of cases in each and every group analyzed.

The largest group in the

current analysis is twenty-nine while the smallest is four (see Table 23).
All of the other groups number sixteen to twelve.

The reliability of the

profile for the stage 2 group,which is based on only four subjects,
is not
statistically satisfactory.

Future research needs to

significantly

increase the number in all groups in the discriminant analysis.
This study has established relationships between moral reasoning
structures and personality structures

Provided that these findings

are replicated in future research, the next most important direction of
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research should be a de
velopmental study of
the development of
these
two structural syst
ems. Only a deve

lopmental study
will determine whethe
r
there is either a ca
usal relationship
between the two deve
lopmental
structures and what
the direction is
of this causality
or whether both
are the result of
an underlying caus
al factor.
This research migh
t
further discover
characterlogical
mechanism in mora
l stage transition
.
Selman (1971) ha
s already conclude
d that empathy is
a necessary and
developmentally pr
ior trait to conv
entional moral de
velopment. Future
research may determ
ine more complex
trait structures
which developmenta
lly
precede stage
4 and stage
5 moral reasonin
g respectively.
Possibly
the rarity of the
individuals functi
oning with stage
six moral reasonin
g
reflects the specia
l personality stru
cture accompanying
it.
In addition to test
ing generational
differences, more at
tention
needs to be focuse
d on sex difference
s. Haier (1975)
reported signific
ant
differences betwee
n the moral reason
ing scores of fema
les and males. No
test is made for
sex differences on
the MJS, SMJS, OM
JS, or MMV in this
study. The possib
ility that males
and females may ha
ve either differen
t
moral reasoning st
ructures for the
same personality
organization or vi
ce
versa is, therefor
e, not known. A
check of the subs
cale scores on the
POI
and 16PF in the pr
esent study reveal
ed that females ha
d significantly
(R. = .05) higher
scores on the foll
owing subscales: PO
I-Feeling Reacti
vity,
16PF-Tough Minded
-Tender Minded (I
), and Relaxed-Ten
se (Q4), while ma
les
had significantly
higher scores on:
Expedient-Conscien
tious (G), Trusti
ngSuspicious (L), Co
nservative-Experim
enting (Q 1 ), and
Undisciplined Self
Conflict-Controlle
d (Q3). This evid
ence further supp
orts the need for
future research to
explore sex differ
ences. There may
be different
character structur
e for males and fema
les.
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Not only mey there be different character structures for each sex,
but there mey also be cultural differences in character structure.

Sex

differences in personality have been clearly attributed to cultural
socialization (Mead, 1935).
was a genetic model.

Kohlberg (1969) claimed that his theory

He (1969) has supported this claim with crossSimpson (1974) challenged Kohlberg's view and

cultural research.

asserted that his moral development scheme was ethnocentric and
culturally-biased.

Another approach to establishing the cross-cultural

validity of moral development is to investigate the personality structures
concomitant with the moral stages.

This would provide a test because of

the personality developmental schemas Kohlberg (1969) proposed as
paralleling moral development.
structures need

Cross-cultural comparisons of character

to be undertaken regardless of Kohlberg's hypotheses

about personality schemas.
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Appagtdis A
KohltilTsi!s 1969 Moral Amoct List
Grouping I

The Categories

A. Prima-Facie Obltgations
Aspect 1: Extra-legal or Moral Norms. Ways of invoking and conceiving
of rules, norms, and role-stereotypes.
Aspect 1M:

Metaethical issues about relativity of moral norms
and rules.

Aspect 2:

Legal Norms.

Ways of invoking and defining legal norms.

(Either explicitly or if norms about stealing. etc.,
are talked about in ways implying crime, police, etc.)
Aspect 2M:

Metaethical issues about relation of morality to law.
Issues of legitimacy of civil disobedience.
(Aspect 2211:

General reasons for making and

keeping laws is listed under Grouping III as a value.)
B.

Conceptions of Prima-Facie Rights

(These are all defined under Grouping III

where each

value aspect has a rights subaspect and a value
subaspect.)
C.
Aspect 3:

Conceptions of Dutiful Choice

Concept of "should" or "ought" for an actor in a choice
situation involving a conflict between rules or
between rules and the interest of self or of others.

Aspect 3R:

Obligation when have right not to fulfill obliaationsthe relation between rights and obligations.

Aspect 3M:

Metaethical issues about relativity of obligations.
D.

Takini_Re_vpnsibility

777
Aspect 4: Limitints.orsegyInces anit.mybons Actor_ t.s remon.siblikfor.
Aspect 5:

Limiting autonomous choice t3 nellAnce on advice or compromise
with others.

Aspect 6: AccountabiliAL Limiting accountability for (not) performing
an act because of ignorance. lack of self control. etc.
E. PraisinALpnd Blapin97tIeWorth of Persons and
Personal Actions
Aspect 7:

Culpability_or Blame.

Judgments of whether to blame someone

as a person when he has violated a norm or oblioation.
(Aspect 8: Praise and Admiration.)
F.
Aspect 9:

Meting Out Punishment and Reward

Rules for Punishing.

When, how, how much to punish.

(Aspect 2311: the general purpose of punishment, its
basic functions as expiative and preventive--is listed
under Grouping III as a value.)
Aspect 10:

Rules for Rewarding. When, how to reward.
(Aspect 2411: purnose or function of reward--is listed
under Grouping III as a value.)

Grouping II.

The Principles
G.

Aspect 11:

Considerations of Prudence

Fear of Punishment and anticipation of guilt (or shame)
was reasons

(Aspect 12:

for following norms.

Anticipation of Reward or of pride or self-esteem as reasons
for following norms.)

Aspect 13:

Anticipation of pain to the self, of injury or failure as
reasons for following norms.

(Differs from Aspect 11

in that these bad consequences are not punishment--

27A
they may be interpersonal. however.

The her. to

the self coming from disruption of desired relations
is Aspect 13. altruistic relations are Aspect 15.)
(Aspect 14:

Anticipation of pleasure to self (outside a defined reward
system) as a reason for following norms.)
Consideration of Welfare of Others

H.

(Note where the welfare is a matter of definite values
of Aspect 2211. Maintenance of Law; of Aspect 26.
Life; of Aspect 27. Property; of Aspect 28, Liberty;
of Aspect 29. Love and Fraternity--it is scored under
Grouping III values.)
Aspect 15:

Welfare of other individuals (Love and friendship as altruistic
motives or reasons for helping others or conforming
come here, the reasons for entering into and maintaining love or friendship relations are scored Aspect 29,
Love.)

Aspect 16:

Welfare of group, institutions, and societies, as a reason.
I.

Considerations of Respect

Aspect 17:

Respect for persons and personal authority as a reason.

Aspect 18:

Respect for the group, for group consensus, and for social
order as a reason.
J.

Aspect 19:

Considerations of Justice

Maintaining_positive reciprocity and trust.

Aspect 19RX:

Defining or justifying obligations by stating actor
should exchange places with the victim-Golden Rule.

Aspect 20:

Maintaining !native reciprocity by vengeance or by refusal
to honor non-reciprocal demands.
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Aspect 21:

Distrihytive Equality -- Maintaining equality or equity
(equality relative to need) as a reason.

Grouping 111.
Aspect 22:

The Basic Values and Rights

Security of Law andjelpl Order as a Value.

Aspect 221:

(Not used as comes under Aspect 2)

Aspect 22//:

Reasons why laws and their enforcement are necessary
or desirable.

Aspect 23:

Punishment as a Value

Aspect 231:

(not used as comes under Aspect 9)

Aspect 2311:

Reasons, purposes of punishment, its basic functions
as expiative and preventive.

(Aspect 24:

Reward as a Value,)

Aspect 241:

(not used as comes under Aspect 10)

Aspect 241 1:

Reasons, purposes of reward.

Aspect 25:

Contract, Promise and Non-Deception as Values.

Aspect 251:

Definition and Use of Contract and Promise-Keeping
Concepts.

Aspect 2511:

Reasons for Maintaining Contract and Promise

Aspect 25M:

The Social Contract--the contract of the individual
with abstract institutions or with society.

Aspect 25T;
Aspect 26:

Truth values.

Life as a Value.

Aspect 261:

Definition of the nature of Life's Value, of the Right
to Life, e.g. of what lives are valuable under what
conditions.

Aspect 26//:

The reasons why life is morally valuable.
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Value.
Aspect 27: Property as a
Aspect 271:

s and Values.
Definition of Property Riot

Aspect 27,1:

perty rights.
Reasons for maintaining pro

Aspect 28:

kke.
Liberty. or Au.topomy_as. a Val

Aspect 281 :

ues of freedom from
Definitions of rights and val
coercion

Aspect 2P 1/:

for having rights of
Reasons for valuing freedom,
liberty.

Aspect 29:

ues.
Love and Fraternity as Val

Aspect 291:

Aspect 29//:

ns and nature of a good
Definition of the obligatio
e motive.
relationship or of a good lov
ship being valued.
Reasons for love and friend

Aspect 30: Sexual Values
Aspect 30/:
Aspect 301 1 :

sexual relations.
Definition of appropriate
riate sexual relations.
Reasons for valuing approp

1.

APPonelli B
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Objective Moroi Judgment Scale
your youth group. Your
You want eery much to on on a trip with

0 up the money for the
father promises you that you can go if you 1104V
trip yourself

and save up
So you work hard at your part-time job

trip, then your father changes
the money it will cost to go on the
decided to go on a special fishing
his mind. Some of his friends have
money it will cost. So he asks
trip, and your father is short of the
saved from your job. You don't
you to give him the money you have
so you think about refusing to give
want to give up going on your trip
your father the money.
er involved here, rather than
Does it matter that it is your fath
someone else?

(1)

Why?

of
greater emotional concern because
Yes, though only as an issue of
. My affection for him and the
the nature of this relationship
d lead me to expect more from
expectation of mutual interest woul
the "contract" which we made.

(2)

to do something nice for me in
Yes, my father is in the position
me for not doing what he asks.
return for a favor or to punish
to do this.
Others do not have as much power

(3)

my father and an obligation to
Yes, I have a responsibility to
opportunity for me to repay him
honor his wishes. This is an
past.
for things he has done for me in the
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(4) Yes, obligations here are defined by conscience.

love or affection

for my father is a value which I have chosen and I should be aware
of the implications of that choice.

(5) Yes. I should feel gratitude and appreciation for
has done for me in the past.

What My

father

His affection is important to me.

I should be concerned for his feelings and willing to act unselfishly.

(6)

Yes. It is my duty to do what my father asks and give him the
money.

2.

Obedience to my father is essential.

You want to go

on the trip but you are afraid to refuse to give

your father the money.
you have made.
with it.
later.

So you give him 510 and tell him that is all

You take your remaining $40 and pay for your trip

You tell your father that the director said you could pay
So you go off on your trip and your father doesn't go on his

fishing trip.
Before you leave on your trip, you tell your younger brother that
you really have made $50 and that you lied to your father and said that
you had made only S10.

He is now wondering if he should tell your father

or not.
Why would you think your brother should not tell your father what
he knows?
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(1)

1 won't trust him anymore if he doss and he may very well heed
me to do the same thing for him someday.

(2) Keeping secrets is a necessary part of maintaining friendships.
He knows that

I won't desire his triendship if I can't trust him.

(3) He shouldn't see the need to tell him.

He should respect my

rights as those of anyone else and respect my ability to make
decisions and to tell whomever I choose.

(4) He has a right to privacy, if my father doesn't ask he's really
not doing anything wrong.

He is merely withholding information

which has not been requested.

(5)

He shouldn't tell because he is younger than I am and,therefore,
shouldn't break his word to me.
than he does.

I have more power and authority

If he breaks his word he risks the consequences

of going against that authority.

(6)

I told him because I trusted him and thought I could rely on him.
If he tells, he'll force reconsideration of that trust.
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1.

Your mother is

near death from a special form of cancer.

is one drug that the doctors think might save her.

There

It is a form of

radium that a druggist in your town has recently discovered.

The drug

is expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the
drug costs him to make.

He pays $200 for the radium and charges $2000

for a small dose of the drug.

You have gone to everyone you know to

borrow the money, but you can only get together about $1000. which is
half of what it costs.

You tell the druggist that your mother is dying

and ask him to sell it to you cheaper or let you pay later.

But the

druggist says, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money
from it."

So you get desperate and break into the man's store to steal

the drug for your mother.
Why shouldn't you steal the drug?

(1)

I am quite desperate in this situation and I may not truly realize
I'm doirq wrong when I steal the drug.

But I'll certainly know

I've done wrong after I'm punished and sent to jail.

I'll always

feel guilty about being dishonest and breaking the law.

(2)

I may not get much of a jail term if I steal the drug, butmy
mother will probably die before I get out so it won't do me much
good.

If my mother dies, I shouldn't blame myself, it isn't my

fault she has cancer.

(3)

I'll get caught and sent to jail if I do.

If I get away my

conscience will bother me thinking how the police will catch up
with me at any minute.

/II
nk 1 am a criminal,
the druggist who will thi
(4) It isn't just
thinking
er I steal it. I'll feel bad
Aft
.
too
l
wil
e
els
ne
ryo
eve
be
my family and myself; I won't
how I've brought dishonor on
able to face anyone again.
ple but I'd
ldn't be blamed by other peo
If I stole the drug, I wou
own conscience
wouldn't have lived up to my
condemn myself because I

(5)

and standards of honesty.

(6)

violate
respect in the community and
I would lose my standing and
y by
for myself if I'm carried awa
the law. I'd lose respect
s.
g term effects of my action
emotion and forget the lon

is no other treatment known to
The drug didn't work and there
y about
her, so you know she has onl
medicine which can save your mot
weak that
in terrible pain, but she is so
is
She
e.
liv
to
ths
mon
six
is delirious
ld make her die sooner. She
wou
ler
kil
n
pai
of
e
dos
d
goo
a
you to
in her calm periods she asks
and
n
pai
h
wit
zy
cra
ost
alm
and
't stand
to kill her. She says she can
ne
ici
med
her
of
ugh
eno
her
e
giv
in a few months anyway.
the pain and she is going to die
ce?
your decision in this instan
How would the law influence

4.

(1)

that they
killing, but with the view
I'd consider the rules about
nature
ining here. The sympathetic
should not be finally determ
really murder.
mercy makes the action not
of
out
her
g
lin
kil
my
of

)6
else's life and mercy
(2) No one has the right to take someone
but I would expect modkilling is in fact violation of the lam.
n.
ification of the law in this situatio

(1)

or legalize mercy killing
I would hesitate to institutionalize
even under conditions of pain.
since human life retains its value
ssity to value human personbut I would be conscious of the nece
terms.
ality and life in other than physical

(4)

Killing her wouldn't be
would die anyway.

bad because it has no effects, she

by getting
I could avoid legal complications

h
ng suicide, or making the deat
her permission in writing, suggesti
look natural.

(5)

as binding in this situation.
I wouldn't see murder rules or laws
t and consent of the 'victim'
It is hardly murder when agreemen
are involved.

(6)

people and make them suffer.
It is against the law to torture
violating this law.
refusing to give her the drug, I'm

By
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Imagine your country has been attacked in war.

S.

You are fighting

in a company of troops which is way outnumbered and is retreating before
the enemy.

Your company has crossed a bridge over a river, but the

enemy is still on the other side.

If someone goes back to the bridge

and blows it up, with the head start the rest of the company would have,
they could probably escape alive; there will be about a 4 to I chance
You, the leader, are the one who knows best

that he will be killed.
how to lead the retreat.

You ask for volunteers, but no one will volunteer.

If you go yourself, the troops will probably not get back safely and you
are the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.
Do you have the right to order a man to go if you think that is
the best thing to do?

(1)

Why?

Yes, it is part of my job to see that respect is maintained.

Respect

for my position is a symbol of respect for the rules and laws of
society.

It is therefore my duty to exercise the power associated

with my pcsition.

(2)

Yes, in this instance I am aware of what is in the best interest
of all.

I can better understand the circumstances than my sub-

ordinates as well as being aware of their point of view.

(3)

Yes, I have

been placed in command of the company.

Anything I

have the power to command I also have the right to command.
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(4) Yes. I have the right in that the others in the company. including the man ordered to go, would see the necessity for my
order.

I give the order with the understanding that my request

Is something the in ordered to comply with would himself choose
to do.

(5)

Yes, I have the right to order my troops to do whatever I consider necessary.

They may not respect my authority, but they

must obey my command.

(6) Yes, according to the rules of military command. I have the right
to order a man to do this.

However. I must also recognize that

individual autonomy of a subordinate allows him the right to refuse
to comply.

6.

You have finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind.

You think it is best to pick one of your two demolition men.

Both of

these men have been trained to use dynamite to blow up bridges and
fortifications at the least risk to themselves.

One of the demolition

men has a lot of strength and cotrage, but is a bad troublemaker.

He is

always stealing things, beating up the other men, and not doing his work.
The second demolition man has gotten a bad disease and is likely to die
in a short time anyway, though he is strong enough now to do the job.
How should either of these men feel about obedience to your orders,
as opposed to a request from another person to do the same thing?
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(1) It is worse not to obey my official orders because it does more
harm.

It is deviation against the government, or public service

rather than against an individual.

(2) Though my request may be more directly relevant to the general
social system, one man's request or order holds no more weight
than that of another.

(3) My position of authority comes from the trust and respect which
the company has placed in my judgment--the exercise of that authority is like

the return of an act of trust.

It would seem most

important to be consistent with this trust in obeying my orders.

(4)

He should feel that it is not that bad to refuse my orders because a refusal would not affect me that much.

I am in the position

to order another man to do the same thing.

(5)

It would be worse not to obey my o-ler because I give so much in
my responsibility for the company and work so hard to get things
done in the ways that are best for all.

(6)

He should realize that it is always worse to disobey the request
of an authority than that of anyone else.

241)
was a poor men who could find
In your town a few years ago there
d and medicine that he needed
no work. Without money, he stole foo
a year, he escapeA from prison and
for himself and his family. After
He
the country under a n•vo name
went to live in another part of
kers
a big factory. He gave his wor
saved money and slowly built up
ital
of his profits to build a hosp
the hiohest wages and used most
rs
good medical care. A number of yea
for people who couldn't afford
e
see the factory owner and recogniz
has passed since that time. You
e
escaped convict whom the police hav
him as being the same man --the

7.

home town.
been looking for back in your
es?
ut the punishment he now deserv
What would be your feelings abo
doing
punish a man who thought he was
to
ng
wro
very
be
d
woul
It
(1)
trated
He has more than adequately demons
ng.
thi
l
mora
and
t
rec
cor
the
uldn't
his commitment to right. He sho
his respect for other men and
be punished.

(2)

tenced.
He broke the law and was sen

The rest of his sentence is

yet to be served.

(3)

at
Neither his motives nor intent

the time of the crime were evil.

is not
ficient to indicate that stealing
Minimal punishment would be suf
a practice to be followed.
spite of
ardless of the motive. In
reg
ng,
wro
are
s
act
gal
Ille
(4)
favorable since the time of the crime,
the fact that he has acted
the
the victim of his crime and see
can appreciate the position of
need for his punishment.
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(S) He has undone the harm which he caused and there would therefore
be little need to punish him.

(6) Someone should not be punished in a situation where everyone would
be expected to do the same thing; laws come from the will of the
community and the will of the community in this

instance

would be

not to punish.

You are involved in war and your city is often bombed by the

B.

enemy.

So each person in the city has been given a post to go to

right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started
and to rescue people in burning buildings.
chief in charge of one fire engine post.

You have been made the
The post is near where you

work so you can go there quickly during the day, but it is a long way
from your home.

One day there is heavy bombing and you leave the

shelter in the place you work and go toward your fire station.

But

when you see how much of the city is burning, you get worried about
your family.

So you decide you have to go home first to see if your

family is safe, even though your home is a long way off and the station
is nearby and there is somebody assigned to protect your family's area.
Was it right for you to do this?

(1)

Why?

No, I should respect all persons' right equally.

I'm showing that I don't have that respect.

By leaving my post

It is inconsistent with

equal regard for all men and the rights of all to equal treatment.
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(2) No. the authority and power of those above me requires me to go
to my post under such circumstances.

I act here in violation of those

commands.

(3) No. if I am to expect protection flr myself and my family I must
earn that by

doing my assigned job.

(4) No, if I do this I am violating the rights of others to protection.
My personal rights can only come from a general social order.

(5) No, I am putting myself in a lot more danger by going across the
city.

(6)

My first duty is to myself, not others.

I should stay at my post.

No, I am expected by others in the town to be at my post; I am

not doing my expected job in deserting my station.

9.

Imagine that you are living before the Civil War and that there

are laws that allow slavery.

According to the law, if a slave escapes,

he has to be returned to his owner like a runaway horse.

You don't

believe in slavery and disobey the law and hide runaway slaves and
help them to escape.
Relate your feelings about slavery to your actions in this situation.

(1)

Laws shouldn't interfere with individual rights.

I have a re-

sponsibility to protect those rights for others since they form the basis
of our whole system of justice.

(2) Every human life has

4

right to respect MI equal treatment.

Slavery laws violate these rights and go against the principles
of human dignity and conscience.

(1) Slavery is wrong; you can't own other people.

However, as the

law stands, it is wrong to help escaped slaves

(4) People with more power have a right to control those with less.
The law says that slavery is legal, by acting in this way I break the law.

(5)

I did break the law, but I don't know if it's right to have laws

which restrict other rights.

(6) Everyone has a right to do what he wants, the law can't tell me
how to live my life.

10.

Imagine that you are the owner of a rooming house which holds

seven rooms.

The rent from the rooming house provides you with just

enough money to make ends meet.
All of your roomers are white and you know them very well.

They

have told you that if you ever rent a room to a Negro they would move out.
If this happens you will receive much less money than the small amount
you now receive.

}hilt you also know that if you refuse a Negro a room you

could get into trouble because the open housing law makes it 'illegal for
you to refuse to rent a room to a person because of his race.
A young black man, Mr. Jones, has just received a job in town

He

has looked around the town all day for housing without success and toward
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evening notices the sign 'Room for Rent

in front of your house.

When he asks you about the room, you tell him that you have just rented
the room and that there are no more rooms left.

In fact, there are

two vacant rooms in your house at the time.
Should you have the right to say who lives in your rooming house?
Why?

(1)

Yes. I work hard for the small amount I get from the house.

1

have a right to what I earn and no one can ask me to give that up for them.

(2)

Yes. I have the right to control

my own

property

It's none of

the business of the people to whom the house does not belong.

I have

absolute rights in matters concerning my house.

(3)

Yes, ideally, but property cannot be owned and controlled outside

of a system of general justice where each man's rights and duties are
respected equally.

(4)

Discrimination goes totally against that equality.

Yes, I should be able to expect my tenants to value my property

and appreciate my need to maintain a full rooming house. an impossibility
If I allow a Black man to move into the house.

(5)

Yes, but I must recognize that property rights come only from in-

dividual rights and by not equally respecting the rights of all I risk
forfeiting the right to control my property.

(6)

Yes, I own the house and people who live there are under my authority.
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girl. (girls)
You have 4 very close relationship with 4 (boys)

II.

boy during your senior year in high school.

Separated for the Simmer, you
One

t one another.
grow apart and return with very mixed feelings abou

s and attraction, yo,J go further
evening, feeling again your former closenes
A few weeks later you find out
and further and have sexual intercourse
(boys) she is. (girls) you are pregnant
in this instance?
What would be your feelings about abortion
It's not really killing.

(1)

The fetus is not really alive.

there
killing something that was never really

It's

The life isn't worth

trouble for me.
anything to the baby and it can only (ause

t.
Its an unborn baby, that's the whole poin
see how anyone can say he's alive.

If a kid isn't born I can't

Even little kids, babies when they're

e is because someone knows them.
just born, the only reason they're aliv
hurt if they die are their parents.
And so the only people that they really
t--nobody knows him. It wouldn't
But if this kid isn't born yet, then I don'
be hurting anyone.

(3)

Life is a universal human right.

The life of the fetus, apart from

ty for me has value in its own right,
all of the considerations of difficul
human being.
and deserves the equal treatment of any

ext of the baby's future. It
Life should be considered in the cont
omenon but as an attitude of respect
should be viewed not as a biological phen
exhibits only the biological aspects
for personality and justice. The fetus
it
for its personality and justice for
of life and the chances for respect

(4)

s seem limited.
in the future under these circumstance
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or the ether It really
Physically the fetus hardly *sista see way

(S)

makes very little different,.
as anyone else and
An unborn baby has just as much right to live
t to decide whether it
I don't think that I or anyone else has the righ
ns have not the right to
should live or not. Life is sacred and huma

(6)

terminate it.
you are alone in the house.
Your parents are away for the weekend and

12.

ls) boyfriend, (boys) girlfriend
Unexpectedly, on Friday evening your (gir
e
together in the house and after a whil
comes over. You spend the evening
sexual intercourse.
start necking and petting and having
to think your behavior is wrong
What considerations would lead you
in this instance?

al intercouse without any thought
It would be wrong if we had sexu
lot
nvenience--a child could cause a
about pregnancy because of the inco

(I)

in high school.
of disturbance--especially to kids

d show discipline and our
If we did not have intercourse we woul
will be more meaningful for us and
ability to wait for marriage when sex
s
in violation of social and religiou
more satisyfing because it will not be

(2)

norms.

mally dependent relationshipsof
Because of our youth and even mini
dignity
ond to considerations of personal
our parents, we cannot fully resp
under such circumstances.
and responsibility most necessary

(3)
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If pregnancy resulted from intercours• in this instance, my

(4)

parents would be most upset and even my friends might shy away from me.

Since we were not totally convinced of the rightness of our actions

(5)

and able to fit them into a logically thought out pattern,

VOI

would be

apt to be bothered by conscience or other considerations.

Sex in this instance could be an example of our using each other

(6)

It would be very difficult at this age to have

for personal advantage.

built a relationship of real honesty and trust which would eliminate the
difficulties of personal advantage seeking.

13.

You are thinking about putting out a mimeographed newspaper for

students in your school which would express many of your strong feelings.
In particular, you want to voice your opposition to the war in Viet Nam
and to many of the school's regulations.
Before publishing your newspaper, you ask your principal for permission.
The principal agrees on the condition that you submit all of your articles
to him for approval.

You agree and begin to submit your articles.

The

principal approves all of them and you publish two issues of the paper
in the next two weeks.
But the principal has not thought about the great attention your
newspaper would receive.

Students reaa the paper eagerly and are beginning

to organize against school rules.
the

Many classes are spent talking about

paper and rallies are held before and after school.

Furthermore,

many parents who favor Viet Nam war are phoning the principal and angrily
telling him that the newspaper is unpatriotic and should not be published.

74E
As a result of the commotion, the principal considers ordering
to stop publishing the newspaper.

HO gives as a

redINIthet

you

your activ-

ities are disruptive to the operation of the school.
If you had advocated the dropping of nuclear bombs on North Viet
Nam and China, what difference. if any, would this have made on the
consideration of your rights to continue publication?
(I) Rights and duties are very different.

In this case it would seem

that legally I would have the right to publish what I want, but the
rightness of my actions in the latter case would be doubtful

My rights

here come from equal respect for others' rights--publication of the latter
articles would not show that respect.

(2)

It's nobody else's business what I write in my newspaper.

I have

absolute rights to write and publish whatever I want.

(3)

It's all in the hands of the principal. If the latter position

were less acceptable to him, then my rights to their publication would
also be less.

(4)

I have worked to publish this newspaper.

That right to publish is

mine in spite of others' interpretations of my use of it as good or bad.
I have the right to publish what I choose to publish.

(5)

A student newspaper should express the views of students in general.

The latter positions do not fairly represent these views and therefore I
don't have as much right to publish them.

?6,
(6) Equal rights have meaning only within a system of general justice
for all.

The latter positions are in violation of the principles

of that justice.

I can expect the rights to consistently publish

what 1 want only if I am personally consistent in upholding an equal
justice structure for all.

You have gotten into serious trouble.

14.

town in a hurry and need money.

You are secretly leaving

You can't get it from anyone you know

and vou are faced with going to a retired old man who is known to help
people in the town.

If you tell this man that you are very sick and

need $500 to pay for an operation, he will give it to you.

Really you

aren't sick at all and have no intention of paying the man back.

Although

he does not know you very well, he would loan you the money.
How important is it tnat you tell the truth in this situation?

(1)

The old man gives money to people he doesn't even know.

shouldn't matter to him what the money is used for.
be lying to someone I know and who depends on me.

It really

It's not like I'd
What I say to him

really makes little difference.

(2)

My telling the truth is essential.

Truth forms the whole basis of

our socialorder; it's something I have the right to expect and people must
expect from me.

(3) Since I need the money so badly, the truth matters very little.
should do and say what I have to in order to get the money.

250
(4) The value of ny word goes beyond situational consideration.

Jus-

tice and respect for human dignity can only he upheld in the context
of consistent truth.

(5) If this man is willing to give me money, he has earned the right
to expect the truth from me.

(6) He has lots of money and power so his word is important. I don't
have any money or power, so my word is worth very little one way or the
other.

15.

One day the air raid sirens begin to sound.

Everyone realizes that

a hydrogen bomb is going to be dropped on the city by the enemy and that
the only way to survive will be in a bomb shelter.

Not everyone has

bomb shelters, but those who do have enough air space inside to last you
You know that after five days the fallout will

and yrur family five days.

have diminished to the point where you could safely leave the shelter.
you leave before that, you will die.
family alone.

There is enough air for

If

you and your

Your next door neighbors have not built a shelter and are

trying to get into yours.

You know that you will not have enough air if

you let the neighbors in, and that you will all die if they come inside.
So you refuse to let them in.
So now the neighbors are trying to break the door down in order to
get in.
shoot.

You take your rifle and tell them to go away or else you will
They don't go away.

come into the shelter.
Why should you shoot?

So you either have to shoot them or let them

2S1
1 have the most power in this situation and 1 must do what it will

(1)

require to hold that position.

(2) Society is based on living up to special obligation of contract
or

agreement.

The special obligations to my family require that I

see first to their protection in this instance.

(3) There is nothing to be gained from letting them in and much to
be lust from their entrance.

(4)

I have no responsibility to protect them.

I have placed myself in a position where my family depends on me.

In spite of love and all other considerations, I owe more to those who
depend on me than I owe to humans in general.

I must protect my family

first.

(5) My family is more important to me and personal affection makes my
duty to protect them the most binding.

(6) My rights to property are essential here.
responsible and reliable in my care for them.

My family must see me as
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Scoring Key for Objective More Judgment Scale

ROI Selection:
Situation:
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2
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3
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2
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1
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2
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ANSAdIZ C
Social AttitudeiOuestionnarie
This booklet consists of two different questionnaires. Each
questionnaire presents statements and questions dealing with several
current social problems and issues.
each questionnaire

Please read the instructions for

and its statenents and questions carefully.

Be

sure to answer each question. Questions are on the front of each page.
The space provided for you in which to write your answers may
be small, you may. therefore, have to write small.

Please state your

opinion or beliefs fully, explaining why you believe that way.

There

are no right or wrong answers.
Instructions precede each questionnaire.

This booklet usually

takes from 40 minutes to no more than 90 minutes to complete.
Thank you.

Instructions for Questionnaire 1:
The following eleven pages present four different stories

Each

story situation is followed by questions about your attitudes relating
to certain aspects of the stories.
supporting reasons.

Answer each one fully with your

Please give your everyday, honest opinions.

are no right or wrong answers.

There

7S4
Skint: In Europe. a woman

was near

death from I Pecia1 kind of cancer.

There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her.

It was a

form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.
The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 10 times
what the drug cost him to make.

He paid S200 for the radium and charged
The sick woman's husband. Heinz,

S2.000 for a small dose of the drug.

went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about S1.000 which is half of what it cost.

He told the druggist

that his wife was dying. and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay
later.

But the druggist said, "4o, I discovered the drug and I'm going

to make money from it."

So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's

store to steal the drug for his wife.
Should Heinz have stolen the drug?

Why or why not?

In this situation law and life come into conflict.

How can you resolve

the conflict taking the best arguments for both into account?

Would you have stolen the drug if it was your wife who was dying?

Why?

If you were the one dying, would you want your husband or wife to
steal the drug?

Why?

If the husband doesn't love his wife, is he obligated to steal the drug
for her?

Why or why not?

2SS
Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as his wife?

What are the rights of the druggist in this case?
right to charge that much?

Heinz was arrested.
him go free?

Does he have a

Why or why not?

Should the Judge sentence him or should he let

Why?

What responsibility does the judge have to follow the law?
right to disobey the law?

Story:

why?

Why or why not?

If so. when?

A man and woman fall in love and get married.

had sexual relations before marriage.
woman finds she doesn't like

Is it ever

They have never

After they are married, the

having sexual intercourse. it just makes

her feel bad and she decides not to have intercourse with her husband.
Was it riaht or wrong for the wife to do that?

Why or why not?

Would you say that it is a duty for a wife to sleep with her husband?
Why or why not?

They talk it ow-n- at great length and no matter what the husband says,
the wife won't change her mind.
husband to do?

What would be the best thina for the

Why?

Does the husband have any obligation to the wife?

Whj or why not?

PS'
KS finally decides that the only way to save the marriage IS to
threaten to separate from her.

He thinks if she does have relations,

after a while she will get used to it and like it.

Should he do that?

Why?

Should the husband get divorced in a case iike that?

Why or why not?

Under what conditions might divorce be the best solution?

Should the

law allow divorce only under these circumstances?

But he meets another girl and they

The husband doesn't get divorced.
have sexual relations.
woman in this case?

Was he wrong to have relations with another

Why or why not?

someone
Why is it (usually) wrong for a husband to have relations with
besides his wife?

es her
Is it the same for a wife to have relati)ns with someone besid
husband?

Why or why not?

outside
Do you consider sexual intercourse in marriage right but not
of marriage?

Why would that be?

marriage in which they
Suppose that the husband and wife have an open
ionships are OK if these
have mutually agreed that outside sexual relat
the same committment
outside sexual relationships are approached with
respect that exists within
to mutual growth and with the same measure of
the marriage.

Is this right?

Why or why not?

1S7
Story:

A man and a woman have a very ClOSO relationship.

Separated for

the summer. they grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about
each other.

One evenini, feeling again their former closeness and

attraction, they go further and further and have sexual intercourse.
But afterwards the doubts about the relationship return.

A few weeks

later the woman finds that she is pregnant.

What would be the right thing for them to do?

Why?

Why?

Who is responsible for making this decision?

What if they dis-

agree about the right thing to do?

She knows that she could arrange an abortion.
wrong for her to arrange an abortion?

Would it be right or

Why?

She considered having the baby and placing it for adoption as an
alternative to abortion.

Would that be the right thing to do?

Why?

The woman decided that she wants to get married and have the baby
it the man's responsibility to marry her?

Is

Why? (If no:) What is his

responsibility to her?

They decide that abortion is the best solution.

Why is ending the life

of an unborn baby different from ending any other human life?
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4hat about the child seriously defective it birth -would it be right
for the doctor to let it die?

Why?

Are there any conditions that might make abortions right (and wrong)?
What and why?

What if they were married and just didn't want the baby?

Why?

Would it make any difference if abortion was legal or illegal?
Should abortions be legalized?

Do

you think these issues about sex have anything to do with morality

and immorality?

What does the word moral mean,and what is its relation to sex?

Can you tell me something that you think is immoral in sex?

Why?

Is this immoral for all people everywhere or only in societies where
it is not accepted?

Story:

Why?

They

Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble.

were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money.
older one, broke into a store and stole $1,000.

Karl, the

Bob, the younger one,

went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town.

Bob told

operation.
the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the
the man
Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying

2S9
back.
money.

Although the man didn't bnow Rob very well, he loaned him the
SO they skipped town. Bob with SSOO and Karl with 11.000

Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob?

Why?

What is so bad about lying to people, in general?

Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?

What is the basic value or importance of property rights?

Which would

be worse in terms of society's welfare: cheating like

Bob or stealing like Karl?

Why?

Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob or stole like
Karl?

Why?

What do you mean by conscience?

What do you think of as your conscience

and what does it do?

What do the words morality or ethics mean to you?

Do you believe there is an objective right or wrong in morality or is
it a matter of personal opinion?

For instance, in the first story

some people say that Heinz should steal the drug. some say he shouldn't.
Do you think there is an objective right answer to that kind of question?
Explain.
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It was a common practice in some ancient societies to kill many of
their female babies.
right or wrong?

Can you say whether something like this is really,

That is

can one make valid moral judgments about a

practice in another society?

Explain

The following pages contain 15 sentences.

Read each statement

and assume that it has been made by a person with whom you are having
a conversation.

Then, on the line below each statement indicate what

your reaction would most likely be.

1.

The FBI has its hands tied in many cases because of the unreasonable opposition of some people to wire tapping.

2.

(Black speaker) Even after graduation from high school I can't
find work.

Yet I know many white dropouts who have good jobs.

3. The city is going to repeat what has been done in many other cities
by building a superhighway right through the slum district.

Many

apartments will be torn down and the people will be forced out.

4.

5.

Some boys had it so easy.

They went to college and got out

of the draft, and we got sent to Vietnam.

(Veteran speaking)

I told Jack my ideas for the new project.

He took them to the

boss and got the credit.

261
6.

The new housing law IS unfair.

Why should I be forced to take

in tenants that I feel are undesirable?

In many medical laboratories experiments are performed on live

7

animals and very little care is taken to minimize pain

8.

I read another story today about a girl who was refused an
abortion in a hospital.

An incompetent doctor gave her an

illegal abortion and she died

9.

I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners
on death row for so long, and to make the execution such an
elaborate ritual.

10.

The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend
and prosecute homosexuals.

Homosexuality threatens the founda-

tions of our society.

11.

The government shouldn't have passed the medicare bill.

Why

should we pay other people's doctor bills?

12.

A powerful group representing hunters and gun manufacturers
is holding Lp a gun control law that the majority of the people
in this country want.
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Several policemen

13.

were called into a OW art* to break up a street

s threw bricks at them
fight but when they arrived the local resident
from the windows.

a boy jump out
During last year's ghetto riots a shopowner saw

14.

vision set.
of the broken window of his store with a tele

The man

lt.
shot the boy, who is now crippled as a resu

15.

The police were rough

when they broke up that crowd of students.

a permit.
even though the students were parading without

out?
What do you think this test was trying to find

What comments do you have about this test?

Appoodta 0
Standardised Scoria, Form
Scorer

Cu.
Story 1:
Life:
Punishment:
Global:
Story 2:
Marital Sex:
Extramarital Sex:
Fixity:
Roles:
Power:
Global:
Story 3:
Laws killing:
Laws sex:
Value life:
Affection:
Conscience:
Civil liberties:
Power:
Global:
Story 4:
Property/Trust:
Conscience:
Global:
Overall Global:
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